ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Gitin 44
GITIN 44 & 45 - Sponsored by Rabbi Dr. Eli Turkel and his wife, Jeri Turkel.
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(a) We learned in a Beraisa that if a Nochri claimed one's Eved or a
Sikrikun took him, the Eved does not go free. The case of Sikrikun is - when
at a time when the murder of Jews was common, someone threatened a Jew's
life, and he offers him his slave to leave him be.
(b) The Chachamim did not decree in these two cases - because he neither
sold the Eved nor borrowed money against him. It was purely an O'nes.
(c) The Tana of another Beraisa says that if the king claimed one's granary
1. ... for his debt - he is obligated to Ma'aser it (from another source).
(d) The criterion for this is - whether he benefits from the claim (in which
case, it is as if he sold it) or not.
2. ... although the owner owed him nothing - he is Patur.
(a) We reconcile the first of the two previous Beraisos, which does not seem
to consider an Eved that is claimed against a debt, a sale, with the second
Beraisa, which does - by switching the criterion of the first Beraisa to the
fact that he was an O'nes, rather than the fact that it was not a sale.
(b) Rav rules that if someone sells his Eved to a Nochri Forhang, the Eved
goes free. A Forhang is - someone who takes people's fields by force.
(c) We resolve Rav's ruling with the Beraisa that does not obligate the
master to set free an Eved claimed by the king for his debt - by pointing
out that in Rav's case, he should have appeased the Forhang by offering him
money and retaining the Eved, something that is not possible when it is the
king who is claiming.
(d) We do not have a proof from Rav that if someone sells his Eved for
thirty days the Eved goes free (since it was common for the Forhang to
return the field after thirty days) - because Rav is speaking about a
Forhang who does not return what he claims.
(a) We ask whether if a master sells his Eved 'Chutz mi'Melachto', he goes
free. The case is that he only sells him to live with a Shifchah, to provide
his master with slaves, but not to work.
(b) We also ask from 'Chutz min ha'Mitzvos' and from 'Chutz mi'Shabbasos
ve'Yamim-Tovim'. Apart from 'le'Ger Toshav Mahu?' wew also ask - what the
Din will be if he sold him to a Kuti or a Yisrael Mumar.
(c) The only one of the above She'eilos that we resolve is that of Ger
Toshav, of which the Beraisa says 'Harei Hu ke'Oved-Kochavim'.
with regard to a Kuti and Yisrael Mumar - that according to some, they are
considered like a Yisrael (and do not go out to frredom), whereas according
to others, they are like an Akum (and they do).
(a) They asked Rebbi Ami whether, if an Eved cast himself upon a band of
robbers and the master is unable to retrieve him either in a Jewish Beis-Din
or in a Nochri court - he is permitted to accept payment for him or not.
(b) Rebbi Yirmiyah told Rebbi Zerika to look into the matter. Rebbi Zerika
quoted a Beraisa, which says - that ...
1. ... if someone sold a house to a Nochri in Eretz Yisrael) - he is not
permitted to accept payment for it.
(c) He is even permitted to take it to a Nochri court to have the deal
substantiated - because he is merely saving his money from falling into
2. ... if someone's house was taken by force and he is unable to retrieve it
either in a Jewish Beis-Din or in a Nochri court - he may.
(d) We might have thought that this at least, would be forbidden at all
costs - because it raises the esteem of the Nochrim and their gods (see
Rashi at the beginning of Mishpatim).
(a) The Eved (of our current She'eilah) might well be more stringent than
the house in the latter case - because whereas an Eved is not indispesible,
a house is. Consequently, it is unusual to sell it (and Chazal often waived
decrees in unusual cases).
(b) Rebbi Ami however, was convinced that he knew the Halachah. He sent
them - that an Eved had exactly the same Din as a house in this regard.
(c) Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi states that that if someone sells his Eved to a
Nochri, we penalise him by forcing him to redeem for anything him up to a
hundred times his value. We try to prove from Resh Lakish, who said that if
someone sells a large animal to a Nochri (which Chazal forbade in
Avodah-Zarah), we penalise him by forcing him to buy it back up to ten times
its value - that Rebbi Yehoshua did not mean literally a hundred times as
(d) We reject this proof on the grounds - that a slave might have a more
stringent ruling that a large animal, because every day, he is prevented
from observing Mitzvos (in which case Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi too, is
(a) Others - reverse the two Halachos. According to them, one is obligated
to pay up to ten times for selling an Eved, and a hundred times for a large
(b) After again asking whether Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi meant literally ten
times as much, and attempting to prove that he did not from Resh Lakish, we
try to reject the proof on the grounds that he has to pay less for the Eved,
because when he redeems him, he goes free, whereas the animal returns to
him. We reject this S'vara however, on the grounds that - that would account
for eleven times more than its value (instead of the Eved's ten); but a
(c) We finally establish that Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi, like Resh Lakish,
meant literally ten times. The reason that Chazal were so much more lenient
by an Eved than by a large animal is - because it is unusual to sell an Eved
to a Nochri, and whatever is unusual, Chazal tended to treat more leniently
(as we just explained).
(d) Rebbi Yirmiyah asked Rebbi Asi whether, if someone sold his Eved and
died, the penalty extends to his sons. We cannot learn from the case of ...
1. ... a Kohen who chipped the ear of a Bechor, where they penalized his
children, forbidding them to Shecht it just like he was - because there he
contravened a La'av d'Oraysa ("Kol Mum Lo Yiheyeh Bo" - Emor), whereas here,
he only contravened an Isur de'Rabbanan.
2. ... someone who performed work on Chol ha'Mo'ed that will cause a loss if
it is not performed, if he could have been performed it before Yom-Tov or
afterwards, where they did not, and his children are permitted to benefit
from that work - because there, he did not actually perform an Isur, whereas
here, he did.
(a) The basis of Rebbi Yirmiyah's She'eilah whether the penalty for selling
one's slave extends to the master's children or not is - whether Chazal
penalized the sinner (and not his children), or the object with which the
sin was performed (irrespective of whether it is owned by the sinner himself
or by his sons).
(b) The Mishnah permits a field from which the thorns were removed in the
Sh'mitah year to be sown in the following year. They did not penalize the
owner - because there is nothing wrong with removing thorns in the
(c) The Tana does however - forbid sowing in the following year, a field
that one manured (manually) or by placing animals there to manure it in the
1. Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina says that - if someone did so and then died,
Chazal did not penalize his sons after him (which also resolves our
She'eilah regarding selling his Eved to a Nochri).
2. Abaye says that if someone rendered Tamei his friend's Taharos and then
died - Chazal did not penalize his sons after him, because, seeing as the
damage is not discernible, the obligation to pay is only a K'nas
mi'de'Rabbanan, and as we just learned, the Rabbanan punished the sinner
and not the article.
(a) The Tana Kama of a Beraisa rules that if someone sells his Eved to
Chutzah la'Aretz, the Eved goes free and he requires a Get Shichrur - from
(b) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel makes a distinction ... . 'P'loni Antuchi'
means - 'so-and-so who lives in Anti'och' (a town in Syria).
(c) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel says that, if the master sold him ...
1. ... 'li'P'loni Antuchi' - he does not go free, because it merely means
that the purchaser was born there, but not that he currently lives there.
(d) The Tana of another Beraisa nevertheless writes 'Machartihu le'Antuchi,
Yeitzei' - because he speaks when the Antuchi does not own a house in Eretz
Yisrael, but is only renting there (in which case, he clearly intends to
return, with the Eved, to Anti'och), whereas the previous Beraisa speaks
when he owns a house in Eretz Yisrael.
2. ... 'le'Antuchi she'be'Antuchya' - he goes free, because it is clear that
the purchaser intended to take him back to Anti'och.
(a) The Tana of the latter Beraisa concedes that 'le'Antuchi' does not go
free - if he adds 'le'Antuchi ha'Sharuy be'Lud', in which case, he clearly
did not intend the purchaser to take the Eved to Anti'och.
(b) Rebbi Yirmiyah asked whether, if a ben Bavel who married a woman in
Eretz Yisrael who brought Avadim and Shefachos into the marriage, and who,
we assume, intends to return to Bavel - they go free or not.
(c) If we hold (with regard to Nechsei Tzon Barzel) ...
1. ... that, in the event of divorce, 'ha'Din Imah' (she is entitled to take
back the articles that she brought in) - Rebbi Yirmiyah's She'eilah will be
that the Avadim might nevertheless be considered her husband's, since they
are Meshubad to him.
(d) The outcome of the She'eilah is - 'Teiku'.
2. ... that 'ha'Din Imo' (her husband is entitled to give her money and
retain the articles) - Rebbi Yirmiyah's She'eilah will be that the Avadim
might nevertheless be considered the wife's, since the husband does not
acquire the body of the Eved.
(a) Rebbi Avahu quoted Rebbi Yochanan that if an Eved follows his master to
Syria, and the master then sells him there, he goes free. Rebbi Chiya quotes
a Beraisa which says 'Ibad es Zechuso' - meaning that, by leaving Eretz
Yisrael of his own accord, the Eved loses his right to go free should his
master sell him there.
(b) We reconcile Rebbi Yochanan with the Beraisa - by establishing his case
when the master intended to return to Eretz Yisrael, in which case, the Eved
expected to return with him, whereas the Beraisa speaks when he had the
intention of remaining in Chutz la'Aretz.
(c) We cite another Beraisa which makes this very distinction. The problem
with the initial text '*Yotze* ha'Eved Achar Rabo le'Surya, Im Da'as Rabo
Lachzor Kofin Oso ... ' is - that the Mishnah in Kesuvos teaches us that the
members of a person's household are not obligated to follow him to Chutz
(d) Consequently, the correct text is '*Yatza* ha'Eved Achar Rabo le'Surya,
Im Da'as Rabo Lachzor Kofin Oso ... '.
(a) Rav Anan heard two things from Shmuel. One of them is the same Halachah
as stated by Rebbi Avahu Amar Rebbi Yochanan. The other follows a Statement
by Rav that if someone sells a field in the Yovel year, the sale is valid,
but it reverts to the seller immediately. Shmuel argue with Rav. He holds
'Einah Mechurah Kol Ikar' - because, if a field that has been sold returns
to the owner in the Yovel year, it stands to reason that a field that has
not been sold cannot be sold then.
(b) Rav Anan says about the two statements of Shmuel - that by one of them,
the sale is valid and the money is returned to the owner immediately, and by
the other, the money remains where it is, only he could not recall which was
(c) What Rav Anan could not remember, Rav Yosef extrapolated from a Beraisa.
The Beraisa says that an Eved whose master sold him to Chutz la'Aretz goes
free, and requires a Sh'tar Shichrur from his second master.
(d) Rav Yosef extrapolates from the fact that the second master is obligated
to give him a Get Shichrur indicates that the sale is valid (and the money
remains where it is) - then it must be in the case of someone who sells a
field in the Yovel that Shmuel holds that it is invalid.
(a) Rav Anan did not think of extrapolating from the Beraisa like Rav
Yosef - because he had not seen the Beraisa.
(b) Neither did he extrapolate from Shmuel himself, who said in the case of
'ha'Mocher Sadeihu bi'Sh'nas ha'Yovel' Einah Mechurah Kol Ikar', that the
sale is invalid (implying that the money returns to the buyer) - because
that does not preclude the possibility of the money remaining in the hand of
(c) The precedent for saying that the transaction is Bateil, yet the seller
retains the money is - a case where someone marries his sister, where Shmuel
holds that the money is considered a gift and the woman retains it.
(d) Rav disagrees. According to him - she must return the money.
(a) In the previous case, we ask why the Chachamim chose to punish the
buyer, rather than the seller. We initially answer 'La'av Achb'ra Ganav, Ela
Chora Ganav - meaning that even though it is the seller who sins (like a
mouse who steals one's food), if not for the purchaser (who offers to
purchase his goods), the seller would not be able to sin (just like the hole
in the Mashal, which enables the mouse to steal).
(b) We reject this answer however, on the grounds - that the opposite is
true; if not for the mouse, there would be no hole, and similarly, if people
did not offer to sell their property, there would be no purchasers (in other
words, the ultimate culprits are the mouse and the seller).
(c) The reason that the purchaser is penalized and not the seller
is -because Chazal decided to punish the one who is currently holding the