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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Gitin 53

GITIN 53-55 - Sponsored by Rabbi Dr. Eli Turkel and his wife, Jeri Turkel. May Hashem bless them with many years of Simcha, health and fulfillment, and may they see all of their children and grandchildren follow them in the ways of Torah and Yir'as Shamayim!



(a) What makes Metamei, Medamei and Menasech a K'nas (rather than a Chiyuv min ha'Torah) is - the fact that it is a 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar' (a damage that is not discernable).

(b) We learned earlier that Rav interprets Menasech literally. He learns that one is Chayav for mixing Yayin Nesech with Kasher wine ('Me'arev' as Shmuel interprets Menasech) - from Medamei, which is also Chayav because of 'Me'arev', and *he* learns one K'nas from another.

(c) According to Rav, having taught us Metamei, the Tana nevertheless finds it necessary to add Medamei, assuming Metamei to mean ...

1. ... Metamei Terumah - because Metamei would then be a total loss, as we explained in our Mishnah, whereas Medamei is not.
2. ... Metamei Chulin - because we might then ascribe the K'nas to the fact that he transgressed the Isur of causing the defilement of Chulin in Eretz Yisrael, which is not applicable to Medamei.
(d) Having taught us ...
1. ... Medamei, he needed to add Metamei - because the former is common, whether the latter is not, and we would have applied the principle that whatever is not common, Chazal did not issue a decree.
2. ... Metamei and Medamei, he needed to add Menasech - because there is no other punishment involved that might exempt them from paying, whereas in the case of Menasech, he might have been Patur, because he is Chayav Misah (as we explained above) and he needs to teach us the Chidush of Rebbi Yirmiyah.
(a) The Chachamim issued a decree forbidding the causing of Tum'ah to Taharos in Eretz Yisrael - to accomodate the P'rushim who are particular to eat their Chulin be'Taharah.

(b) According to Avuhah de'Rebbi Avin, the Chachamim intially forbade only two of the three damages listed in our Mishnah - Metamei and Menasech, adding Medamei only afterwards.

(c) They did not include Medamei in the first list - because compared to the first two, the loss is relatively small.

(a) Chizkiyah holds that min ha'Torah, 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar, Shmei Hezek, and the Chachamim exempt Shogeg - to encourage the Mazik to inform us that the fruit is forbidden.

(b) They did not exempt Meizid for the same reason - because seeing as his very intention is to hurt the owner of the fruit, he does not require an inducement to inform him of what he did.

(c) According to Rebbi Yochanan - 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar Lo Shmei Hezek' min ha'Torah.

(d) Chazal obligated Meizid to pay - to discourage people from taking advantage of the Halachah, to render other people's Taharos, Tamei.

(a) The Mishnah later states 'ha'Kohanim she'Piglu ba'Mikdash, Mezidin Chayavin', to which the Beraisa adds - 'Mipnei Tikun ha'Olam'.

(b) Chizkiyah (according to whom the Mishnah's Din is really d'Oraysa) will explain - that the Beraisa refers to the inference 'Ha Shogegin Peturin ... Mipnei Tikun ha'Olam'.

(c) We derive the P'sul Melachah by ...

1. ... the Parah Adumah itself from the Pasuk in Chukas "Asher Lo Alah Alehah Ol".
2. ... the Mei Chatas - from the Pasuk there "le'Mishmeres le'Mei Nidah".
(d) The Tana of the Beraisa says that someone who worked with either of them - is Patur mi'Dinei Adam, but Chayav be'Dinei Shamayim.
(a) Chizkiyah, according to whom he ought to be Chayav mi'Dinei Adam, establishes the case of ...
1. ... Paras Chatas - when he brought the cow into the stable mainly for it to suckle its baby, in which case his secondary intention of letting it thresh simultaneously, is only a Machshavah, for which he is not Chayav.
2. ... Mei Chatas - where the water is already placed on one of the scales, and all he did was to place a piece of meat on the other scale. Here too, the Melachah that he performed with the Mei Chatas is only be'Machshavah.
(b) To resolve Rava, who validates Mei Chatas even mi'de'Rabbanan if one used it to weigh with, we say 'Ha be'Gufan, Ha be'Kenegdan' - meaning that Rava speaks in the way that we just explained, whereas the Beraisa speaks when he actually poured water into a measuring vessel, and then places the weight into it to see how high the water rises.

(c) We refute this answer - on the grounds that if that is how the Beraisa speaks, then he ought to be Chayav be'Dinei Adam, too.

(d) After establishing both Beraisos in the case of Kenegdan, we finally resolve Rava with the Beraisa - by establishing the Beraisa when he took his mind off guarding the Mei Chatas against Tum'ah (which renders them Pasul mi'de'Rabbanan), whereas Rava speaks when, despite his using it for weighing, his mind is still on them.




(a) The Beraisa says that if someone stole a coin which was taken out of circulation, Terumah which subsequently became Tamei or Chametz and Pesach came and went - he can say to the owner 'Here is your's before you. Take it!'

(b) If he were to lose these objects - he would be obligated to pay for them (their value at the time when he stole them), because otherwise, he would not fulfill the Mitzvah of "ve'Heishiv es ha'Gezeilah Asher Gazal" (Vayikra).

(c) Despite the fact that the articles that he is returning are now useless, he fulfills the Mitzvah of "ve'Heishiv ... ", because the Torah added the words "Asher Gazal", and this is what he stole.

(d) We prove from this Beraisa - that 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar, Lo Sh'mei Hezek' (like Rebbi Yochanan). Otherwise, he could not fulfill the Mitzvah with the article which is now valueless.

(a) In another Beraisa, Rebbi Meir obligates a Metamei, Medamei and Menasech to pay, irrespective of whether he did the damage be'Shogeg or be'Meizid. Rebbi Yehudah says - 'be'Shogeg Patur, be'Meizid Chayav'.

(b) We propose the basis of their Machlokes to be - whether 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar, Sh'mei Hezek' (Rebbi Meir), or not (Rebbi Yehudah).

(c) We learn that a Mazik be'Shogeg is Chayav - from the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Petza Tachas Patza".

(d) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak concludes that both Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah hold 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar, Lo Sh'mei Hezek'. The basis of their Machlokes is - whether 'Kansu Shogeg Atu Meizid' (Rebbi Meir) or not (Rebbi Yehudah).

(a) Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa, permits someone who cooks on Shabbos be'Shogeg to eat the food - 'be'Meizid Lo Yochal'.

(b) Rebbi Yehudah forbids the food to the Meizid forever - but be'Shogeg, Yochal le'Motza'ei Shabbos'.

(c) We qualify Rebbi Yehudah's concession to eat it on Motza'ei Shabbos - by permitting it only after the time that he would have needed to prepare it (so as not to benefit from his sin).

(d) Rebbi Yehudah forbids the culprit to eat the food that he cooked on Shabbos until Motza'ei Shabbos - because he holds 'Kansu Shogeg Atu Meizid'.

(a) Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar is the most stringent of all. He forbids Meizid to be eaten by anybody ever - because he holds 'Ma'aseh Shabbos Asur'.

(b) 'be'Shogeg', he says - Ye'achel le'Motza'ei Shabbos la'Acheirim ve'Lo Lo'.

(c) We reconcile Rebbi Meir in this Beraisa, where he does not decree Shogeg on account of Meizid, with his own opinion regarding Metamei, Medamei and Menasech, where he does - by differentiating between Isurim d'Oraysa (where he does not decree, because they do not require reinforcement) and Isurim de'Rabbanan (where he does decree, because Rabbinical decrees need to be reinforced).

(d) Granted, Menasech is d'Oraysa, yet he decrees - because of the stringency of Yayin Nesech (which is a branch of Avodah-Zarah).

(a) We reconcile Rebbi Yehudah in this Beraisa, who decrees Shogeg on account of Meizid, with his own opinion regarding Metamei, Medamei and Menasech, where he does not, using the exact opposite logic that we used with Rebbi Meir - Rebbi Yehudah decrees Shogeg Atu Meizid by Isurim d'Oraysa, but not by Isurim de'Rabbanan.

(b) Sure, Menasech is d'Oraysa, yet he does not decree - because Yayin Nesech is such a serious Isur, that it does not require reinforcement.

(a) In another Beraisa, Rebbi Meir obligates someone who plants in Shevi'is to uproot what he planted 'bein be'Shogeg, bein be'Meizid' - 'be'Shabbos, be'Shogeg Yekayem, be'Meizid Ye'aker'.

(b) Rebbi Yehudah obligates someone who plants on Shabbos to uproot what he planted 'bein be'Shogeg, bein be'Meizid' - 'bi'Shevi'is, be'Shogeg Yekayem, be'Meizid Ye'aker'.

(c) Besides the discrepancy between Rebbi Meir's previous ruling (that he is not Ko'nes Shogeg Atu Meizid by a d'Oraysa) and what his current ruling with regard to Sh'mitah, we also have a problem with Rebbi Meir's opinion here (in fact, the same problem exists in Rebbi Yehudah) - since he seems to contradict himself from Shabbos to Shevi'is, seeing as both are d'Oraysa.

(a) In fact, Rebbi Meir's ruling regarding Shabbos conforms with his previous opinion. His ruling regarding Shevi'is however, is based on two considerations. The second of them, because Yisrael are suspect on transgressing it (so Chazal decreed on Shogeg, too). The first consideration is - the fact that since Yisrael need to count the years of planting (to know when is Orlah and Neta Revai), people will easily be able to work out retroactively that he must have planted the tree in the Shmitah. Consequently, unless we were to decree even Shogeg, they would jump to the conclusion that planting is permitted in Shevi'is (in which case, it is a branch of Mar'is ha'Ayin).

(b) This reasoning does not apply to someone who planted on Shabbos be'Shogeg - because there is no reason to count the days with regard to planting, so nobody will have occasion to realize that he planted on Shabbos.

(c) It is possible to apply the same reasoning to someone who planted on Shabbos be'Shogeg - in a case where he planted on Shabbos which fell on the thirtieth day before Rosh Hashanah. When two years and thirty days later, the fruit of the tree leave the realm of Orlah and become permitted, and people will ask how fruit becomes permitted after two years, they will be informed that this is because the tree was planted exactly thirty days before Rosh Hashanah. This will bring to their attention the fact that it was planted on Shabbos.

(d) By saying this - we answer the Kashya why Rebbi Meir found it necessary to give his second explanation, pointing to a flaw in the first explanation, which differentiates between counting the years and counting the days. And he concludes that, even if people would realize that he planted the tree on Shabbos, they would never come to permit planting on Shabbos.

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