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Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Gitin 30

GITIN 29 & 30 - have been anonymously dedicated by a very special Marbitz Torah and student of the Daf from Ramat Beit Shemesh, Israel.



(a) The man who stipulated that if he failed to arrive within thirty days, the Get that he gave his wife was to be valid - arrived at the end of the thirty day period but was delayed due to his inability to find the river-crossing.

(b) Following the man's cries 'Chazu de'Asa'i, Chazu de'Asa'i' - Shmuel ruled that, when all's said and done, he had not arrived.

(c) We do not have an absolute proof from here that 'Ein O'nes be'Gitin' ('there is no such thing as an O'nes by a condition on a Get') - because even 'Yesh O'nes be'Gitin' only applies to an O'nes that one could not have anticipated, whereas the O'nes under discussion, could have been anticipated, and should therefore have been stipulated.

(a) The man who stipulated that if he did not appease his wife within thirty days, the Get that he had given her was to be valid - did indeed attempt to pacify her, but she refused to be appeased.

(b) According to the first Lashon, Rav Yosef ruled there that he could have pacified her by offering her three Kav of Dinrim (even though he did not possess so much money). According to the second Lashon, he ruled - that seeing as the man had done all within his power to pacify his wife, he is an O'nes, and the Get is not valid.

(c) The basis of the Machlokes between the two Leshonos is - whether we hold 'Yesh O'nes be'Gitin' (the second Lashon) or 'Ein O'nes be'Gitin' (the first Lashon).

(a) The Tana of our Mishnah rules that someone who lends money to a Kohen, a Levi or a poor man - may stipulate that he will exact payment of his loan from his own Terumah, Ma'aser Rishon or Ma'aser Ani respectively, selling the first of these to Kohanim, and eating the latter two himself, should he so wish.

(b) After the death of the original debtors however, he may not continue to do this, without permission from the debtors' heirs - because they are not obligated to repay their father's debts.

(c) If the original loan took place in front of Beis-Din then the original Din prevails - because Beis-Din place a debt of this nature on the entire tribe, in order to make it easier for them to obtain loans (similar to the Takanah of 'Ne'ilas Deles' that Chazal initiated in various areas of Halachah pertaining to loans).

(a) Rav asks on our Mishnah from the fact that the particular Kohen or Levi did not actually make a Kinyan on his creditor's Terumah. The problem is - how the creditor is then able to take it in lieu of payment, since this appears be stealing from the rest of the tribe?

(b) Rav answers 'be'Makirei Kehunah' - meaning that the debtors are the regular recipients of his Terumos and Ma'asros. Consequently, other Kohanim and Levi'im will have despaired from receiving anything, eliminating any question of theft.

(c) According to Shmuel, the Tana speaks when the creditor actually asks a third person to acquire the Terumah on behalf of the debtor, before selling or eating it. Ula establishes the author of our Mishnah like Rebbi Yossi who says - that Chazal declared the Kohen and Levi in question Zocheh (like we explained above in the case where the loan took place in front of Beis-Din). He maintains this in many places in Shas.

(d) The two disputants of Rav and Shmuel respectively, decline to learn like them because the Tana made no mention of 'Makirei Kehunah' or of 'making a 'Kinyan'. Rav and Shmuel decline to learn like Ula - because his opinion is an individual one.

(a) The Beraisa further permits the creditor to fix the price of repayments (of the Terumah ... ) at the cheap market price in advance of its fixing. Bearing in mind that, on the assumption that the basic price has already been fixed (see Maharam DH 'u'Posek'), this is always the case - the Chidush is that we assume this to be the case even without specifically stipulating it.

(b) Even assuming that the basic price has not yet been fixed, this is not Ribis - because, in the eventuality of the field becoming swamped, he will not be able to claim his debt, removing the La'av of "Lo Yigos". Consequently, even when the field does *not* become swamped, he does not transgress "Lo Yigos" either.

(c) We just learned that if the field became swamped, there is nothing the creditor can do about it - because the debtor already acquired the money. Rav Papa permits the debtor to retract - because the creditor did not acquire the crops (according to Levi opinion cited earlier, who maintains that 'Asu she'Eino Zocheh ke'Zocheh' [like Rebbi Yossi]).

(a) If the creditor verbally despairs of receiving payment for his loan, the Tana of the Beraisa prohibits him from claiming it. This speaks - when the field that became swamped, the crops had already begun to grow, and subsequently continued to grow once the field dried.

(b) The Chidush is - that, seeing as the crops had already begun to grow when the field was swamped, their continued growth should have been expected, and consquently, the creditor's Yi'ush might not have been a proper Yi'ush. So the Beraisa informs us that it is.

(c) Assuming that the loan took place in Beis-Din, Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov permits the creditor in the above case, if the debtor ...

1. ... the Kohen or the Levi dies - to separate Terumah or Ma'aser on behalf of the next of kin in the tribe.
2. ... the poor man dies - to separate Ma'aser Ani on behalf of all the remaining poor.
(d) In the latter case, Rebbi Achi disagrees. He says 'be'Chezkas Aniyei Olam' - including the poor Kutim, whom he considers to have been Geyrei Emes (genuine proselytes), whereas Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov specifies 'Aniyei Yisrael', but not Kutim (whom he considers Geyrei Arayos (as having converted only out of fear of lions).



(a) The Tana of the Beraisa says - that in a case where the poor man becomes wealthy, the creditor is no longer permitted to separate Ma'asros as repayment for his loan, which the debtor is now permitted to keep (since that was the condition on which he received the loan.

(b) The reason that the Rabbanan made a Takanah on behalf of the creditor in the case when the debtor died, but not when he became wealthy is - because the former is common, whereas the latter is not (conforming with the rule that Chazal confined their Takanos to cases that are common).

(c) This distinction gave rise to the idiom 'When your friend dies, be confident that you stand to gain, but not when he becomes wealthy'.

(a) We learned in our Mishnah that if the debtor dies, the creditor may not continue to take the Ma'asros as payment of his loan without the heirs' express permission. Rebbi Yochanan explains Rebbi, who says in a Beraisa 'Yorshim she'Yarshu', to mean - that it is only if their father left them Karka, that their permission will allow him to continue using his Ma'asros to claim his debt, but not if he left only Metaltelin (since children are only obligated to pay their father's debts when he leaves them Karka, but not when he leaves them only Metaltelin).

(b) Rebbi Yonasan permits the creditor to claim his loan up to the value of the Karka that the debtor left his children. According to Rebbi Yochanan - even if he left them an area the size of a needle, the creditor may take Ma'asros that cover an area the size of a spade (i.e. up to the amount of the debt), because it is possible to claim this over and over again.

(c) We compare this to the case of 'Ketina de'Abaye' in Kesuvos - where the creditor claimed his debt of a hundred Zuz from the field worth fifty Zuz that the deceased debtor left the Yesomim. Then, when the Yesomim, bought it back for fifty Zuz, he claimed it again, to cover the rest of the loan.

(a) According to Abaye's interpretation of the Beraisa, if a Yisrael gives a Levi money against the Ma'aser that he separated from his crops, and says to the Levi '*Ma'aser* Yesh Lecha be'Yadi ve'Heilech Damav', we do not suspect that the Levi then declared it Terumas Ma'aser on other Ma'aser that he had received. The difference between this case and where the Yisrael said '*Kur Ma'aser* Yesh Lecha be'Yadi, ve'Heilech Damav', where we *do* is - that in the former case, we know that the Levi cannot have declared it Terumas Ma'aser, because he does not know how much Ma'aser there is to make such a declaration.

(b) We object to Abaye's interpretation of the Beraisa on the grounds - that it is not the way of Tana'im to speak about Resha'im (who take money and promptly declare the Ma'aser of the purchaser, Terumas Ma'aser). (See Tosfos DH 'ha'Meni'ach').

(c) Rav Mesharshaya Brei de'Rav Idi therefore amends Abaye's interpretation of the Beraisa to - when the creditor said (not that he had Ma'aser belonging to the seller, whom we then suspect of declaring it Terumas Ma'aser, but) that he had Ma'aser belonging to the seller's father, whom we suspect, might have declared it Terumas Ma'aser during his life-time.

(d) We refute Rav Mesharshaya's explanation on the grounds - that we would not suspect a Chaver (the Tana is obviously not speaking about an Am ha'Aretz) of separating Terumas Ma'aser from what is not 'Mukaf'.

(a) Rav Ashi finally explains the Beraisa - when it is the purchaser who is telling the seller that he is buying from him Ma'aser which his father left him, and which we suspect he might have declared Terumas Ma'aser during his life-time.

(b) A Yisrael may separate Terumas Ma'aser, according to Aba Elazar ben Gamla, as we shall now see.

(a) Aba Elazar ben Gamla extrapolates from the Pasuk in Korach "ve'Nechshav Lachem Terumaschem ka'Dagan min ha'Goren ... " that the Pasuk is referring to two Terumos - because on the one hand, the Pasuk is talking to the Levi'im, in which case the first of the two phrases must be referring to Terumas Ma'aser, whereas "ke'Dagan min ha'Goren" by definition, refers to Terumah Gedolah.

(b) We learn that Terumas Ma'aser can be separated by assessment (without the need to measure it accurately) from the Torah's comparison to Terumah Gedolah. We know that this is so by Terumah Gedolah - from the fact that, min ha'Torah, Terumah has no Shiur ('even one grain exempts the entire pile'). In that case, why should it be necessary to measure the excess that one gives.

(c) "ve'Nechshav Lachem Terumaschem" teaches us - that both Terumah Gedolah and Terumas Ma'aser can be separated in the mind alone (without verbalizing the separation - 'Nosen Einav be'Tzad Zeh le'Shem Terumah, ve'Ochel be'Tzad Zeh').

(d) Aba Elazar ben Gamla also learns from the comparison of Terumas Ma'aser to Terumah Gedolah - that just as the owner separates Terumah Gedolah, so too, is he permitted to separate Terumas Ma'aser.

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