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Kesuvos 81

KESUVOS 81 - dedicated by S. Teichman, l'Zecher Nishmas his father, Reb Avrohom ben Reb Shmuel Teichman.



(a) Rava queries the previous ruling (that the Yavam who inherits the Yevamah's Kesuvah, is obligated to bury her) - on the grounds that, due to the fact that he only receives the Manah, Masayim, and not the Nechsei Tzon Barzel, the Yavam can argue that he is inheriting his brother, and not the Yevamah.

(b) When Abaye counters 'de'Ba'in Alav mi'Sh'nei Tzedadim' - he means to say that Beis-Din can reply 'Either you bury her or you pay her Kesuvah (like he would have been obligated to do, had she died after they were married).

(c) Rava explains that his Kashya was really based on the principle 'Lo Nitnah Kesuvah li'Gevos me'Chayim' - which we learn from the Sh'tar Kesuvah, where it is written that only when she is fit to marry (after her husband's death) can she claim her Kesuvah (but not in the lifetime of her husband).

(d) We answer Rava's Kashya by establishing the principle 'Lo Nitnah Kesuvah li'Gevos me'Chayim' according to Beis Shamai (because they are the one's who Darshan from the wording of Kesuvah - from which we learn this principle, as we just explained) - and Beis Shamai also happen to hold 'Sh'tar ha'Omed li'Gevos ke'Gavuy Dami' (a substantiated document is considered as if it had already been claimed), in which case, the Kesuvah is in the Chazakah of the Yevamah, in which case it is from her that the Yavam inherits it, not from his brother.

(a) According to Beis Shamai, if the husband of a Sotah dies before his wife has had a chance to drink the Mei Sotah, the Sotah claims her Kesuvah and *does not need to drink* - because the Torah writes in Naso "ve'Heivi ha'Ish es Ishto", which he cannot do once he is dead.

(b) In view of this D'rashah (with which Beis Hillel cannot help but agree), we amend Beis Hillel, who say 'O Shosos O Notlos Kesuvah' - to read 'Mitoch she'Lo Shosos, Lo Notlos Kesuvah'.

(c) Beis Hillel's reason is based on the principle 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah'. Beis Shamai - holds 'Sh'tar ha'Omed li'Gevos ke'Gavuy Dami', as we explained above, in which case the woman is considered a Muchzak in the Kesuvah, not a Motzi.

(d) Abaye learned earlier that we force the Yavam from two directions. Despite the fact that she is not free to marry anyone other than the Yavam, we adhere to the Lashon of the Kesuvah, which explicitly states 'ke'she'Tinas'i *le'Acher* Titli Mah she'Kasuv Lechi' - because the Yavam is also called 'Acher'.

(a) When Rebbi Aba (alias Rav) asked Sumchus what a Yavam (after Yibum) should do to enable him to sell his brother's property, assuming the Yavam was ...
1. ... a Kohen - he replied that he should make a party and take the opportunity to persuade her to allow him to sell.
2. ... a Yisrael - he replied that he should divorce her and take her back.
(b) In the latter case, it makes no difference whether he pays her the Kesuvah and sells what he wants before taking her back, or whether he takes her straight back, and writes her a fresh Kesuvah stipulating that whatever he has bought or will buy is all Meshubad towards her Kesuvah (see Tosfos DH 'Megarshah').

(c) Despite the fact that the Yevamah will anyway be able to claim from the fields that he sells (as we shall see later on Daf 95b.) she can nevertheless stop him from selling them, using the argument that she does not want the trouble of going to Beis-Din (to extract the property from the buyer).

(d) Rava asked Abaye from this Beraisa on what he said earlier (that according to Beis Hillel, the Kesuvah of a Yevamah can be claimed in the lifetime of the Yavam) - because according to him, why did the Tana not permit him to designate some property towards her Kesuvah and sell the rest?

(a) Rava did not ask the same Kashya from the Tana of our Mishnah (which forbids a Yavam to tell the Yevamah that her Kesuvah is lying on the table) - because there, Abaye could have answered simply that the Tana was merely offering the Yavam a piece of advice (to avoid having to write her another Kesuvah. See Tosfos DH 'Ela'); whereas in the case of Rebbi Aba, where the Yavam is advised to divorce the Yevamah, it would surely make more sense to avoid the stigma by designating a field for the Kesuvah.

(b) We prove this answer from the Seifa, where the Tana states the same Halachah with regard to a husband and his wife - and where we know from Bava Basra that, with the exception of one of three fields (that he specified in her Kesuvah), he is permitted to sell his property (due to the fact that he stipulated in the Kesuvah that whatever he bought or would buy in the future, was designated towards her Kesuvah).

(c) Abaye repudiates Rava's Kashya from Rebbi Aba's Beraisa - on the grounds that designating a specific field for the Yevamah's Kesuvah will evoke her suspicions that he wants to divorce her, causing her to hate him; whereas divorcing her with the express intention of taking her back, will not, because she will realize that he is doing this only because he wants to sell the rest of the property.




(a) That man from Pumbedisa prepared to throw a Get to his Yevamah - to prevent his older brother (who had first rights) from performing Yibum with her (and from thereby inheriting all of his deceased brother's property).

(b) His older brother appeased him - by promising him half of their deceased brother's inheritance, and even went so far as to make a Kinyan to that effect.

(c) The Beraisa states - that a Yavam is forbidden to sell his deceased brother's property, even if it is worth a *hundred* Manah, and the Yevamah's Kesuvah is worth only *one*.

(d) Based on this Beraisa - Rav Yosef ruled that if a Yavam did sell any of his brother's property, the sale is invalid, and that consequently, the older brother's gift to his younger brother of half the deceased brother's property was invalid.

(a) We learned in a Mishnah (on Daf 78a.) that if a woman inherited property after her betrothal, Beis Shamai permit her to sell it, but Beis Hillel do not. In the event that she sold it however - Beis Hillel concede that her sale is valid.

(b) If so, Abaye asked Rav Yosef - how can he deduce from the Beraisa which forbids a Yavam to sell his deceased brother's property, that if he did sell it, the sale must be invalid?

(c) When Rav Chanina bar Papi sent his approval of Rav Yosef's ruling - Abaye pointed out that his approval had not come with a proof.

(a) Rav Minyumi Brei de'Rav Nichumi sent a message that he agreed with Abaye - adding that, should Rav Yosef have any further proof for his opinion, they should let him know.

(b) Rav Yosef took up the challenge and discovered a Beraisa. The Beraisa says that despite the fact that he is brother's heir, a Yavam who is also his brother's creditor - may not assume full ownership of the property, but must buy with it land (for his wife's Kesuvah) from which he eats the Peiros.

(c) Abaye refutes Rav Yosef's proof from there - on the grounds that the Tana is only presenting the Yavam with a sound piece of advice, to ensure that he retains his inheritance, rather than squander the money and lose it all.

(d) When Rav Yosef proved his point from the Lashon of the Beraisa 'Motzi'in mi'Yavam', implying that we do so even against his will, they sent word to Rav Minyumi Brei de'Rav Tivyumi. He quoted Rav Yosef bar Minyumi who quoted Rav Nachman - who said that the word 'Motzi'in' was inserted erroneously and should be erased.

(a) We try to establish the basis of Rav Nachman's ruling to erase 'Motzi'in' from the above Beraisa. We rule out the suggestion that it is because Metaltelin *are not Meshubad towards a Kesuvah* - because the author might be Rebbi Meir, in whose opinion *they are*.

(b) Establishing the Beraisa like Rebbi Meir would help Rav Yosef, despite the fact that the Halachah is not Rebbi Meir anyway - because whereas the Chachamim may well argue with him regarding Metaltelin, we do not find that they also argue with the statement 'Motzi'in', which is the point Rav Yosef is making.

(c) We rule out the suggestion that he erases 'Motzi'in' because he can say to the Yevamah 'You are *my brother's* creditor, not *mine*, because of a statement of Rebbi Nasan in a Beraisa - who learns from the Pasuk "ve'Nasan la'Asher Asham Lo", that if Reuven owes Shimon money and Shimon owes Levi, Levi has the right to claim directly Reuven, as if he was *his* debtor. In our case too, using the same argument, the Yavam becomes the Yevamah's debtor.

(d) Rav Nachman erased 'Motzi'in' from the Beraisa - on the grounds that, seeing as Kesuvah is only mi'de'Rabbanan, we do not find a Tana who applies two stringrencies with regard to it. Consequently, we will establish the Beraisa either like Rebbi Meir or like Rebbi Nasan, but not like both.

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