(Permission is granted to print and redistribute this material
as long as this header and the footer at the end are included.)


prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

Previous daf

Kesuvos 59


(a) How will ...
  1. ... Rav Ada bar Ahavah amend the Beraisa 'Tiknu Mezonos Tachas Ma'asehYadehah'?
  2. ... Rav and Shmuel amend the Beraisa 'Im Eino Nosen Lah Ma'ah Kesefle'Tzorchehah, Ma'aseh Yadehah she'Lah'?
(b) How can the latter Beraisa pertain to Mosar, when the Tana goes on to state the amount that the woman is obligated to produce?
(a) The Tana Kama in the Mishnah in Kidushin states that if a married woman declares the work of her hands, a Konem, her husband *does not need to nullify* her Neder.
Why not?

(b) On what grounds does Rebbi Akiva maintains that he *does*?

(c) Shmuel rules like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who rules like Rebbi Akiva, but for a different reason.
What is his reason?

(d) Shmuel also rules like Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar in our Mishnah. Considering that, on the previous Amud, Shmuel agreed with Rav (that, when Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar considers the Mosar of a woman whose husband declared the work of her hands Hekdesh, he is referring to the Mosar after her death), why do Shmuel's two rulings appear contradictory?

(a) We try to reconcile Shmuel's two rulings by establishing his ruling like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri by Ha'adafah (Mosar).
Why in fact, does this not really answer the question?

(b) Besides that, we object to this answer because, if that is so, Shmuel should have said 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri le'Ha'adafah' (seeing as even Shmuel will agree that Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri himself does not speak exclusively about Ha'adafah).
In which other two ways might he have issued his ruling?

(c) Rav Yosef resolves the contradiction in Shmuel's rulings, by pointing out that Konamos (which are the topic discussed by the Mishnah in Kidushin) are different.
In what way are Konamos unique, that we should extend their uniqueness to cover 'Davar she'Lo Bo le'Olam'?

(d) How does Abaye refute Rav Yosef's answer? Why might one be able to forbid someone else's things on oneself exclusively, but not a Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam?

(a) So Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua establishes the Mishnah in Kidushin when she declares Hekdesh, not her Ma'aseh Yadayim, but her hands (with regard to what they produce).
What objection do we raise to that?

(b) We also object to the suggestion that she does not declare them Hekdesh now, only after she is divorced, on the grounds that something that one does not want to declare Hekdesh immediately, one cannot now declare Hekdesh for later either.
How does Rebbi Yirmiyah differentiate between this case and that of Rebbi Ila'a, who rules that if someone declares Hekdesh a field that he is about to sell to his friend, but that the Hekdesh should only come into effect after he has bought it back from his friend, the Hekdesh is indeed effective?

(c) What is the Din if someone declares Hekdesh a field that he just sold to his friend for the Hekdesh to take effect the moment he buys it back?

(d) How does Rav Papa differentiate between that case and ours?

Answers to questions



(a) So we try to compare our case to a case where a person declares Hekdesh a field that he gave to his friend as collateral for a loan the moment he redeems it. There the Hekdesh is valid.
On what grounds ...
  1. ... does Rav Shisha Brei de'Rav Idi differentiate between that case and ours?
  2. ... do we then differentiate between our case and that of a case similar to the previous one, only when the owner fixed the collateral for ten years time (in which case he cannot redeem it until then)?
(b) We finally establish Shmuel's ruling like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri on the grounds that Konamos are different, like Rava.
What does Rava say about Hekdesh?

(c) Which kind of Hekdesh is he referring to?

(d) Why is this not considered stealing from the creditor?

(a) Which other two cases have the power to remove the Shibud?

(b) If that is Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri's reasoning, why did he say that the Konam takes effect only after the woman is divorced? Why not immediately?

(a) What do the following Melachos have in common: grinding, baking, washing clothes, cooking and feeding one's baby? (b) Which other two Melachos belong in this list?

(c) From which three Melachos is she exempt in the event that she brings a Shifchah Kena'anis into the marriage?

(d) If she brings in two Shefachos, she is also exempt from cooking and feeding her baby.
What happens if she brings in ...

  1. ... three?
  2. ... four?
(a) According to Rebbi Eliezer, she is never exempt from manufacturing woolen clothes (even if she brings in a hundred Shefachos).
Why is that?

(b) What does Rebbi Shimon ben Gamliel say about someone who makes a Neder forbidding his wife from working?

(a) The word 'Tochenes' used by the Tana for 'grinding', appears to be incorrect, because it is not the woman who actually grinds, but the water which turns the wheel, which in turn, operates the mill.
So how do we amend the Lashon 'Tochenes'?

(b) What does 'Mat'chenes comprise?

(c) What alternative explanation do we give which leaves the Lashon 'Tochenes' intact?

(a) The author of our Mishnah cannot be the Tana quoted by Rebbi Chiya in a Beraisa. What does that Tana give as the main objective of a woman that will clash with some of the things mentioned by the Tana of our Mishnah (see Tosfos DH 'Tani')?

(b) Rebbi Chiya lists this objective together with having children.
What else does he add to the list in a second Beraisa?

(c) If a man wants to enhance his wife's looks, he should dress her in linen clothes (though this, as well as other statements made in this Sugya, are not necessarily true today).
What should he do for his daughter (besides feeding her young birds) to make her look prettier?

(a) According to Beis Hillel in a Beraisa, if a woman made a Neder not to feed her baby, we nevertheless force her to do so. What do Beis Shamai say?

(b) Once she is divorced however, Beis Hillel concede that her Neder stands and must be kept.
Under which circumstances will Beis Hillel agree with Beis Shamai even whilst they are married? What is then the Halachah?

(c) We try to establish the Beraisa when the woman made the Neder but her husband upheld it.
How would that enable us to establish our Mishnah like Beis Shamai?

(a) We conclude however, that Beis Shamai cannot be the author of our Mishnah, because if their bone of contention is really *who* is responsible for a Neder that the wife made and the husband upheld, then they should have argued in a straight case of Kesuvah.
What would then have been their Machlokes? What would be the case?

(b) On what other basis do we reject the possibility of establishing our Mishnah like Beis Shamai?

Answers to questions

Next daf


For further information on
subscriptions, archives and sponsorships,
contact Kollel Iyun Hadaf,