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Kesuvos 70

KESUVOS 70 - dedicated by Uri Wolfson and Naftali Wilk in honor of Rav Mordechai Rabin of Har Nof, a true beacon of Torah and Chesed.



(a) The Tana in a Mishnah in Gitin states that whatever Pe'utos buy or sell is valid. 'Pe'utos' - are children who are eight or nine years old.

(b) This Halachah is confined to Metaltelin - any transaction involving Karka is invalid.

(c) Rafram restricts this Halachah to where there is no Apotropus - meaning an administrator.

(d) Rafram proves his point from our Mishnah - which, in the case when a father placed his property into the hands of a third person, concludes 'Ein Ma'aseh Ketanah K'lum'. If that ruling would be confined to the Din of a third person, who is given *specific instructions* what to do with the property, but not to an administrator (who is *not*) - then the Tana should have said 'Aval bi'Ketanah, Ya'aseh ha'Shelish Mah she'Hushlash be'Yado', and not 'Ein Ma'aseh Ketanah K'lum' (implying that their transaction is invalid, irrespective of who is in charge of the money).

***** Hadran Alach 'Metzi'as ha'Ishah' *****

***** Perek ha'Madir *****


(a) According to the Tana Kama of our Mishnah, if a man makes a Neder forbidding his wife to derive any benefit from him for longer than thirty days, he must divorce her and pay her Kesuvah. Should the Neder be for less than thirty days - he may appoint a trustee to sustain her.

(b) Rebbi Yehudah gives the time period as one month for a Yisrael - two, for a Kohen (because, once a Kohen divorces his wife, he can never take her back).

(c) The Tana also speaks about a man who made such a Neder forbidding his wife to eat a certain type of fruit even for one day - which can only speak when the woman made the Neder, and her husband upheld it.

(d) Rebbi Yehudah gives the time limit as one day for a Yisrael, two, for a Kohen.

(a) The third case of Neder dealt with by the Tana is - if she makes a Neder forbidding one particular type of make-up on herself, and her husband upheld it.

(b) According to Rebbi Yossi ...

1. ... in the case of a poor woman, assuming no time limit was specified - he must divorce her immediately and pay her K'suvah. If a time-limit was specified, then he may wait until it expires.
2. ... in the case of a rich woman - he waits thirty days before divorcing her and paying her K'suvah.
(a) The Mishnah in Nedarim states that if a woman forbids the work of her hands on her husband - her Neder does not even require nullification.

(b) That poses a problem on the Reisha of our Mishnah - because if she cannot make a Neder to nullify her obligations towards her husband, on what grounds can her husband make a similar Neder nullifying his obligations towards her?

(c) In order to resolve this problem - we try to explain our Mishnah on the basis that he could say to her 'Tze'i Ma'aseh Yadayich bi'M'zonosayich', so we consider it as if he had actually said it.




(a) We refute this contention because of Rav Huna Amar Rav's statement. Rav Huna Amar Rav says - that a woman can say to her husband 'Eini Nizones ve'Eini Osah', giving her the upper hand.

(b) So we finally establish our Mishnah when he actually said to her 'Tze'i Ma'aseh Yadayich bi'M'zonosayich' (which apparently he is entitled to do in spite of her having the upper hand).

(c) Nevertheless, she needs a trustee to sustain her - because the Mishnah speaks when she doesn't quite manage to feed herself.

(d) Rav Ashi explains this to mean that she manages to produce enough for her basic requirements, but not for the small extras that a person needs to supplement his diet, which explains why he needs to appoint a trustee to sustain her.

(a) The previous case cannot be speaking about a case ...
1. ... when she is accustomed to having the small extras - because then his Neder would not be effective in the first place.
2. ... when she is not used to having them - because then, why should he be obligated to even ask a trustee to sustain her?
(b) The case is - when she was used to these small extras before she got married, but got used to being without them after she got married. And she now claims that she only got used to living without them of her own volition, but not now that he had forbidden them on her with a Neder (similar to the S'vara 'Eino Domeh Mi she'Yesh Lo Pas be'Salo le'Mi she'Ein Lo Pas be'Salo').

(c) The Tana of our Mishnah gives a time limit of thirty days, after which he is obligated to divorce her and pay her Kesuvah - because after thirty days, people get to hear about the Neder, causing her embarrassment.

(a) Alternatively, we answer our initial Kashya (how the Neder should be valid in the first place) by establishing the Mishnah when he made the Neder whilst they were still betrothed. His obligation to feed her is due to the fact - that the Tana is speaking after the time of marriage had arrived, in which case, he has become obligated to feed his Arusah.

(b) The Neder is nevertheless valid - because the obligation for an Arus to feed his Arusah before the Chupah is only mi'de'Rabbanan, whereas the Neder is mi'd'Oraysa.

(c) The thirty-day limit, according to this answer - is due to the fact that we can only trust a person (the trustee in this case) to perform his Sh'lichus for thirty days, but not more.

(a) We attempt to give a third answer - that he made the Neder when they were betrothed and they subsequently married, explaining why the Neder is valid on the one hand, and why he is obligated to feed her on the other. Despite the fact that she knew when she married him that she would not receive Mezonos, he nevertheless needs to feed her through a trustee - because she can say 'I thought that I could manage without Mezonos, but I now realize that I can't'.

(b) We refute this answer however, on the grounds that, although we apply a similar S'vara with regard to a man who marries a woman with Nedarim, we cannot apply it here - because whereas in the case of Nedarim, it is feasible for a person to think that he can manage to live with a wife who has Nedarim, to think that one can live without Mezonos is not. Consequently, she must have been Mochel completely, and cannot retract.

(a) Ordinarily, the trustee would be carrying out the Sh'lichus of the husband, which would be forbidden (because the husband would then be contravening his Neder). To avoid this problem - we establish our case when he appoints the trustee by announcing 'Kol ha'Zan Eino Mafsid!', in which case he does not really become his Sh'li'ach.

(b) If a man falls into a deep pit and announces 'Kol ha'Shomei'a Koli Yichtov Get le'Ishti' - whoever hears his voice should write the Get and hand it to his wife.

(c) So we see that even an indirect appointment such as 'Kol ha'Shomei'a Koli Yichtov Get le'Ishti' is considered a Sh'lichus (otherwise, in what capacity would the person who heard the husband's voice be permitted to act on behalf of the husband) - in that case, why should 'Kol ha'Zan Eino Mafsid' be any different?

(d) We differentiate between the two cases - by drawing a distinction between 'Kol ha'Zan' (which is not a command), and 'Yichtov Get' (which is).

(a) Rebbi Ami said that when there is a fire - one is permitted to announce on Shabbos 'Kol ha'Mechabeh Eino Mafsid', in the hope that a Nochri will come forward and volunteer to put out the fire, for remuneration).

(b) Rebbi Ami specifically said '*bi'Deleikah* Hitiru Lomar Kol ha'Matzil ... ' not to preclude our case of 'Kol ha'Zan ... ', but to preclude other Melachos of Shabbos (where Chazal were strict), which are not generally as crucial as a fire, and will not result in Chilul Shabbos if they are not permitted.

(c) The Beraisa permits someone whose friend has no money for food and who is forbidden to have any Hana'ah from him (due to a Neder) - to approach a store-keeper from whom one often purchases and tell him of his friend's predicament, on the assumption that he will provide his friend with food, and come back to him for payment.

(d) The Beraisa specifically mentions the case of the store-keeper - to inform us that even that is permitted (even though he made the [albeit indirect] request to a *specific person* with whom he is acquainted), and all the more so when he said 'Kol ha'Zan ... ', where the request is to no-one in particular.

(a) The Beraisa permits a person whose friend is forbidden to have any Hana'ah from him (due to a Neder), and who ...
1. ... cannot afford to have his house or his fence repaired, or to hire workers to harvest his corn - to approach the relevant professionals and tell them about his friend's predicament, in the hope that they will carry out the required tasks and come back to him for payment.
2. ... is accompanying him on a journey and has nothing to eat - to give a gift of food to a third person, who may then feed his friend.
(b) If there is nobody to whom to give a gift - then he is permitted to place the food on a rock or on a fence and declare it Hefker for anyone who wants it.

(c) Rebbi Yossi disagrees with the Tana Kama in the latter case because of the episode that once took place in Beis Choron - where a man gave the Chatzer and the Se'udah for his son's wedding-feast to a third person in order to permit his own father who was Mudar Hana'ah from him to participate. But when the recipient declared the gift Hekdesh, he protested that the gift was for the exclusive purpose of permitting his father to participate. The Chachamim ruled that, in such a case, the gift is not valid (because a gift by definition, means that it belongs to the recipient to do with as he wishes).

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