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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Kesuvos 101


(a) According to Rebbi Eliezer, the sole regard in which the marriage of a Ketanah (married off by her mother or brothers) is considered valid - is that she requires Miy'un.
What does Rebbi Yehoshua say? In which sole regard is she not considered his full-fledged wife?

(b) How do we initially establish their Machlokes, by connecting it to that of Rav and Shmuel?

(c) We conclude however, that, according to Rebbi Eliezer, everyone agrees. What does this mean?

(d) In fact, Rav and Shmuel are arguing about how to interpret Rebbi Yehoshua. Shmuel, who holds that the marriage of a Ketanah who goes out with a Get *is valid*, will certainly hold like Rebbi Yehoshua.
How will Rav, who holds that it *is not*, reconcile his opinion with that of Rebbi Yehoshua?

(a) Why is 'Nechsei Tzon Barzel' called by that name?

(b) Rav Huna bar Chiya cites Rav Kahana in the name of Shmuel regarding the worn-out clothes, which, according to the Tana of our Mishnah, the three women do not receive.
What distinction does he make in this regard between Nechsei mi'Kug and Nechsei Tzon Barzel?

(c) Rav Papa queries this however. Why can it not refer to the case of Mema'enes when the clothes ...

  1. ... are available? Why should she receive them either way?
  2. ... are not available? Why should she not receive them in the case of Nechsei Tzon Barzel? ...
  3. ... Nechsei mi'Lug?
(d) And why can it not refer to the case of Aylonis when the clothes are no longer available (given that, when they are, she will receive them in either case, since there is no reason to penalize her)?
(a) We therefore conclude that Rav Kahana in the name of Shmuel was referring to the case of Sh'niyah 've'Kansu Rabbanan le'Dideih be'Didah, u'le'Didah be'Dideih'.
What does this mean? Why did Chazal differentiate in this way?

(b) Rav Shimi bar Ashi learns from an inference from Rav Kahana's Din that a coat is considered the principle (and not Peiros). From where does he learn this?

(c) What are the ramifications of Rav Shimi bar Ashi's statement?

(d) How do we reconcile this with Rav Nachman, who considers a coat Peiros, and the husband is permitted to wear it?

(a) Shmuel qualifies our Mishnah.
What does he say regarding the three women in our Mishnah?

(b) The Beraisa substantiates Shmuel.
What does the Tana say regarding women about whom Chazal said ...

  1. ... 'Ein Lahen Kesuvah'?
  2. ... 'Yotz'os she'Lo bi'Kesuvah'?
(c) What category of women does the latter comprise?
Answers to questions



(a) And what does the Tana of the Beraisa (as well as Rav Huna) say about a woman who goes out because she committed adultery?

(b) What did Rav Nachman say to the Beraisa expert who quoting a Beraisa, stated 'Zinsah, Hifsidah Bela'osehah Kayamin'?

(c) Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi Yochanan (who agrees in principle with the current opinion) establishes the Beraisa as it stands, like Rebbi Menachem S'timta'ah.
What does 'S'timta'ah' mean?

(d) How does Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi Yochanan conclude his statement?

(a) What did Rav Huna mean when he referred to an Aylonis as an 'Ishah ve'Einah Ishah', and an Almanah as an 'Ishah Gemurah'?

(b) What does Rav Yehudah say?

(a) What does the Tana of the Beraisa mean when he says 'Kansah be'Chezkas she'Hi Chein, ve'Hi Chein, Yesh Lah Kesuvah'?

(b) What do we infer from there? On whom does this pose a Kashya?

(c) Why can we not answer by changing the inference to 'Ha Kansah be'Chezkas she'Einah Kein (that they told him initially that she was a Besulah) ve'Nimtzeis she'Hi Chein (an Almanah), Ein Lah Kesuvah' (but S'tam, she does)?

(a) We also have another Beraisa, which specifically states 'Kansah S'tam, Ein Lah Kesuvah', proving Rav Huna wrong.
What is it in the presentation of the Mishnah which prompted Rav Huna's mistake?

(b) So how do we know that the same distinction that applies to Aylonis, applies to Almanah?

***** Hadran Alach Almanah Nizones *****

***** Perek ha'Nosei *****


(a) A husband undertakes to feed his wife's daughter for five years. He then divorces her within the five-year period, she remarries and her second husband makes the same undertaking.
Is the first husband still obligated to fulfill his undertaking?

(b) If the mother and daughter live far away, on whom lies the onus of transportation?

(c) Are the two husbands permitted to take turns to feed her, one month the one, and one month, the other?

(d) So what do they do ...

  1. ... under the current circumstances? Why does the daughter need two sets of Mezonos?
  2. ... in the event that the daughter then marries (still within the five-year period)?
(a) What would an astute husband add to the condition when he got married, to avoid the problem of having to provide his wife's daughter with Mezonos should they move to another town?

(b) What happens if both husbands die? What distinction will then be made between the way that their daughter is fed and the way that her daughter is fed?

(c) Why is that?

(a) What will be the Din if someone admits that he owes his friend money in the presence of two ...
  1. ... designated witnesses?
  2. ... witnesses whom he did not designate?
(b) In which case then, do Rebbi Yochanan (who says that if someone admits to owing his friend a Manah, he is Chayav) and Resh Lakish (who says that he is not), argue?

(c) According to Rebbi Yochanan, may he claim even from Meshubadim, or is his claim confined to B'nei Chorin?

(d) How do we reconcile Resh Lakish's opinion with the Mishnah in ha'Ishah she'Nisarmelah 'Hotzi Alav K'sav Yado she'Hu Chayav Lo, Govah mi'Nechasim B'nei Chorin'?

Answers to questions

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