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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Kesuvos 86

KESUVOS 86 - Sponsored anonymously in honor of Brian and Bailey Sigman, on the occasion of the birth of their baby girl.



(a) We quoted earlier Shmuel's ruling that if a creditor who sold a Sh'tar Chov (a document of debt) subsequently absolved the debtor, the latter is Patur from paying the purchaser. An astute purchaser might avoid this problem - by paying the debtor to write a Sh'tar Chov on what he owes him, before it enters the latter's mind to plot with the creditor.

(b) There is a Machlokes whether Beis-Din will claim 'Dina de'Garmi' - the obligation to pay for certain damages that one person causes another.

(c) Those who do not hold of Dina de'Garmi say that, in our case, the purchaser may claim the value of the paper - by which he means that the debtor is not obligated to pay anything, seeing as the purchaser already has the document in his possession.

(d) Rav Ashi, it seems, did not initially hold of 'Dina de'Garmi' - until Rafram overwhelmed him with proofs that one is Chayav to fully reimburse the losses that he caused.

(a) Ameimar said in the name of Rav Chama that, if someone died, leaving land and money, and a wife's Kesuvah and a debt that needed to be settled - one pays the creditor with land (which became Meshubad to him when he lent the debtor), and his wife with money (which is her main claim - seeing as she did not lend him anything).

(b) If he only left one field, which did not suffice to pay both, it is the creditor who gets precedence - so as not to close the door to all potential borrowers (which does not apply so much to a woman, who wants to get married even more than a man does).

(c) The woman will nevertheless have the first claim - if her document preceded the creditor's (whilst Rav Chama is speaking when both documents are dated on the same day).

(a) When Rav Papa asked Rav Chama whether he had issued a ruling in the name of Rava, that we force the debtor to sell his land in order to pay the creditor money - he replied in the negative.

(b) Such a ruling would have been incorrect - because, as we just saw, a creditor relies on land, and that is what he expects to receive. Consequently, under normal circumstances, there would be no reason for the debtor to sell land so as to pay the creditor money.

(c) Rava nevertheless ruled like that with regard to a specific case - because the debtor there tried to cheat by pretending that his money belonged to a Nochri. So they penalized him by forcing him to sell his land and pay the creditor money ('Hu Asah she'Lo Kehogen, Lefichach Asu Bo she'Lo Kehogen').

(a) Rav Papa maintains that the repayment of a loan is a Mitzvah - that of "Hin Tzedek", keeping one's word (Kedoshim).

(b) Rav Kahana asked Rav Papa what would happen if the debtor refused to perform it. He replied - that for contravening a La'av, one receives thirty-nine Malkos (as a punishment), but for refusing to perform an Asei, Beis-Din beat him (as an inducement) until he condescends to comply.




(a) According to the first Lashon, if a man gives his wife a Get to take effect in thirty days time, and the Get is then lying at the side of the street - Rav Chisda rules that she is not divorced (because the side of a street cannot acquire for a person - unless he actually picks up the object there).

(b) He derives this from Rav and Shmuel - who said (above) that whoever acquires the detached fruit from the Reshus ha'Rabim acquires it. And he assumes that the side of the street has the same Din as the Reshus ha'Rabim itself.

(c) We try do counter our original proof from Rav and Shmuel, with Rav Nachman, who says that someone who makes a Meshichah on a cow to acquire it in thirty days time acquires it, even if it standing in a meadow at that time - and we assume that the side of the street is equivalent to a meadow.

(d) We refute this counter-proof - by differentiating between a meadow (which does acquire for the owner) and the side of the street (which does not).

6) In the second Lashon, Rav Chisda begins by proving from Rav Nachman that the sides of the Reshus ha'Rabim are similar to a meadow. We then refute the counter-proof from Rav and Shmuel, who hold that the street does not acquire for a person - by differentiating between the street itself (which does not acquire for a person) and the sides of the street (which do).


(a) The Tana of our Mishnah says that a man who places his wife in charge of his shop or appoints her to be an administrator - has the right to make her swear whenever he pleases.

(b) Rebbi Eliezer adds that he may even make her swear on her knitting and on her dough. Perhaps he is referring to a Gilgul Shevu'ah - in which case he would mean that whenever he demands an oath from her regarding her administrating or store-keeping, he can make her add that she has not kept any of her knitting or baking either (though he cannot make her swear on these independently).

(c) The Rabbanan will hold however - that Gilgul Shevu'ah only applies when the basic Shevu'ah is d'Oraysa, but not in this instance, where it is only mi'de'Rabbanan.

(d) Alternatively - Rebbi Eliezer authorizes the husband to demand even an independent oath on her knitting and baking (whereas the Rabbanan consider that too petty to accede to such demands. They both agree though, that he *does* have the right to demand a Gilgul Shevu'ah).

(a) We attempt to resolve the She'eilah in Rebbi Eliezer's statement from the Rabbanan's retort 'Ein Adam Dar im Nachash bi'Kefifah Achas' - which makes good sense if Rebbi Eliezer obligates her to swear an independent Shevu'ah, even for such trivial demands, but not if he is talking about a Gilgul Shevu'ah, seeing as she has to swear anyway.

(b) We reject this proof on the grounds that - even if Rebbi Eliezer is referring to Gilgul Shevu'ah, she can claim that she cannot live with a man who takes her so much to task, and who neither trusts her nor loves her.

(c) We finally resolve the She'eilah from a Beraisa - which specifically cites their Machlokes with regard to making her swear independently on her knitting and baking.

(a) Once the husband writes for his wife 'Ein Li Neder u'Shevu'ah', he can no longer force her to swear. He can however, demand a Shevu'ah from her heirs or from those who come on her account (unless he specifically includes them in the exemption).
The Shevu'ah that he demands from her heirs (in the event that he divorced her before she died, and they come to collect her Kesuvah) is - that their mother did not inform them at any time before her death, nor did they discover any documented evidence to the effect that the Kesuvah had already been paid.

(b) By 'those who come on her account' - the Tana means someone who purchased her Kesuvah.

(c) Even his heirs will not be permitted to demand a Shevu'ah from her, from her heirs or from those who come on her account - if he specifically inserts into the exemption 'Ein Li ve'Lo le'Yorshai, ve'Lo le'Ba'im bi'Reshusi ... '.

(a) The Tana continues that, if she went directly from burying her husband to her father's house or to her home without undertaking to become his heirs' administrator, they cannot make her swear. The Tana is speaking about the same case as he discussed earlier - when her husband had previously exempted her from a Shevu'ah.

(b) If she did undertake to administrate their affairs - they are entitled to make her swear on anything to do with her administration from then on, but not to what concerns the past.

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