ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kesuvos 86
KESUVOS 86 - Sponsored anonymously in honor of Brian and Bailey Sigman, on
the occasion of the birth of their baby girl.
(a) We quoted earlier Shmuel's ruling that if a creditor who sold a Sh'tar
Chov (a document of debt) subsequently absolved the debtor, the latter is
Patur from paying the purchaser. An astute purchaser might avoid this
problem - by paying the debtor to write a Sh'tar Chov on what he owes him,
before it enters the latter's mind to plot with the creditor.
(b) There is a Machlokes whether Beis-Din will claim 'Dina de'Garmi' - the
obligation to pay for certain damages that one person causes another.
(c) Those who do not hold of Dina de'Garmi say that, in our case, the
purchaser may claim the value of the paper - by which he means that the
debtor is not obligated to pay anything, seeing as the purchaser already has
the document in his possession.
(d) Rav Ashi, it seems, did not initially hold of 'Dina de'Garmi' - until
Rafram overwhelmed him with proofs that one is Chayav to fully reimburse the
losses that he caused.
(a) Ameimar said in the name of Rav Chama that, if someone died, leaving
land and money, and a wife's Kesuvah and a debt that needed to be settled -
one pays the creditor with land (which became Meshubad to him when he lent
the debtor), and his wife with money (which is her main claim - seeing as
she did not lend him anything).
(b) If he only left one field, which did not suffice to pay both, it is the
creditor who gets precedence - so as not to close the door to all potential
borrowers (which does not apply so much to a woman, who wants to get married
even more than a man does).
(c) The woman will nevertheless have the first claim - if her document
preceded the creditor's (whilst Rav Chama is speaking when both documents
are dated on the same day).
(a) When Rav Papa asked Rav Chama whether he had issued a ruling in the name
of Rava, that we force the debtor to sell his land in order to pay the
creditor money - he replied in the negative.
(b) Such a ruling would have been incorrect - because, as we just saw, a
creditor relies on land, and that is what he expects to receive.
Consequently, under normal circumstances, there would be no reason for the
debtor to sell land so as to pay the creditor money.
(c) Rava nevertheless ruled like that with regard to a specific case -
because the debtor there tried to cheat by pretending that his money
belonged to a Nochri. So they penalized him by forcing him to sell his land
and pay the creditor money ('Hu Asah she'Lo Kehogen, Lefichach Asu Bo she'Lo
(a) Rav Papa maintains that the repayment of a loan is a Mitzvah - that of
"Hin Tzedek", keeping one's word (Kedoshim).
(b) Rav Kahana asked Rav Papa what would happen if the debtor refused to
perform it. He replied - that for contravening a La'av, one receives
thirty-nine Malkos (as a punishment), but for refusing to perform an Asei,
Beis-Din beat him (as an inducement) until he condescends to comply.
(a) According to the first Lashon, if a man gives his wife a Get to take
effect in thirty days time, and the Get is then lying at the side of the
street - Rav Chisda rules that she is not divorced (because the side of a
street cannot acquire for a person - unless he actually picks up the object
In the second Lashon, Rav Chisda begins by proving from Rav Nachman that the
sides of the Reshus ha'Rabim are similar to a meadow. We then refute the
counter-proof from Rav and Shmuel, who hold that the street does not acquire
for a person - by differentiating between the street itself (which does not
acquire for a person) and the sides of the street (which do).
(b) He derives this from Rav and Shmuel - who said (above) that whoever
acquires the detached fruit from the Reshus ha'Rabim acquires it. And he
assumes that the side of the street has the same Din as the Reshus ha'Rabim
(c) We try do counter our original proof from Rav and Shmuel, with Rav
Nachman, who says that someone who makes a Meshichah on a cow to acquire it
in thirty days time acquires it, even if it standing in a meadow at that
time - and we assume that the side of the street is equivalent to a meadow.
(d) We refute this counter-proof - by differentiating between a meadow
(which does acquire for the owner) and the side of the street (which does
(a) The Tana of our Mishnah says that a man who places his wife in charge of
his shop or appoints her to be an administrator - has the right to make her
swear whenever he pleases.
(b) Rebbi Eliezer adds that he may even make her swear on her knitting and
on her dough. Perhaps he is referring to a Gilgul Shevu'ah - in which case
he would mean that whenever he demands an oath from her regarding her
administrating or store-keeping, he can make her add that she has not kept
any of her knitting or baking either (though he cannot make her swear on
(c) The Rabbanan will hold however - that Gilgul Shevu'ah only applies when
the basic Shevu'ah is d'Oraysa, but not in this instance, where it is only
(d) Alternatively - Rebbi Eliezer authorizes the husband to demand even an
independent oath on her knitting and baking (whereas the Rabbanan consider
that too petty to accede to such demands. They both agree though, that he
*does* have the right to demand a Gilgul Shevu'ah).
(a) We attempt to resolve the She'eilah in Rebbi Eliezer's statement from
the Rabbanan's retort 'Ein Adam Dar im Nachash bi'Kefifah Achas' - which
makes good sense if Rebbi Eliezer obligates her to swear an independent
Shevu'ah, even for such trivial demands, but not if he is talking about a
Gilgul Shevu'ah, seeing as she has to swear anyway.
(b) We reject this proof on the grounds that - even if Rebbi Eliezer is
referring to Gilgul Shevu'ah, she can claim that she cannot live with a man
who takes her so much to task, and who neither trusts her nor loves her.
(c) We finally resolve the She'eilah from a Beraisa - which specifically
cites their Machlokes with regard to making her swear independently on her
knitting and baking.
(a) Once the husband writes for his wife 'Ein Li Neder u'Shevu'ah', he can
no longer force her to swear. He can however, demand a Shevu'ah from her
heirs or from those who come on her account (unless he specifically includes
them in the exemption).
The Shevu'ah that he demands from her heirs (in the
event that he divorced her before she died, and they come to collect her
Kesuvah) is - that their mother did not inform them at any time before her
death, nor did they discover any documented evidence to the effect that the
Kesuvah had already been paid.
(b) By 'those who come on her account' - the Tana means someone who
purchased her Kesuvah.
(c) Even his heirs will not be permitted to demand a Shevu'ah from her, from
her heirs or from those who come on her account - if he specifically inserts
into the exemption 'Ein Li ve'Lo le'Yorshai, ve'Lo le'Ba'im bi'Reshusi ...
(a) The Tana continues that, if she went directly from burying her husband
to her father's house or to her home without undertaking to become his
heirs' administrator, they cannot make her swear. The Tana is speaking about
the same case as he discussed earlier - when her husband had previously
exempted her from a Shevu'ah.
(b) If she did undertake to administrate their affairs - they are entitled
to make her swear on anything to do with her administration from then on,
but not to what concerns the past.