ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Gitin 83
GITIN 83-85 - Dedicated by an admirer of the work of the Dafyomi Advancement
Forum, l'Iluy Nishmas Mrs. Gisela Turkel, Golda bas Reb Chaim Yitzchak Ozer,
(a) After Rebbi Eliezer's death, Rebbi Yossi Hagelili, Rebbi Tarfon and
Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah went in to query his rulings. The fourth sage was -
(b) What all five queries have in common is - that they are ultimately boil
down to the fact that it is not 'K'risus'.
(c) Rebbi Tarfon queried Rebbi Eliezer who rules that, in the case of 'Harei
At Muteres le'Chol Adam Ela li'P'loni', she is permitted to everyone except
for P'loni. Rebbi Tarfon asks on this - that if as Eliezer ascertains, the
Get is valid and P'loni remains forbidden, then assuming that she marries
his brother who dies without children, her husband will have nullified the
Mitzvah of Yibum.
(d) Rebbi Yossi Hagelili asks that we never find a woman who is permitted to
one person and forbidden to someone else. Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah asks from
the very word "K'risus" - which implies that their marriage is completely
cut (and not that she is still forbidden to marry someone because of it).
(a) The most dramatic objection to Rebbi Eliezer's ruling comes from Rebbi
Akiva - who asks from a case where the woman remarried, her second husband
died and she then went and married P'loni. By doing so, she negates the Get
retroactively, thereby rendering any children that she had from her second
husband, Mamzeirim. Is this what you call 'K'risus', asks Rebbi Akiva?
(b) In his second explanation, Rebbi Akiva Darshens a 'Kal va'Chomer' to
(negate the Get and) forbid the woman on the world assuming that P'loni is a
Kohen. Consider that, as far as P'loni is concerned she is an Almanah, and
for the rest of the world, a Gerushah. Yet when her husband dies, she is
forbidden to 'P'loni (because she bears the title 'Gerushah'). In that case,
she ought certainly to be forbidden to the rest of the world (because
vis-a-vis the rest of the world, she still bears the title 'Eishes Ish' - as
far as P'loni is concerned), and if the title 'Gerushah' forbids her to
P'loni (even though it is only a La'av), then the title 'Eishes Ish' (which
carries with it the death penalty) should certainly forbid her to the rest
of the world (like the Rabbanan).
(c) Rebbi Yehoshua objected to the above meeting - because one cannot 'knock
out the a lion after his death'.
(a) Rava has a Pircha (a knockout) on all the Tana's Kashyos, except for -
that of Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah.
(b) He has the support of a Beraisa - whose author is Rebbi Yossi.
(a) Rebbi Tarfon queries Rebbi Eliezer from the fact that, should the woman
marry P'loni's brother and he dies without children, her husband will have
uprooted the Mitzvah of Yibum. We ...
1. ... amend this statement - because he cannot be accused of having
(b)`The final version of Rebbi Tarfon's Pircha is - 'Nimtza Gorem La'akor
Davar min ha'Torah'.
2. ... refute the suggestion to amend it from 'Oker Davar min ha'Torah' to
'Masneh La'akor Davar min ha'Torah' - because he cannot even be accused of
doing that, since he did not ask his ex-wife to marry P'loni's brother.
(c) Rava refutes Rebbi Tarfon's proof - based on the precedent of the case
where someone marries his brother's daughter, say, who also causes the
Mitzvah of Yibum to become nullified (since the woman will not be permitted
to perform with her father), yet no-one suggests that this is prohibited.
(d) Rebbi Tarfon's query must be from 'al-M'nas' - because by 'Chutz', once
the woman remarries and breaks completely with the ties of her first
marriage, Rebbi Eliezer concedes that P'loni becomes permitted.
(a) Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili bases his Kashya on the fact that nowhere do we
find the concept of someone/something being forbidden to one person and
permitted to another. Rava asks on this - that every married woman is
forbidden to the world and permitted to her husband.
(b) He cannot ask his Pircha from...
1. ... Terumah and Kodshei Kodshim, that are forbidden to a Yisrael but
permitted to a Kohen - because that has nothing to do with Nashim.
(c) Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili's query must be from 'Chutz' - because as far as
'al-M'nas' is concerned, Rebbi Eliezer concedes that she would be permitted
to P'loni without marriage (seeing as the condition was 'al-M'nas she'Lo
2. ... the Arayos, who are forbidden to their relatives but permitted to
everyone else - because that has nothing to do with marriage.
(a) Rebbi Akiva bases his query on the fact that the woman might marry the
man to whom she is forbidden, after becoming divorced or widowed from her
second husband, thereby breaking her condition ... . Rava's Pircha on Rebbi
Akiva is - that in that case, we ought to forbid every T'nai by Gitin, in
case one of them breaks the condition after she is already remarried with
(b) Rebbi Akiva's query must be from 'al-M'nas' - because by Chutz, once the
woman remarries and breaks completely with the ties of her first marriage,
Rebbi Eliezer concedes that P'loni becomes permitted (as we explained
(c) In the second Lashon, he asks from a case where the forbidden man was a
Kohen from a 'Kal va'Chomer'. There, his query must be from 'Chutz' -
because, by 'al-M'nas', the forbidden man is permitted to her (as we just
(d) Rebbi Akiva asks once from 'al-M'nas' and once from 'Chutz' - because
having heard that according to some, Rebbi Eliezer argues with the Rabbanan
by 'Chutz', and according to others, by 'al-M'nas', he asked first on one,
and the on the other, so that 'mi'Mah-Nafshach', Rebbi Eliezer will be
(a) Rava's Pircha on Rebbi Akiva's second explanation, which is based on a
'Kal va'Chomer' from the title 'Gerushah' on to the title 'Eishes Ish' - is
that one cannot learn a 'Kal va'Chomer' from Kohanim who have extra Mitzvos
(as we learned earlier).
(b) The Kashya Rava that, when all's said and done, Rebbi Eleizer's very
ruling is based on the Pasuk ''ve'Ishah Gerushah me'Iyshah", as Rebbi
Yochanan explained above (proving that Rebbi Eliezer does not consider this
a Kashya), we answer - by establishing Rava like Rebbi Yanai who citing a
certain sage, learns Rebbi Eliezer's ruling from the Pasuk "ve'Haysah le'Ish
Acher" (and not from the Pasuk by Kohanim at all).
(a) Despite the fact that Rebbi Yehoshua himself has a Pircha on Rebbi
Eliezer, he nevertheless stated 'Ein Meshivin es ha'Ari le'Achar Misah' -
because what he meant to say was that one can ask as many Kashyos as one
likes, but one cannot prove him wrong after his death (seeing as there is no
way of knowing that he would not have answered them).
(b) Based on the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei "Ki *Yikach* Ish Ishah ... ve'Yatz'ah
*ve'Haysah* le'Ish Acher" - Rebbi Yehoshua asked on Rebbi Eliezer from the
Torah's comparison of the divorce after the second marriage to the divorce
after the first (which severed her connections with her husband completely).
(c) Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar too, asked on Rebbi Eliezer. When he said
'Heichan Matzinu she'Zeh Oser ve'Zeh Matir', he meant to ask - that we never
find one person permitting what someone else forbade (like we do according
to Rebbi Eliezer, according to whom, the death or divorce of the second
husband permits P'loni, even though it was the husband who issued the
(d) We repudiate the Kashya on Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar from ...
1. ... a Yevamah, whose Yavam permits what her husband forbade - on the
grounds that it is really the Yavam himself who prohibits the Yevamah, and
not her husband's death (which actually permits her).
2. ... a Chacham, who permits what the Noder forbade - based on Rebbi
Yochanan, who explained that it is really the Noder himself who causes the
Neder to be rescinded (through his Charatah).
3. ... a husband, who annuls the Neder that his wife declared - based on
Rebbi Pinchas quoting Rava, who said that when a woman declares a Neder, she
does so on the understanding that, if her husband wishes, he will annuil it.
(a) We learned above that Rebbi ben Azaryah learns from "K'risus" that the
divorce must break the tie between husband and wife completely. The Rabbanan
(who do not query Rebbi Eliezer from there) learn from "K'risus" - that any
T'nai that binds the woman forever (such as 'al-M'nas she'Lo Tishti Yayin
le'Olam'), invalidates the Get.
(b) Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah's source for this Halachah - is the superfluous
expression "Kareis - K'risus".
(c) The Rabbanan - do not learn consider "Kareis - K'risus" superfluous.
(a) Rava initially says - that if a man gives his wife a Get on condition
that she does not drink wine for ...
1. ... as long as he lives - the Get is invalid (because it is not
(b) We object to this distinction - on the grounds that, just as it is
possible for the other man to die before his wife (in which case it cannot
be described as not being 'K'risus'), so too, is it possible for *him* to
die before his wife, so why the difference?
2. ... as long as so-and-so lives - the Get is valid.
(c) The distinction that Rava therefore made was - between forbidding his
wife to drink wine for as long as she lives (which is not 'K'risus') on the
one hand, and forbidding her to drink wine for as long as he or so-and-so
lives (which is).
(a) Rava asked Rav Nachman whether the Get will be valid if the man gives it
to his wife stipulating that today she would not be his wife, but tomorrow
she would be his wife again. This might ...
1. ... not be a valid T'nai even according to Rebbi Eliezer who permits
Shiyur - because there at least, her husband permitted her to the rest of
the world forever, whereas here there is no aspect of forever.
(b) Rava himself concluded like the second side of the She'eilah, both
according to Rebbi Eliezer and according to the Rabbanan.
2. ... be a valid T'nai even according to the Rabbanan who do not - because
here at least, the break with her today is total (which is not the case
(c) Tomorrow - she will remain divorced (because there is nothing to reunite