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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Kesuvos 101



(a) According to Rebbi Eliezer, the sole regard in which the marriage of a Ketanah (married off by her mother or brothers) is considered valid - is that she requires Miy'un. Rebbi Yehoshua says - that her husband acquires all the rights that he would if she was a Gedolah: he acquires her findngs and what she produces, he has the right to nullify her vows, he inherits her upon her death and is obligated to bury her (though not if he is a Kohen - unless she is considered a Meis Mitzvah, since nobody else will want to do it). The sole area in which she is not his full-fledged wife is that Miy'un is effective.

(b) Initially, we establish their Machlokes, by connecting it to that of Rav and Shmuel - Rebbi Eliezer holds that the marriage of a Ketanah who is married off by her mother or brothers is not valid (like Rav); whereas Rebbi Yehoshua holds that it is (like Shmuel).

(c) We conclude however, that, according to Rebbi Eliezer, everyone agrees - meaning that even Shmuel has to concede that, according to Rebbi Eliezer, the marriage of a Ketanah who is married off by her mother or brothers is not valid (like Rav). Because, if the marriage is invalid with regard to the rights that go from the woman to the man, then how much more with regard to the rights that go from the man to the woman.

(d) In fact, Rav and Shmuel are arguing about how to interpret Rebbi Yehoshua. Shmuel, who holds that the marriage of a Ketanah who goes out with a Get is valid, will certainly hold like Rebbi Yehoshua. But even Rav, who holds that it is not, will explain that it is only with regard to the rights that go from the woman to the man that Rebbi Yehoshua validates her marriage, but when it comes to the rights that go from the man to the woman, he will agree that her marriage is ineffective, like Rav himself maintains.

(a) 'Nechsei Tzon Barzel' is called by that name - due to the fact that they are like sheep (which are generally considered a lucrative business) of iron (which is long-lasting), because the husband takes responsibility for them.

(b) Rav Huna bar Chiya cites Rav Kahana in the name of Shmuel regarding the worn-out clothes, which, according to the Tana of our Mishnah, the three women do not receive. That he says, pertains to Nechsei mi'Lug but not to Nechsei Tzon Barzel, which she does receive.

(c) Rav Papa queries this however. It cannot refer to the case of Mema'enes when the clothes ...

1. ... *are* available - because then, either way, she ought to receive them, seeing as there is no reason to penalize her.
2. ... are *not* available. She should not receive them in the case of ... Nechsei Tzon Barzel - because, since he married her legally, he was entitled to wear the clothes.
3. ... Nechsei mi'Lug - because he can argue that, until she dies, he is not obligated to return them, seeing as she may die first, in which case, he will inherit her.
(d) And why can it not refer to the case of Aylonis (given that, if the clothes are available, she would receive them in either case since there is no reason to penalize her) when they no longer available - because then, the reverse should be the case (the Nechsei mi'Lug, which are in *her possession*, she ought to receive, whereas the Nichsei Tzon Barzel, which are in *his*, she ought not.
(a) We therefore conclude that Rav Kahana in the name of Shmuel was referring to the case of Sh'niyah 've'Kansu Rabbanan le'Didei be'Didah, u'le'Didah be'Didei' - which means that Chazal penalized her with what should have been claimed from him (the Kesuvah, Mezonos and the worn-out clothes), and him with what should have come from her (Nechsei Tzon Barzel).

(b) Rav Shimi bar Ashi infers from Rav Kahana's Din that a coat is considered the principle (and not Peiros) - that it is only a Sh'niyah (who sinned), who cannot not claim the worn-out clothes that are no longer available, but that a Kasher woman can (though this would not be the case if wearing the clothes was considered Peiros).

(c) The ramifications of Rav Shimi bar Ashi's statement are - that the husband should not wear the garments of Nechsei mi'Lug, but is obligated to sell them and to buy Karka whose fruit he subsequently eats.

(d) Rav Nachman, who considers a coat Peiros (in which case, the husband is permitted to wear it) - disagrees with Rav Shimi bar Ashi.

(a) Shmuel, qualifying our Mishnah says - that the three women in our Mishnah only lose Manah or Masayim, but not the Tosefes.

(b) The Beraisa substantiates Shmuel. The Tana says that women about whom Chazal said ...

1. ... 'Ein Lahen Kesuvah' - do not lose the Tosefes.
2. ... 'Yotz'os she'Lo bi'Kesuvah' - do.
(c) The latter category comprises - women who transgressed 'Das Moshe ve'Yehudis' (as the Mishnah explained above 72a.).



(a) The Tana of the Beraisa (as well as Rav Huna) says that a woman who goes out because she committed adultery - may take the Nechsei mi'Lug that are still available.

(b) When the Beraisa expert quoted a Beraisa which stated 'Zinsah, Hifsidah Bela'osehah Kayamin' - Rav Nachman corrected him on the grounds that even if the woman sinned, her clothes did not. So the Beraisa must be amended to read 'Zinsah, Lo Hifsidah Bela'osehah Kayamin'.

(c) Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi Yochanan (who agrees in principle with the current opinion) establishes the Beraisa as it stands, like Rebbi Menachem S'timta'ah - which means that many of his opinions appear in S'tam Mishnahs and Beraisos.

(d) Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi Yochanan concludes - 'Aval Chachamim Omrim, Zinsah, Hifsidah Bela'osehah Kayamin'.

(a) When Rav Huna referred to an Aylonis as an 'Ishah ve'Einah Ishah', and an Almanah as an 'Ishah Gemurah', he meant to say - that whereas an Aylonis only receives a Kesuvah if her husband knew when he married her that she was an Aylonis, an Almanah receives a Kesuvah (of a Manah) whether he knew that she was an Almanah, or not.

(b) According to Rav Yehudah - an Almanah, like an Aylonis, only receives a Kesuvah if her husband knew when he married her, that she was an Almanah.

(a) When the Tana of the Beraisa says 'Kansah be'Chezkas she'Hi Chein, ve'Hi Chein, Yesh Lah Kesuvah' - he means to say that an Almanah receives a Kesuvah if her husband knew that she was an Almanah when he married her.

(b) We can infer from there - that if he did not know, she does not receive a Kesuvah (a Kashya on Rav Huna).

(c) We cannot answer by changing the inference to 'Ha Kansah be'Chezkas she'Einah Kein (that they told him that she was a Besulah) ve'Nimtzeis she'Hi Chein (an Almanah), Ein Lah Kesuvah' (but S'tam, she does) - because then, the Tana should have rather presented the case of 'Kansah S'tam ... ' (rather than that of 'Kansah be'Chezkas she'Hi Kein ... ').

(a) We also have another Beraisa, which specifically states 'Kansah S'tam, Ein Lah Kesuvah', proving Rav Huna wrong. What prompted Rav Huna's mistake - was the fact that when the Tana of our Mishnah stated 'Nas'ah le'Shem Aylonis, Yesh Lah Kesuvah' (from which we can deduce 'Ha S'tam, Ein Lah Kesuvah'), he did not include Almanah in that statement.

(b) In fact, we know that the same distinction that applies to Aylonis, applies to Almanah - because immediately afterwards, he begins to talk about an Almanah, hinting that the same Din that applies to an Aylonis also applies to an Almanah.

***** Hadran Alach Almanah Nizones *****

***** Perek ha'Nosei *****


(a) A husband undertakes to feed his wife's daughter for five years. He then divorces her within the five-year period, she remarries and her second husband makes the same undertaking. Nevertheless - the first husband remains obligated to fulfill his undertaking.

(b) If the mother and daughter live far away - the onus of transportation lies on the husband.

(c) The two husbands - are not permitted to take turns to feed her, one month the one, and one month, the other. Both obligations apply in full force.

(d) What they do ...

1. ... under the current circumstances is - that one of them feeds her, whilst the other one, gives her money.
2. ... in the event that the daughter then marries (still within the five-year period) is - that her husband provides her with Mezonos, whilst the two husbands of her mother give her money.
(a) To avoid the problem of having to provide his wife's daughter with Mezonos should they move to another town after the divorce - an astute husband would add the words 'Kol Z'man she'At Imi'.

(b) Should both husbands die - their own daughter is fed from B'nei Chorin, and her daughter, from Meshubadim.

(c) This is because the latter, who has a Sh'tar of claim, is like a creditor, whereas their daughter does not.

(a) If someone admits that he owes his friend money in the presence of two ...
1. ... designated witnesses - he is obligated to pay.
2. ... witnesses whom he did not designate - he is not.
(b) Rebbi Yochanan (who says that if someone admits to owing his friend a Manah, he is Chayav) and Resh Lakish (who says that he is not), argue - in a case where he does not designate witnesses, but where, the debtor issues the creditor with a Sh'tar instead.

(c) According to Rebbi Yochanan, his claim is confined to B'nei Chorin.

(d) We reconcile Resh Lakish's opinion with the Mishnah in ha'Ishah she'Nisarmelah 'Hotzi Alav K'sav Yado she'Hu Chayav Lo, Govah mi'Nechasim B'nei Chorin' - by establishing the Mishnah where the debtor signed his name at the foot of the Sh'tar, whereas the Machlokes between Rebbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish speaks where he did not (an unsigned I.O.U.).

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