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Kesuvos 59



1. Rav Ada bar Ahavah amends the Beraisa 'Tiknu Mezonos Tachas Ma'aseh Yadehah' - to 'Tiknu Mezonos Tachas *Mosar* Ma'seh Yadehah'.
2. Rav and Shmuel amend the Beraisa 'Im Eino Nosen Lah Ma'ah Kesef le'Tzorchehah, Ma'aseh Yadehah she'Lah' - to 'Im Eino Nosen Lah Ma'ah Kesef le'Tzorchehah, *Mosar* Ma'aseh Yadehah she'Lah'.
(b) Even though the Tana goes on to state the amount that the woman is obligated to produce, the latter Beraisa can pertain to Mosar - because one needs to know how much the basic Ma'aseh is, in order to now what is considered Mosar.
(a) The Tana Kama in the Mishnah in Kidushin states that if a married woman declares the work of her hands a Konam, her husband *does not need to nullify* her Neder - because, seeing as the work of her hands belong to him, her Neder is inaffective.

(b) Rebbi Akiva maintains that he *does* - because she might produce Mosar (see Tosfos DH 'Rebbi Akiva').

(c) Shmuel rules like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who rules like Rebbi Akiva - but because we are afraid that her husband may divorce her, in which case her Neder will come into effect, preventing him from ever taking her back (seeing as it is impossible to live with a woman from whose work one is forbidden to benefit).

(d) Shmuel also rules like Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar in our Mishnah. Considering that, on the previous Amud, Shmuel agreed with Rav (that, when Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar considers the Mosar of a woman whose husband declared the work of her hands Hekdesh, he is referring to the Mosar after her death), Shmuel's two rulings appear contradictory - because, according to Rav and Shmuel's interpretation, Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar holds 'Ein Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam', whereas Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri clearly holds 'Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam'.

(a) We try to reconcile Shmuel's two rulings by establishing his ruling like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri by Ha'adafah (Mosar). In fact, this does this not really answer the question - because the Ha'adafah is no more 'Ba le'Olam' than the Ma'aseh Yadehah (even more so considering that she is not yet divorced).

(b) Besides that, we object to this answer because, if that is so, Shmuel should have said 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri le'Ha'adafah' (seeing as Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri himself, even according to Shmuel, does not speak exclusively about Ha'adafah). Or he could have said - 'Ein Halachah ke'Tana Kama' (who says 'Ein Tzarich Lehafer') or 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Akiva' (who says 'Yafer Shema Ta'adif').

(c) Rav Yosef resolves the contradiction in Shmuel's rulings, by pointing out that Konamos (which are the topic under discussion in the Mishnah in Kidushin) are different. Konamos are unique - inasmuch as (unlike Hekdesh), one can forbid someone else's object on oneself only by means of a Konam. Consequently, he argues, we should be able to extend their uniqueness to cover 'Davar she'Lo Bo le'Olam'.

(d) Abaye refutes Rav Yosef's answer however, on the grounds that the reason that one can forbid one's friend's object on oneself exclusively is because one can also forbid one's own object on one's friend exclusively; but perhaps one cannot forbid a Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam any more than one can forbid one's friend's objects on himself.

(a) So Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua establishes the Mishnah in Kidushin when she declares Hekdesh, not her Ma'aseh Yadayim, but her hands (with regard to what they produce). We object to that however - on the grounds that her hands, together with the work that they produce, are Meshubad to her husband, so how can she declare them Hekdesh?

(b) We also object to the suggestion that she does not declare them Hekdesh now, only after she is divorced, on the grounds that something that one does not want to declare Hekdesh immediately, one cannot declare Hekdesh now for later either. Rebbi Yirmiyah differentiates between this case and that of Rebbi Ila'a, who rules that if someone declares Hekdesh a field that he is about to sell to his friend, but that the Hekdesh should only come into effect after he has bought it back from his friend, the Hekdesh is indeed effective - because there, he could have declared the field Hekdesh immediately, whereas in our case, she could not have done so.

(c) If someone declares Hekdesh a field that he just sold to his friend for the Hekdesh to take effect the moment he buys it back - his declaration is invalid (because he would have been unable to declare it Hekdesh immediately even if he had wanted to).

(d) But that is because he owns neither the field nor the Peiros (the current rights to it), argues Rav Papa - whereas in our case, where the woman owns her hands, maybe her declaration will be valid.




(a) So we try to compare our case to a case where a person declares Hekdesh a field that he gave to his friend as collateral for a loan the moment he redeems it. There the Hekdesh is valid. Nevertheless ...
1. ... Rav Shisha Brei de'Rav Idi differentiates between that case and ours - on the grounds that there, he is able to redeem the field, whereas the woman is not able to obtain a divorce (on her volition).
2. ... we differentiate between our case and that of a case similar to the previous one, only when the owner fixed the collateral for ten years time (in which case he cannot redeem it until then) - on the grounds that there, he will at least be able to redeem the field in ten year's time, whereas the woman will never be able to obtain a divorce.
(b) We finally establish Shmuel's ruling like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri on the grounds that Konamos are different, like Rava - who says that Hekdesh negates a creditor's Shibud.

(c) He is referring specifically to Hekdesh of Kedushas ha'Guf (such as an ox that he declared a Korban and which had previously been Meshubad to his creditor); but not to Kedushas Damim (such as Bedek ha'Bayis - Hekdesh's repair fund).

(d) This is not considered stealing from the creditor - seeing as the article does not belong to him. It is no more than a collateral, and now that he has lost it, he retains the right to claim from other sources.

(a) The other two cases which have the power to remove the Shibud - are 1. 'Chametz': If someone designated his Chametz as collateral for a Nochri (without actually placing it in his domain), he becomes obligated to destroy it on Erev Pesach; 2. Shichrur: If someone sets free his slave whom he designated as collateral, he goes free.

(b) That is indeed Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri's reasoning. Nevertheless, he maintains that the Konam takes effect only *after* the woman is divorced - because Chazal reinforced the husband's rights over his wife's property, giving him the Din of a buyer rather than a creditor.

(a) Grinding, baking, washing clothes, cooking and feeding one's baby - are all Melachos that a woman is obligated to perform for her husband (the latter to save him the expense of hiring a wet-nurse).

(b) The other two Melachos belong in this list - are making his bed and manufacturing woollen clothes.

(c) In the event that she brings a Shifchah Kena'anis into the marriage - - she becomes exempt from grinding, baking and washing his clothes.

(d) If she brings in two Shefachos, she is also exempt from cooking and personally feeding her baby. If she brings in ...

1. ... three - she is also exempt from - making his bed and manufacturing woollen clothes.
2. ... four - she can relax all day (and is not even obligated to carry his things up to the attic).
(a) According to Rebbi Eliezer, she is never exempt from manufacturing woollen clothes (even if she brings in a hundred Shefachos) - because idleness leads to immorality.

(b) Rebbi Shimon ben Gamliel says that someone who makes a Neder forbidding his wife from working - is obligated to divorce her and to pay her Kesuvah, because idleness leads to senility.

(a) The word 'Tochenes' used by the Tana for 'grinding', appears to be incorrect, because it is not the woman who actually grinds but the water which turns the wheel, which operates the mill, so we amend the Lashon 'Tochenes' to 'Mat'cheness'

(b) 'Mat'chenes' - implies pouring the grain into the mill and removing the flour.

(c) Alternatively - our Mishnah could be speaking about a hand-mill, in which case, the word 'Tochenes' is appropriate.

(a) The author of our Mishnah cannot be the Tana quoted by Rebbi Chiya in a Beraisa - in whose opinion, the main objective of a woman is to look beautiful, since this clashes with some of the Melachos (such as grinding, baking and feeding her baby, which all detract from her beauty).

(b) Rebbi Chiya lists this objective together with having children. In a second Beraisa - he adds the wearing of ornaments.

(c) If a man wants to enhance his wife's looks, he should dress her in linen clothes (though this, as well as other statements made in this Sugya, are not necessarily true today). Besides feeding her young birds - he should give her plenty of milk to drink as she approaches the age of maturity (Na'arus at twelve).

(a) According to Beis Hillel in a Beraisa, if a woman made a Neder not to feed her baby, we nevertheless force her to do so. According to Beis Shamai - we force her to stop even if she is in the middle of feeding.

(b) Once she is divorced however, Beis Hillel concede that her Neder stands and must be kept. And they will agree with Beis Shamai even during the marriage - if it is clear that the baby recognizes its mother, and refuses to feed from anybody else (due to life danger), in which case, her husband is obligated to pay *her* to feed the baby.

(c) We try to establish the Beraisa when the woman made the Neder but her husband upheld it - in which case Beis Shamai's reason is because it is as if was *he* who made the Neder. In principle however, Beis Shamai agree that the woman is obligated to feed her baby for her husband.

(a) We conclude however, that Beis Shamai cannot be the author of our Mishnah, because if their bone of contention is really who is responsible for the Neder that the wife made and the husband upholds, then they should have argued in a straight case of Kesuvah. Their Machlokes would then have been - whether, if the husband upheld his wife's Neder not to provide him with any benefit, she goes out with a Kesuvah (Beis Shamai) or without it (Beis Hillel).

(b) We also reject the possibility of establishing our Mishnah like Beis Shamai - on the basis of a Beraisa, which Beis Shamai say 'Einah Meinekes' (with or without a Neder) should she not wish to do so.

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