ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kesuvos 78
KESUVOS 75-80 - dedicated by Mrs. Rita Grunberger of Queens, N.Y., in loving
memory of her husband, Reb Yitzchok Yakov ben Eliyahu Grunberger. Mr Irving
Grunberger helped many people quietly in an unassuming manner and is sorely
missed by all who knew him. His Yahrzeit is 10 Sivan.
Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that a betrothed woman is permitted to
sell or give away property that she inherited before she was betrothed
(Nechsei mi'Lug). According to Beis Shamai, the same applies to property
that she inherited after the betrothal. According to Beis Hillel there ...
1. ... Lechatchilah - she is not permitted to sell.
2. ... Bedi'eved (if she did go ahead and sell) - her sale is valid.
(a) The Mishnah says that if a woman sold property that she inherited after
she married - both Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that her husband may
reclaim the property from the buyer.
(b) Rebbi Yehudah quotes the Chachamim, who asked Raban Gamliel that, if the
Chasan acquired the woman, why should he not acquire her property (this will
be explained later in the Sugya). Raban Gamliel replied - that it is
embarrassing enough for us that the husband is permitted to reclaim the
Nichsei mi'Lug that she inherited *after the marriage*, and they should not
add to the embarrassment by incorporating property which she inherited
*beforehand* in this Halachah.
(c) We just saw that, in the opinion of Raban Gamliel, if after she is
marriage, a woman sold property that she inherited beforehand, the sale is
valid. Rebbi Chanina ben Akavya asked him - that if he acquired the woman,
why should he not acquire her property?
(d) Raban Gamliel relied - that it is embarrassing enough that the husband
is permitted to reclaim the Nichsei mi'Lug that she inherited *after the
marriage* ... (as we just explained).
(a) Rebbi Shimon makes a distinction between a woman who sells property of
which her husband is aware - in which case her sale is invalid, and property
of which he is not - in which case it is valid (though in both cases she is
forbidden to sell Lechatchilah). This case will be explained later in the
(b) We initially contend that, in the Reisha, the woman is permitted to sell
property that she inherited *before* her betrothal, because she is not yet
in her husband's domain, whereas in the Seifa, she is not permitted to sell
property that she inherited *after* her betrothal, because she has already
entered his domain. We reject this contention however - on the grounds that,
if the property belongs to her husband, why, in the Seifa, is the sale valid
(c) We therefore ascribe the Din in the Seifa, not to the fact that, when a
Chasan betroths a woman, he *definitely acquired his Kalah*, but because it
is a *Safek* (maybe he will marry her, maybe he won't). Consequently,
Lechatchilah she is not permitted to sell (in case the property belongs to
him), but Bedieved, her sale is valid (in case it belongs to her).
(a) We ask whether Rebbi Yehudah (who quotes the Rabbanan as saying that if
a Chasan acquires the woman once they are betrothed, surely he should
acquire her property) is referring to Lechatchilah or Bedieved - means
whether they are referring to Beis Shamai, querying the Din that she is
permitted to sell even Lechatchilah (though they would agree with Beis
Hillel, that Bedieved, the sale would be valid); or whether they are even
querying Beis Hillel (why the sale should be valid at all, even Bedieved).
(b) We resolve the She'eilah from Rebbi Yehudah in a Beraisa, where he
specifically uses the expression 'Af Zu Michrah Bateil', confirming the
latter side of the She'eilah.
(a) According to Rebbi Chananya ben Akavya in a Beraisa, when the Rabbanan
asked Raban Gamliel why the sale of an Arusah should be valid, he did not
give the response that the Tana of our Mishnah states ('we are already
embarrassed with the first ones ... '), because he had a better answer. The
response that he gave them was - granted, one can argue that a married man
acquires his wife, because he does indeed acquire her as regards her
findings, the work of her hands and nullifying her vows (without the
participation of her father), but how can one present such an argument in
the case of an Arusah, where the Chasan does not acquire his Kalah in these
(b) Raban Gamliel gave the response quoted by the Tana of our Mishnah
(according to Rebbi Chananya ben Akavya) - in the Seifa, with regard to
property that she inherited before the marriage and came to sell after the
(c) In view of Raban Gamliel in the Beraisa, where he says 'Mocheres
ve'Nosenes ve'Kayam' - Rav Z'vid changes the text in our Mishnah to read
(a) Rav Papa maintains that Raban Gamliel's opinion is actually a Machlokes
Tana'im: According to Rebbi Chananya ben Akavya in the Beraisa, Raban
Gamliel holds 'Mocheres ve'Nosenes ve'Kayam', whereas according to Rebbi
Yehudah in our Mishnah, he holds 'Im Machrah ve'Nasnah, Kayam'. This does
not mean that Rebbi Chananya ben Akavya follows the opinion of Beis Shamai
(in the Reisha of our Mishnah) - because he maintains that this opinion is
also the opinion of Beis Hillel.
(b) The fact that the opinion of Rebbi Chananya ben Akavya is quoted in our
Mishnah - does not mean that he agrees with Rebbi Yehudah's interpretation
of Raban Gamliel's opinion. In fact, Rebbi cites his opinion briefly,
leaving the Tana of the Beraisa to fill in the details.
(c) Rav and Shmuel both agree that even if a married woman sold the Nechsei
mi'Lug which she inherited before or after the betrothal, her husband can
reclaim it from the buyers. Now the Machlokes between Rebbi Yehudah and
Rebbi Chananya ben Akavya concerns a married woman who sold property that
she inherited *after she was betrothed*. Both agree however, that if she
sold property that she inherited *before her betrothal*, the sale is valid.
So like whom do Rav and Shmuel hold?
(d) We establish Rav and Shmuel like Raboseinu in the Beraisa, who maintain
that, once a woman is married, any sale of her Nechsei mi'Lug, irrespective
of when she received it, is invalid.
(a) Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina cites Takanas Usha - that if a married woman
sells Nechsei mi'Lug, her husband may reclaim them from the buyer.
(b) We do not know for sure whether or not, Takanas Usha is mentioned in the
Mishnah (or whether it is cited for the first time by the Amora, Rebbi Yossi
b'Rebbi Chanina). There is no proof for Takanas Usha from our Mishnah, which
explicitly states that if a married woman sold the Nechsei mi'Lug that she
received after her betrothal, the husband can reclaim it from the buyers -
because our Mishnah speaks during the woman's lifetime and with regard to
the Peiros (as far as the actual property is concerned, even after the
woman's death, the Tana could hold that the sale is final, and the husband
cannot claim it from the buyer); The Chachamim in Usha added that the
husband inherits the actual property, even after his wife's death.
(a) We learned in our Mishnah that Rebbi Shimon differentiates between
property which the husband knows about (which is *not sold*) and property
which he does not know about (which *is*). Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina
classifies the former as Karka, and the latter, as Metaltelin - because when
the man married his wife, he married her with the Karka in mind (but not the
(b) Rebbi Yochanan considers both of these to be 'known' property. Unknown
property - is property which his wife inherited overseas, and which he
literally knows nothing about.