ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Gitin 53
GITIN 53-55 - Sponsored by Rabbi Dr. Eli Turkel and his wife, Jeri Turkel.
May Hashem bless them with many years of Simcha, health and fulfillment, and
may they see all of their children and grandchildren follow them in the ways
of Torah and Yir'as Shamayim!
(a) What makes Metamei, Medamei and Menasech a K'nas (rather than a Chiyuv
min ha'Torah) is - the fact that it is a 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar' (a damage
that is not discernable).
(b) We learned earlier that Rav interprets Menasech literally. He learns
that one is Chayav for mixing Yayin Nesech with Kasher wine ('Me'arev' as
Shmuel interprets Menasech) - from Medamei, which is also Chayav because of
'Me'arev', and *he* learns one K'nas from another.
(c) According to Rav, having taught us Metamei, the Tana nevertheless finds
it necessary to add Medamei, assuming Metamei to mean ...
1. ... Metamei Terumah - because Metamei would then be a total loss, as we
explained in our Mishnah, whereas Medamei is not.
(d) Having taught us ...
2. ... Metamei Chulin - because we might then ascribe the K'nas to the fact
that he transgressed the Isur of causing the defilement of Chulin in Eretz
Yisrael, which is not applicable to Medamei.
1. ... Medamei, he needed to add Metamei - because the former is common,
whether the latter is not, and we would have applied the principle that
whatever is not common, Chazal did not issue a decree.
2. ... Metamei and Medamei, he needed to add Menasech - because there is no
other punishment involved that might exempt them from paying, whereas in the
case of Menasech, he might have been Patur, because he is Chayav Misah (as
we explained above) and he needs to teach us the Chidush of Rebbi Yirmiyah.
(a) The Chachamim issued a decree forbidding the causing of Tum'ah to
Taharos in Eretz Yisrael - to accomodate the P'rushim who are particular to
eat their Chulin be'Taharah.
(b) According to Avuhah de'Rebbi Avin, the Chachamim intially forbade only
two of the three damages listed in our Mishnah - Metamei and Menasech,
adding Medamei only afterwards.
(c) They did not include Medamei in the first list - because compared to the
first two, the loss is relatively small.
(a) Chizkiyah holds that min ha'Torah, 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar, Shmei Hezek,
and the Chachamim exempt Shogeg - to encourage the Mazik to inform us that
the fruit is forbidden.
(b) They did not exempt Meizid for the same reason - because seeing as his
very intention is to hurt the owner of the fruit, he does not require an
inducement to inform him of what he did.
(c) According to Rebbi Yochanan - 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar Lo Shmei Hezek' min
(d) Chazal obligated Meizid to pay - to discourage people from taking
advantage of the Halachah, to render other people's Taharos, Tamei.
(a) The Mishnah later states 'ha'Kohanim she'Piglu ba'Mikdash, Mezidin
Chayavin', to which the Beraisa adds - 'Mipnei Tikun ha'Olam'.
(b) Chizkiyah (according to whom the Mishnah's Din is really d'Oraysa) will
explain - that the Beraisa refers to the inference 'Ha Shogegin Peturin ...
Mipnei Tikun ha'Olam'.
(c) We derive the P'sul Melachah by ...
1. ... the Parah Adumah itself from the Pasuk in Chukas "Asher Lo Alah
(d) The Tana of the Beraisa says that someone who worked with either of
them - is Patur mi'Dinei Adam, but Chayav be'Dinei Shamayim.
2. ... the Mei Chatas - from the Pasuk there "le'Mishmeres le'Mei Nidah".
(a) Chizkiyah, according to whom he ought to be Chayav mi'Dinei Adam,
establishes the case of ...
1. ... Paras Chatas - when he brought the cow into the stable mainly for it
to suckle its baby, in which case his secondary intention of letting it
thresh simultaneously, is only a Machshavah, for which he is not Chayav.
(b) To resolve Rava, who validates Mei Chatas even mi'de'Rabbanan if one
used it to weigh with, we say 'Ha be'Gufan, Ha be'Kenegdan' - meaning that
Rava speaks in the way that we just explained, whereas the Beraisa speaks
when he actually poured water into a measuring vessel, and then places the
weight into it to see how high the water rises.
2. ... Mei Chatas - where the water is already placed on one of the scales,
and all he did was to place a piece of meat on the other scale. Here too,
the Melachah that he performed with the Mei Chatas is only be'Machshavah.
(c) We refute this answer - on the grounds that if that is how the Beraisa
speaks, then he ought to be Chayav be'Dinei Adam, too.
(d) After establishing both Beraisos in the case of Kenegdan, we finally
resolve Rava with the Beraisa - by establishing the Beraisa when he took his
mind off guarding the Mei Chatas against Tum'ah (which renders them Pasul
mi'de'Rabbanan), whereas Rava speaks when, despite his using it for
weighing, his mind is still on them.
(a) The Beraisa says that if someone stole a coin which was taken out of
circulation, Terumah which subsequently became Tamei or Chametz and Pesach
came and went - he can say to the owner 'Here is your's before you. Take
(b) If he were to lose these objects - he would be obligated to pay for them
(their value at the time when he stole them), because otherwise, he would
not fulfill the Mitzvah of "ve'Heishiv es ha'Gezeilah Asher Gazal"
(c) Despite the fact that the articles that he is returning are now useless,
he fulfills the Mitzvah of "ve'Heishiv ... ", because the Torah added the
words "Asher Gazal", and this is what he stole.
(d) We prove from this Beraisa - that 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar, Lo Sh'mei
Hezek' (like Rebbi Yochanan). Otherwise, he could not fulfill the Mitzvah
with the article which is now valueless.
(a) In another Beraisa, Rebbi Meir obligates a Metamei, Medamei and Menasech
to pay, irrespective of whether he did the damage be'Shogeg or be'Meizid.
Rebbi Yehudah says - 'be'Shogeg Patur, be'Meizid Chayav'.
(b) We propose the basis of their Machlokes to be - whether 'Hezek she'Eino
Nikar, Sh'mei Hezek' (Rebbi Meir), or not (Rebbi Yehudah).
(c) We learn that a Mazik be'Shogeg is Chayav - from the Pasuk in Mishpatim
"Petza Tachas Patza".
(d) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak concludes that both Rebbi Meir and Rebbi
Yehudah hold 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar, Lo Sh'mei Hezek'. The basis of their
Machlokes is - whether 'Kansu Shogeg Atu Meizid' (Rebbi Meir) or not (Rebbi
(a) Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa, permits someone who cooks on Shabbos be'Shogeg
to eat the food - 'be'Meizid Lo Yochal'.
(b) Rebbi Yehudah forbids the food to the Meizid forever - but be'Shogeg,
Yochal le'Motza'ei Shabbos'.
(c) We qualify Rebbi Yehudah's concession to eat it on Motza'ei Shabbos - by
permitting it only after the time that he would have needed to prepare it
(so as not to benefit from his sin).
(d) Rebbi Yehudah forbids the culprit to eat the food that he cooked on
Shabbos until Motza'ei Shabbos - because he holds 'Kansu Shogeg Atu Meizid'.
(a) Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar is the most stringent of all. He forbids
Meizid to be eaten by anybody ever - because he holds 'Ma'aseh Shabbos
(b) 'be'Shogeg', he says - Ye'achel le'Motza'ei Shabbos la'Acheirim ve'Lo
(c) We reconcile Rebbi Meir in this Beraisa, where he does not decree Shogeg
on account of Meizid, with his own opinion regarding Metamei, Medamei and
Menasech, where he does - by differentiating between Isurim d'Oraysa (where
he does not decree, because they do not require reinforcement) and Isurim
de'Rabbanan (where he does decree, because Rabbinical decrees need to be
(d) Granted, Menasech is d'Oraysa, yet he decrees - because of the
stringency of Yayin Nesech (which is a branch of Avodah-Zarah).
(a) We reconcile Rebbi Yehudah in this Beraisa, who decrees Shogeg on
account of Meizid, with his own opinion regarding Metamei, Medamei and
Menasech, where he does not, using the exact opposite logic that we used
with Rebbi Meir - Rebbi Yehudah decrees Shogeg Atu Meizid by Isurim
d'Oraysa, but not by Isurim de'Rabbanan.
(b) Sure, Menasech is d'Oraysa, yet he does not decree - because Yayin
Nesech is such a serious Isur, that it does not require reinforcement.
(a) In another Beraisa, Rebbi Meir obligates someone who plants in Shevi'is
to uproot what he planted 'bein be'Shogeg, bein be'Meizid' - 'be'Shabbos,
be'Shogeg Yekayem, be'Meizid Ye'aker'.
(b) Rebbi Yehudah obligates someone who plants on Shabbos to uproot what he
planted 'bein be'Shogeg, bein be'Meizid' - 'bi'Shevi'is, be'Shogeg Yekayem,
(c) Besides the discrepancy between Rebbi Meir's previous ruling (that he is
not Ko'nes Shogeg Atu Meizid by a d'Oraysa) and what his current ruling with
regard to Sh'mitah, we also have a problem with Rebbi Meir's opinion here
(in fact, the same problem exists in Rebbi Yehudah) - since he seems to
contradict himself from Shabbos to Shevi'is, seeing as both are d'Oraysa.
(a) In fact, Rebbi Meir's ruling regarding Shabbos conforms with his
previous opinion. His ruling regarding Shevi'is however, is based on two
considerations. The second of them, because Yisrael are suspect on
transgressing it (so Chazal decreed on Shogeg, too). The first consideration
is - the fact that since Yisrael need to count the years of planting (to
know when is Orlah and Neta Revai), people will easily be able to work out
retroactively that he must have planted the tree in the Shmitah.
Consequently, unless we were to decree even Shogeg, they would jump to the
conclusion that planting is permitted in Shevi'is (in which case, it is a
branch of Mar'is ha'Ayin).
(b) This reasoning does not apply to someone who planted on Shabbos
be'Shogeg - because there is no reason to count the days with regard to
planting, so nobody will have occasion to realize that he planted on
(c) It is possible to apply the same reasoning to someone who planted on
Shabbos be'Shogeg - in a case where he planted on Shabbos which fell on the
thirtieth day before Rosh Hashanah. When two years and thirty days later,
the fruit of the tree leave the realm of Orlah and become permitted, and
people will ask how fruit becomes permitted after two years, they will be
informed that this is because the tree was planted exactly thirty days
before Rosh Hashanah. This will bring to their attention the fact that it
was planted on Shabbos.
(d) By saying this - we answer the Kashya why Rebbi Meir found it necessary
to give his second explanation, pointing to a flaw in the first explanation,
which differentiates between counting the years and counting the days. And
he concludes that, even if people would realize that he planted the tree on
Shabbos, they would never come to permit planting on Shabbos.