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Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Kesuvos 80

KESUVOS 75-80 - dedicated by Mrs. Rita Grunberger of Queens, N.Y., in loving memory of her husband, Reb Yitzchok Yakov ben Eliyahu Grunberger. Mr Irving Grunberger helped many people quietly in an unassuming manner and is sorely missed by all who knew him. His Yahrzeit is 10 Sivan.



(a) According to Rebbi Aba quoting Amri Bei Rav, even a Shigra de'Tamri is termed 'a little benefit' to prevent the man from reclaiming his expenses. A 'Shigra de'Tamri' - is pressed dates, which are much cheaper than dried figs.

(b) It cannot mean a cluster of dates - because then (based on the Mishnah in Eiruvin, which implies that a cluster of dates is more valuable than dried figs) the term 'even' would make no sense. It would only make sense if we were to place the Din of 'Shigra de'Tamri' before that of dried figs.

(c) We remain uncertain whether 'Chuvtza de'Tamri' also fall under this category. 'Chuvtza de'Tamri' - is the residue of dates after beer has been manufactured from them, or dates that have been well-pressed in order to manufacture beer from them.

(d) We learned earlier that the small measure of a dried fig is only considered 'a little benefit' if he ate it in an honorable manner. The Amora'im of Eretz Yisrael dispute how much one needs to eat to be considered 'a little benefit' however he ate it. One opinion maintains an Isur's worth - the other holds that it is a Dinar (which is more than an Isur).

(a) The Dayanim of Pumbedisa cite Rav Yehudah, who ruled 'What he spent, he spent, and what he ate, he ate' in a case where all the man benefited from the property was a bundle of branches - which is normally elephant fodder.

(b) Rav Yehudah ruled - that if someone made a three-year Chazakah on a field, including one year of Orlah, Shevi'is or Kil'ayim (which can only refer to the wood, which is fit to be used as animal fodder, but not to the fruit, which is Asur be'Hana'ah), his Chazakah is nevertheless complete (because that is called eating). That ruling conforms with his ruling here, where he considers using animal-fodder 'eating'.

(c) Rav Ya'akov Amar Rav Chisda said that someone who spends money on the property of his wife who was a Ketanah, whom her mother and brothers married off - has the Din of someone who spends money on a stranger's property, who is permitted to claim like a regular share-cropper. This is in order to encourage him to take good care of her father's property.

(a) The four hundred Zuz that a certain husband was taking from Chuza'a to the town where he resided in order to invest it - was the money that his wife had inherited in Chuza'a.

(b) His travelling expenses were six hundred Zuz.

(c) Rav Ami ruled 'What he spent, he spent ... ', because he used up one Zuz of his wife's money. The Rabbanan protested - on the grounds that the money that he used was capital, and not Peiros.

(d) Following their protest - he ruled that, in that case, he should swear how much he spent and claim what was coming to him.

(a) We learned in our Mishnah that if the man did not reap any benefit from his wife's property, he swears how much he spent and claims his expenses. Rav Asi establishes this when he profits equal the expenses. Rava rejects Abaye's interpretation of Rav Asi's statement (that if the profits would exceed the expenses he would claim without having to swear) - on the grounds that, if that were so, there would be nothing to deter him from cheating (by understating his expenses, in order to spare himself having to make a Shevu'ah).

(b) So Rava interprets Rav Asi's statement to mean - that if the profits are less than the expenses, he is only entitled to claim his expenses up to the value of the profits, and no more.

(a) Arisim (share-croppers) would normally accept full responsibility for cultivating the field, whose annual yield would then belong to them. However, instead of paying the owner rent, they would pay him a percentage of the yield (a half, a third or a quarter, depending upon local custom).

(b) We ask what the Din will be if the husband brought an Aris into his wife's fields and then divorced her, before he could derive the full benefits of their work. Despite the fact that *he* is the one who hired the Aris, we may well *not* say 'Mah she'Asah Asah, Mah she'Achal, Achal' - because a field needs an Aris, and if the husband would not have hired him, then the wife would.

(c) Someone who enters someone's field and cultivates it - is entitled to claim his expenses (up to the value of the profits).

(d) An Aris who is hired by the husband might have less of a claim than him - because the woman can say that if not for the Aris, her husband would have cultivated the field anyway, without her having to pay anything.

Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua makes a compromise - if the husband is capable of cultivating the field, then the woman can tell the Aris that she did not need him, since her husband would have done the work anyway, but if he is not, then he is considered to be *her* Aris.



(a) We ask whether the husband has the right to sell the Peiros of his wife's Nechsei mi'Lug - which might be forbidden, because the purpose of the Takanah of eating the Peiros of Nechsei mi'Lug was only for the purpose of helping the household to flourish (based on the theory that the more one receives, the more one puts in).

(b) Yehudah Mar bar Mereimar quotes Rava as saying that the sale is valid. Rav Papi quotes him as saying - that it is not.

(c) The significance of the statement that Mar bar Mereimar did not hear it directly from Rava, but that he derived it from an incident that occurred is - that it is then subject to interpretation (i.e. maybe Rava does not really hold what Mar quoted him as saying).

(d) He was referring to the incident - when a man used one of the two maidservants that his wife brought into the marriage, to serve his second wife. When the first wife complained, Rava ignored her complaint.

(a) In fact, there is no proof from Rava's ruling there that he holds 'Mah she'Asuy Asuy' - because Rava's silence was due to the fact that even if the maidservant was serving the other woman, the entire household benefited from her services.

(b) We finally rule that the husband's sale is invalid. We learned above that the reason for this is the fact that the Takanah of Nechsei mi'Lug was in order to help the household flourish. That is Abaye's explanation. According to Rava, it is because 'Shema Tachsif' - we are afraid that, since the purchaser has only acquired the Peiros and not the actual field, he will not bother to cultivate it (only to take from it whatever he can), thereby causing it to deteriorate.

(c) One of the three distinctions between the two explanations is when the property is close to the town, in which case, the wife can keep an eye on it (making sure that the purchaser does not let the field deteriorate [so that only Abaye's reason applies, but not Rava's]). The second distinction is if the husband is an Aris - in which case it is he who will look after the field, sending the purchaser the annual yield each year (in which case, Abaye's reason applies, but not Rava's). Incidentally, the husband, knowing that, when his wife dies, he will inherit the field, will not display the same laxness as the purchaser.

(d) The third distinction is - when the husband invests the money from the sale (in which case, Rava's reason applies, but not Abaye's).

(a) Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that a Shomeres Yavam may sell or give away property that she inherits at that stage. According to Beis Shamai, in the event of her death, the Yavam's heirs share the Nechsei mi'Lug with her's. Her heirs do not however, share the Nechsei Tzon Barzel with her husband's.

(b) Beis Hillel say ...

1. ... 'Nechasim be'Chezkasan'. The meaning of 'be'Chezkasan' will be discussed in 'Mi she'Meis'. Beis Hillel are referring to - Nechsei Tzon Barzel. 2. ... 'u'Kesuvah be'Chezkas Yorshei ha'Ba'al'. 'Kesuvah' means - Manah, Masayim and the Tosefes.
(c) Beis Hillel hold that Nechsei mi'Lug - are in the Chazakah of the father's heirs.

(d) According to Rebbi Meir, the money or the detached fruit that her husband left behind are used to purchase land, from which the Yevamah eats the Peiros. The basis of this Halachah is - the fact that all of her husband's property is Meshubad towards her Kesuvah (even Metaltelin - according to this Tana).

(a) If her husband left fruit that was attached to the ground, Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim argue in exactly the same way as they argued earlier (in the Mishnah on 79a.) with regard to Nechsei mi'Lug which she inherited. According to ...
1. ... Rebbi Meir - the husband must pay however much the field is worth more with the attached fruit than without it, and with that money, she purchases land of which he eats the fruit.
2. ... the Chachamim - the attached fruit belongs to him.
(b) The Chachamim also argue with Rebbi Meir regarding money and detached fruit. In their opinion, whoever takes it first, may retain it. Assuming that she took it already during the lifetime of her husband, she buys land and her husband eats the Peiros.

(c) The Chachamim's reason for this ruling is - because, in their opinion, Metaltelin are not Meshubad toward a woman's Kesuvah.

(d) Once the Yavam marries her, she is his wife in every regard except one - her Kesuvah comes, not from his property, but from her first husband (the Yavam's brother).

(a) When the Tana forbids the Yavam to tell the Yevamah that her Kesuvah is lying on the table - he means that he is not allowed to designate one particular field for her Kesuvah, because all of her husband's property is Meshubad to her Kesuvah.

(b) The same prohibition applies - to a husband vis-a-vis his wife.

(c) When the Tana writes that, having divorced her, she only receives her Kesuvah - he means that, even though, until then, all her husband's property was Meshubad towards her Kesuvah, once she becomes divorced, she may only claim her Kesuvah, and no more.

(d) If the Yavam divorces the Yevamah and remarries her - she receives only the first Kesuvah that she was owed, and no more.

(a) We are not sure who buries the Shomeres Yavam when she dies. The obligation to do so might fall upon ...
1. ... the heirs of her husband (i.e. the Yavam) - because they are the ones who inherit her Kesuvah.
2. ... her father's heirs - because they are the ones who inherit her Nechsei mi'Lug.
(b) Rav Amram quotes a Beraisa which specifically states - that it is those who inherit her Kesuvah who are obligated to bury her.

(c) Abaye corroborates this ruling from another Beraisa, which states 'Yorshehah, Yorshei Kesuvasah, Chayavin bi'Kevurasah'. He infers from these words that the Tana is talking about a Shomeres Yavam - because they imply that *the heirs who inherit her Kesuvah* are obligated to bury her, but that there are other heirs, who do not (and that can only be referring to a Yevamah).

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