ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kesuvos 37
(a) Rebbi Yossi gives a Giyores who sees blood the same Din as a born
Jewess - who must render Tamei retroactively, any Taharos that she worked
with within twenty-four hours or since the last time she examined herself
(whichever is closer).
(b) According to Rebbi Yehudah - she is Tamei only from the moment that she
actually saw ('Dayah Sha'atah').
(c) He does not declare her Tamei retroactively like Rebbi Yossi - because,
even if she were to have seen blood twenty-four hours earlier, she would not
have been Tamei (seeing as, at that time, she was still a Nochris, and
Nochrim are not subject to Tum'ah).
(d) We are not afraid that maybe the blood only moved after the conversion,
and emerged immediately - because, since the concept of rendering her Tamei
retroactively is only mi'de'Rabbanan, we only declare her Tamei
retroactively, if both mi'P'kidah li'P'kidah and mei'Es le'Es can be
applied; wherever one is not applicable, we do not apply the other, either.
(a) According to Rebbi Yehudah, a Giyores needs to wait three months before
marrying - in case she is pregnant, and we will not subsequently know
whether the baby that is born is from the first man or the second.
A Ketanah, who cannot become pregnant anyway, is obligated to wait three
months before marrying - because Chazal decreed a Ketanah on account of a
(b) Rebbi Yossi says - that she may marry immediately.
(c) Rav Yosef reconciles this ruling of Rebbi Yehudah, with his previous
one, where he holds that a Shevuyah retains her Kedushah - by
differentiating between a Giyores, who does not guard herself against
pregnancy, and a Shevuyah, who does.
(d) Rav Papa bar Shmuel stumped Rav Yosef however, when he asked him from
another Beraisa, where Rebbi Yehudah issued the same ruling with regard to a
Giyores, a Shevuyah and a Shifchah (who converted or was freed when they
were over three). Rav Papa bar Shmuel himself quoted Rav Sheishes - who
established Rebbi Yehudah there when they actually saw the girl being raped.
(a) Rav Sheishes established the Beraisa when they saw the girl being raped.
Rebbi Yossi nevertheless exempts her from having to wait three months before
marrying, says Rabah - because in his opinion, a girl who is being raped
uses a cloth, to prevent herself from becoming pregnant (as we explained in
(b) This is fine in the case of a Giyores, who presumably knew that she
would soon convert, and in the case of a captive, who hopes that she will
soon be redeemed by her fellow-Jews, both of whom will consequently be
prepared by carrying a cloth with them. It is also fine in the case of a
Shifchah who overheard her master saying that he intended to set her free.
The case which presents us with a problem however - is that of a Shifchah
who goes free because her master knocked out her tooth or eye. She cannot
possibly know in advance that this will happen, so why should she we take
for granted that she has a cloth handy?
(c) We reject the suggestion that in all unforeseen cases, Rebbi Yossi does
indeed concede that the woman is obligated to wait three months - because of
the Beraisa, where Rebbi Yossi permits even a woman who was raped or seduced
to become engaged or married immediately (despite the fact that she could
hardly have known in advance that that is what would happen).
(d) Abaye finally explains that Rebbi Yossi permits a woman who has been
raped or seduced to marry immediately, because she turns over after the
Bi'ah to ensure that she does not become pregnant. Rebbi Yehudah disagrees -
on the grounds that she may not turn round sufficiently to clear all the
(a) Our Mishnah cites the Pasuk "ve'Im Lo Yihyeh Ason, Anosh Ye'anesh" as
the source for 'Kol ha'Mischayev be'Nafsho, Ein Meshalem Mamon'. We
reconcile this with the source cited in other places in Shas "Kedei
Rish'aso", from which Chazal derive 'Mishum Rish'ah Achas Ata Mechayvo ...
' - by establishing the former in the case of *Misah* and Mamon, and the
latter, in the case of *Malkos* and Mamon.
(b) We would not know ...
1. ... Malkos and Mamon from Misah and Mamon - since, unlike the latter
case, he is not receiving the extreme punishment of being put to death (so
maybe he will receive both punishments).
(c) According to Rebbi Meir, who holds 'Lokeh u'Meshalem', we need the two
Pesukim - because the former is speaking about Misah and *Mamon*, and the
latter, about Misah and *Malkos*.
2. ... Misah and Mamon from Malkos and Mamon - because, unlike in the latter
case, he has transgressed such a terrible sin that, if not for the second
Pasuk, we would have thought that he deserves to receive both punishments.
(d) We would not know ...
1. ... Misah and Malkos from Misah and Mamon - because, unlike the latter
(where one punishment pertains to the body, and the other, to his property),
both punishments pertain to the body, so, if not for the second Pasuk, we
might have thought that he will receive both, because it is as if he was
receiving an extended death.
2. ... Misah and Mamon from Misah and Malkos - because we would have said
that it is only when the two punishments are administered to the *body* that
he cannot receive both, but that when one of them pertains to the body and
the other one to the property, perhaps he should receive both.
(a) In spite of the fact that we already know that a person cannot receive
any two punishments, from the above two Pesukim, we nevertheless need the
1. ... "ve'Lo Sikchu Kofer le'Nefesh Rotzei'ach" - to teach us, not that a
murderer does not also have to pay, but that one cannot take money from him
to redeem him from death.
(b) We could not have learned the prohibition ...
2. ... "Lo Sikchu Kofer la'Nus el Ir Miklato" - that one cannot take money
from a murderer be'Shogeg to exempt him from the need to flee to a city of
1. ... by Shogeg from that of Meizid - because his sin was not as severe as
the latter (so maybe taking money instead would be permitted).
2. ... by Meizid from that of Shogeg - because we would otherwise have
thought that it is perhaps a Mitzvah to save someone from death.
(a) We learn from the Pasuk "ve'la'Aretz Lo Yechupar le'Dam Asher Shupach
Bah ki-im be'Dam Shofcho" - that, if the murdered was found after the Eglah
Arufah was killed, he must be sentenced to death.
(b) The Eglah Arufah only atones - for a Safek, but not for a Vaday.
(c) And the Torah writes the Pasuk (in connection with Eglah Arufah)
"ve'Atah Teva'er Dam ha'Naki mi'Kirbecha" to compare all those who are put
to death by the sword to an Eglah Arufah - inasmuch as the stroke must be
delivered on the neck.
(d) They are not however, killed with a hatchet at the back of the neck -
because of the Pasuk in Kedoshim "ve'Ahavta le'Rei'acha Kamocha", from which
we extrapolate 'B'ror Lo Misah Yafah' (i.e. kill him by severing the
Simanim - at the front of the neck, with a sword that kills quickly, to
avoid causing any undue pain or suffering.
(a) The Tana Kama of the Beraisa learns from the Pasuk ...
1. ... "Kol Cherem Asher Yochram (min ha'Adam) Lo Yipadeh" - that if someone
undertakes to pay the Erech of someone who, after being sentenced to death,
is being taken out by Beis-Din to die, he is not Chayav to pay anything.
(b) We ask what Rebbi Chananya ben Akavya will learn from this Pasuk -
because Rebbi Chananya ben Akavya disagrees with the Tana Kama. In his
opinion, even if one undertakes to pay the Erech of someone who has already
been sentenced, he is Chayav to pay.
2. ... " ... min ha'Adam" - that this does not pertain to everyone who is
sentenced to death: that if he does so *before* Beis-Din have actually
passed the sentence, he is Chayav to pay the Erech (according to the
person's sex and age-group).
(c) If not for their interpretation of the Pasuk, the Rabbanan would agree
that, in spite of the fact that he is about to be put to death, a person
still has an Erech. This is because - granted, he has no Damim (real value),
but Erech is a fixed assessment made by the Torah according to a person's
sex and age, and has nothing whatsoever to do with his real value.
(a) So we establish Rebbi Chananya ben Akavya's interpretation like Rebbi
Yishmael B'no shel Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah, who bases his interpretation
of the Pasuk " ... Cherem min ha'Adam Lo Yipadeh" on the Pasuk "Im Kofer
Yushas Alav" - which comes to teach us that a person whose Mu'ad ox (that
killed four people) can redeem himself from Misah bi'Yedei *Shamayim* by
(b) Rebbi Yishmael subsequently learns from the Pasuk " ... Cherem min
ha'Adam Lo Yipadeh" - that someone who is Chayav Misah bi'Yedei *Adam*
cannot redeem himself from Misah by paying.
(c) And from *"Kol* Cherem ... " he learns to include even lesser cases of
Misah, who have a Kaparah if they transgressed be'Shogeg.
(d) 'Misos Chamuros she'Lo Nitnah Shigegasan le'Kaparah' refers to someone
who wounds his father or who kidnaps - who is not Chayav Kareis when there
is no warning, and therefore not Chayav Chatas be'Shogeg.