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Kesuvos 68

KESUVOS 68 (3 Sivan) - dedicated l'Zecher Nishmas Rabbi Bennett Gold (Rav Dov ben Dovid Meir), by Shari and Jay Gold and family, on his Yahrzeit.



(a) The Tana in a Beraisa says that someone who makes out ...
1. ... that he is blind, fat or lame, when really, he is not - will eventually become what he pretended to be.
2. ... that he needs Tzedakah when really, he doesn't - will eventually become poor and need the support of others.
(b) A person must possess - two hundred Zuz before becoming forbidden to take Tzedakah.
(a) A person who has close to two hundred Zuz - is not obligated to sell his house and household vessels to remove the necessity to take from Tzedakah.

(b) Another Beraisa obligates him to sell his household goods. Rav Z'vid initially makes a distinction - between a bed and a chair, which he *is obligated to sell* (and replace), and cups and dishes, which he is *not*.

(c) We reject Rav Z'vid's distinction however - on the grounds that it is just as unpleasant for someone who is used to using expensive beds and chairs to begin using cheaper ones as it is to begin using cheaper cups and dishes.

(d) Rava establishes the Beraisa that obligates the sale by something like a silver plow, which it is not unpleasant for a person to replace. Rav Papa establishes the Beraisa which obligates him to sell after he has claimed - meaning that if someone who owned two hundred Zuz took Leket, Shikchah or Pei'ah (for example), and Beis-Din reclaim it from him, they are even permitted to sell his household articles in order to reclaim the debt.

(a) If a Yesomah's mother and brother married her off and gave her a dowry of a hundred or fifty Zuz, when she grows up she is permitted to claim her full due - one tenth of her father's property.

(b) This applies - even if she agreed to what they gave her at the time.

(c) According to Rebbi Yehudah, if the father married off his first daughter in his lifetime, then the subsequent daughters are entitled to the same amount. According to the Chachamim, a person's fortunes tend to fluctuate. Consequently - Beis-Din will assess the father's assets and fix the amount for the second daughter's dowry accordingly.

(a) When Shmuel says 'le'Parnasah, Shamin be'Av' - he means that when it comes to the dowry of an orphan, Beis-Din assess what they think the father would have given.

(b) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak reconciles this with the Beraisa, which says that we do not gauge Parnasah by what the father would have given, but by the value of the father's property - by establishing the Beraisa, not by her dowry, but by the Mezonos that she receives from the heirs.

(c) Even though the Tana specifically wrote 'Nizonos u'Misparnesos' - he is not referring to Mezonos and Parnasah (dowry) respectively, but to food and drink, and clothes and covers, both of which are assessed according to the property that the father left when he died.

(a) The Chachamim in our Mishnah refer to a rich man who became poor or a poor man who became rich. They cannot mean that her dowry depends on the value of her father's property - because that would mean that according to the Tana Kama (Rebbi Yehudah), we will ignore the value and give her the same as her sister, even though he had now become poor. But how can we possibly give her what is no longer available?

(b) In that case, the Chachamim must be referring to assessing the wishes of the father, which they maintain, Beis-Din do not do. What they do assess, is the value of the property. We reconcile Shmuel with our Mishnah - by establishing his opinion like that of Rebbi Yehudah, who holds that we assess the father's wishes.

(c) Even though Shmuel follows the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah, as we just concluded, he preferred not to say 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Yehudah' - because then we would have thought that we only give the second daughter the same as the first because the father married her off in his lifetime, so Shmuel comes to teach us that Rebbi Yehudah's reason is based on assessment (whether the father married off his first daughter or not).

(d) The reason that Rebbi Yehudah speaks specifically about when the father married his off his first daughter, is to teach us that the Rabbanan argue even there, and decline to follow the father's precedent.

(a) When Rava informed Rav Chisda that they had Darshened in his name 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Yehudah' - he expressed his wish that they should always say such nice things in his name.

(b) We reconcile this statement of Rava with another statement where he ruled like Rebbi, who authorizes a daughter to receive a tenth of her father's property - by establishing the second statement when the father left no indication of any alternative sum.

(c) We prove this answer from a statement made by Rav Ada bar Ahavah - who quoted Rebbi as once having allotted a Yesomah one twelfth of her father's property (clearly in a case whether her father *had* left an indication that that is what he would have wanted her to receive).

(a) Even according to Rebbi, that generally, a daughter is entitled to a tenth of her father's property, it does not follow that if a man has ten daughters, his sons do not receive anything - because after the first daughter has received a tenth, the second daughter receives a tenth of what remains, the third daughter, a tenth of what remains after that, and so on. Finally, one divides the total by ten, and each daughter receives an equal portion. The remainder of their father's property goes to their brothers.

(b) The above case speaks in a case when they all married simultaneously - should they wish to marry one after the other, then each subsequent daughter who marries receives only one tenth of what is left after the first sister took her portion (without dividing the total into ten equal portions).

(c) A statement of Rav Masna is misquoted as 'Im Ba'u Linasei Kulam ke'Achas, Notlos Isur Echad'. What he really said was 'Im B'au Linasei Kulam ke'Achas, *Notlos Isur ke'Echad'*.




(a) According to Rebbi in a Beraisa, once a Yesomah becomes a Bogeres or marries, she loses her rights to Mezonos - but not to Isur Nechasim.

(b) According to Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar - she loses her rights to Isur Nechasim as well.

(c) Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar will agree however, that even a married girl receives Isur Nechasim - provided she married when she was a Ketanah.

(d) Consequently - they would 'hire a husband' for Yesomos when they were still Ketanos, to ensure that they did not lose their rights to Isur Nechasim.

(a) Rav Nachman quoted Rav Huna who ruled like Rebbi. In answer to Rava's Kashya, he reconciled that ruling with our Mishnah, which permits specifically a Ketanah whose mother or brother married her off to claim Isur Nechasim when she grows up, but not if she married as a Na'arah or a Bogeres - by establishing the Mishnah when she married without lodging a protest (demanding her rights to Isur Nechasim - a sign that she is willing to forego the Isur Nechasim), whereas Rebbi is speaking when she does protest.

(b) Rav Nachman proves this answer to Rava from another Beraisa, where Rebbi rules that a daughter who is being fed by her brothers (i.e. a Ketanah or a Na'arah) is entitled to Isur Nechasim - from which we can infer that if she is not being fed, she loses those rights. To reconcile this with what we just said (that, according to Rebbi, even a woman who marries or who becomes a Bogeres retains her rights to Isur Nechasim)we will have to establish this Beraisa when she did not protest, whereas Rebbi in the previous Beraisa speaks when she did.

(c) Rav Ada bar Ahavah quoting Rava qualified this ruling (that marriage loses a girl Isur Nechasim) - by restricting it to a case where she got married after she became a Bogeres. In all other cases, she does not lose her rights to Isur Nechasim, even if she failed to protest.

(d) We reconcile Rava's ruling with Rav Nachman, who answered Rava's Kashya with the Beraisa, where the girl clearly loses Isur Nechasim even if she married when she was a Na'arah - by establishing that case when she was not being fed by her brothers (of her own choice), in which case her failure to lodge a protest is a sure sign that she is willing to forego the Isur Nechasim. Briefly then, a Na'arah never loses Isur Nechasim, a Na'arah who marries retains Isur Nechasim, if she is either being fed by the brothers or if she lodges a complaint, whereas a Bogeres who marries only retains Isur Nechasim if she complains.

(a) Rav Huna quoting Rebbi states that a daughter's dowry does not have the Din of T'nai Kesuvah - meaning the daughter's Mezonos ( that she is fed by her brothers).

(b) He could not have meant that, unlike T'nai-Kesuvah ...

1. ... she can claim Parnasah from Meshubadim - because it was an everyday occurrence to claim Parnasah from the Meshubadim of the brothers, but not Mezonos (in which case, his statement would not have contained any Chidush).
2. ... she cannot claim it from Metaltelin - because according to Rebbi in a Beraisa, both may claim from Metaltelin.
(c) A woman may claim Parnasah from Meshubadim, but not Mezonos - because the former is a fixed amount (and the buyers know exactly how much is at stake), whereas the latter is not.

(d) What Rebbi meant was - that whereas if a dying man left instructions not to feed his daughters from his property, we ignore his instructions (seeing as Mezonos is a T'nai Kesuvah), we do follow his instructions not to give them Parnasah (because Parnasah is not a T'nai Kesuvah. It is merely an obligation on the heirs, based on the assumption that that is what their father would have wanted).

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