ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Gitin 14
GITIN 14 & 15 - have been anonymously dedicated by a very special Marbitz
Torah and student of the Daf from Ramat Beit Shemesh, Israel.
(a) Rav Ashi suggests the reason that Ma'amad Sheloshtan applies even to a
loan is because, due to the extended time period, the debtor gladly
obligates himself to the new creditor. But Rav Huna the grandson of Rav
Nechemyah refutes this suggestion by referring to people the likes of Bei
bar Elyashiv - who were tough guys, and who, in the above circumstances,
would claim the money immediately (allowing no extension of the loan).
(b) This creates a problem with Rav Ashi's explanation - inasmuch as this
would mean that whenever the third person belonged to that caliber of
people, Ma'amad Sheloshtan would not apply (whereas in fact, no such
(c) We cannot differentiate between the majority of people and people of the
caliber of Bei bar Elyashiv - because of the principle 'Im Kein, Nasata
Devarecha le'Shi'urin' (Chazal did not make such distinctions in their
decrees, applying them to some, but not to others).
(a) Mar Zutra finally explains - that Ma'amad Sheloshtan is not based on
logic at all, but is 'ke'Hilchesa be'Lo Ta'ama' (as if it was a Halachah
(b) The right to institute Halachos without any real reason - is based on
the principle 'Hefker Beis-Din Hefker' (the free hand in transferring money
from one person to another, whenever they see fit to do so).
(a) Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel said that if someone writes all his property to
his wife - he has appointed her a manager over it (but she does not acquire
(b) And Rav Chananyah said that if someone marries off his eldest son in a
house that belongs to him but in which he does not reside - the son acquires
(c) What these two Halachos have in common with Rav's Din of Ma'amad
Sheloshtan is - that Mar Zutra lists all three as 'Hitches be'Lo Ta'ama'.
(a) Having instructed the trustee (or the debtor) to hand the deposit (or
the loan) to a third person, the owner (or the creditor) - is not permitted
(b) Rav deposited - a Kaba de'Morika (a Kav of spice called safflower) by
Rav Acha Bardela.
(c) When, in the presence of the recipient, Rav instructed Rav Acha Bardela
to hand it to him, adding that he would not retract - he meant that since
the third person was present, he could not retract even if he wanted to.
(d) Despite the fact that he had already stated this with regard to someone
who deposited (or lent) a Manah, he nevertheless found it necessary to
repeat it here - to teach us that, even a deposit as small as a Kav of
Morika also requires the presence of the recipient to finalize the
(a) One of a group of gardeners thought that he owed his colleagues five
Istiri Zuzi - meaning five Sela Medinah (each of which is an eighth of a
Sela Tzuri, or half a Dinar [see Rashash]).
(b) His colleagues instructed him to give the money to the owner of the land
(for whom they worked).
(c) When the gardener came before Rav Nachman initially (in order to
retract) - he initially cited Rav's ruling of 'Ma'amad Sheloshtan', from
which he could not retract. And besides, he pointed out, the gardeners had
made a Kinyan, which further weakened his hand.
(d) He changed his mind however - when the gardener told him that he was not
going back on the transaction, but that he did not owe them the money in the
first place. Consequently, Rav Nachman absolved him from having to pay,
because it was a Kinyan made in error.
(a) Rav says that if one man asks another to take a Manah to his creditor,
he remains responsible to replace it should anything happen to the money,
yet he cannot retract. Shmuel says - that since he is responsible to replace
it, he also has the right to retract.
(b) Even if, as we suggest, they argue over whether 'Holech ki'Z'chi (Rav)
or not (Shmuel), he will nevertheless be held responsible in the event of
an accident occurring according to Rav - because the creditor did not ask
for the money to be returned to him.
(c) We conclude that both Rav and Shmuel hold 'Holech ki'Z'chi', and the
basis of their Machlokes is - whether we say 'Migu' ( since he is
responsible to replace it, he also has the right to retract [Shmuel]) or not
(d) Shmuel will agree that he cannot retract - in the case of a gift, where
for obvious reasons he cannot be held responsible.
(a) In the previous case (of Holech ki'Z'chi), we will rule like Rav,
despite the principle 'Halachah ki'Sh'muel be'Dini' ('the Halachah is like
Shmuel in money-matters') - because there is a Beraisa which supports Rav.
(b) We obligate a trustee who gives a deposit to a second person to look
after - because the owner can say 'I do not want my article to be in the
hands of another person!' (i.e. 'I gave it to you to look after, and to you
(c) The Tana, who rules that if a trustee says 'Holech Manah li'P'loni
Pikadon she'Yesh Lo be'Yadi', he cannot retract - is speaking when the
trustee has already been proven to be dishonest, in which case we can take
for granted that the owner will be only be too pleased for the article to
(a) Rav Sheishes had sold coats to businessmen in Mechuza on credit (and it
seems that they had retracted from the sale) and he now wanted them back.
(b) He asked - Rav Yosef to bring them back with him when he returned from
(c) The businessmen asked to make a Kinyan from him before he set out on his
return journey - in order to obligate him to accept liability, should
anything happen to the coats on the way. He said he would comply, but evaded
having to do it.
(d) When, upon Rav Yosef's return, Rav Sheishes quoted the Pasuk "Eved Loveh
le'Ish Malveh" - he meant ...
1. ... either to commend Rav Yosef on his astuteness in evading the
accepting responsibility (because "a debtor is a slave to the creditor").
2. ... to rebuke him for not accepting his responsibilities.
(a) Rebbi Dustai b'Rebbi Yanai and Rebbi Yossi bar Kipar undertook to return
some silver in a container from Neherda'a on behalf of Rebbi Achi b'Rebbi
Yoshiyah. When Rebbi Dustai b'Rebbi Yanai and Rebbi Yossi bar Kipar declined
to make a Kinyan - the men of Neherda'a responded by demanding the silver
(b) Rebbi Dustai b'Rebbi Yanai agreed to return the silver immediately -
because he was afraid of them (for reasons that will soon become apparent).
(c) When the men of Neherda'a, who were beating Rebbi Yossi bar Kipar for
refusing to return it, complained to him about his colleague's obstinacy -
he commented 'Beat him more!' (or 'He deserves to be beaten!')
(d) Rebbi Yossi bar Kipar refused to return the silver - because once the
Sheli'ach receives the money, the trustee is not permitted to retract, like
Rav on the previous Amud.
(a) When, upon their return, Rebbi Achi b'Rebbi Yoshiyah asked Rebbi Dustai
b'Rebbi Yanai why he agreed to return the silver immediately, he described
the frightening appearance of the men of Neherda'a. He described ...
1. ... their size - as men of measure (extremely tall) see Agados Maharsha.
(b) According to Rebbi Dustai b'Rebbi Yanai, if those men threatened to tie
somebody up or kill him - then they would.
2. ... their clothes - weird and frightening.
3. ... their voices - as deep-sounding (as if they emerged from their
4. ... their names - unusual (and fear-inspiring).
(c) He therefore feared for his life to cross swords with them, since nobody
would be able to provide his father Yanai with a son like him.
(d) Rebbi Achi b'Rebbi Oshaya finally vindicated him - when he added that
they were close to the king, and that horses and mules ran behind them (a
sign of power).
(a) If the Sheli'ach who brought the Sh'tar was unable to find the
recipient, two Tana'im argue over what to do. According to the Tana of one
Beraisa, he must return the Sh'tar to the Meshale'ach. According to the Tana
of the other Beraisa, he gives it to the heirs of the recipient. We try to
establish the Machlokes as to whether 'Holech ki'Z'chi' (the latter Tana),
or not (the former Tana).
(b) Rebbi Aba bar Mamal however, maintains that both Tana'im hold 'Holech
La'av ki'Z'chi'. The Tana who rules that it should be given to the heirs of
the recipient however - is speaking about a Shechiv-Mera (whose 'Holech' is
(c) According to Rav Z'vid, both Beraisos speak about a Shechiv-Mera, and
the reason of the Tana who holds that it should be returned to the
Meshale'ach is - because he is speaking in a case when the recipient had
already died when the Sh'tar was handed to the Sheli'ach (only the
Meshale'ach was unaware of it).
(d) Rav Papa establishes both Beraisos by a healthy Meshale'ach. The
Sheli'ach gives the Sh'tar ...
1. ... back to the Meshale'ach - when the recipient died during the
life-time of the Meshale'ach (and the Shelichus became Bateil [even if the
Meshale'ach died immediately afterwards]).
2. ... to the heirs of the recipient - if the Meshale'ach died after having
handed the Sh'tar to the Sheli'ach (when it becomes a Mitzvah to fulfill the
command of the deceased).
(a) The Tana Kama in another Beraisa rules that in the case of 'Holech Manah
li'P'loni u'Biksho ve'Lo Matz'o', the Sheli'ach must return the money to the
Meshale'ach. If the Meshale'ach died, Rebbi Nasan and Rebbi Ya'akov say that
he should return the money to his heirs. According to Yesh Omrim - he gives
it to the heirs of the recipient.
(b) Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi Mishum Rebbi Ya'akov Mishum Rebbi Meir cites the
principle 'Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Meis' - and the Chachamim say
(c) The most unusual ruling is that of ve'Ka'an Amru, who hold 'Shuda
de'Dayna' - meaning that it is left to the Dayan (in this case, the
Sheli'ach) to act according to his assessment of the donor's intentions.
(d) 'Ka'an' - means in Bavel.
(a) Assuming the key issue among the Tana'im in the above Beraisa to be
whether we say 'Holech ki'Z'chi' or not, the Tana Kama ('Biksho ve'Lo
Matz'o, Yachzero li'Meshale'ach') on the one hand, and Rebbi Nasan and Rebbi
Ya'akov ('Meis Meshale'ach, Yachzero le'Yorshei Meshale'ach) on the other,
as well as Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi ('Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Meis') all
hold - 'Holech La'av ki'Z'chi'.
(b) Rebbi Ya'akov and Rebbi Nasan argue with Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi -
inasmuch as they do not hold 'Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Meis'.
(c) Yesh Omrim ('le'Yorshei Mi she'Nishtalchu Eilav') clearly holds 'Holech
ki'Z'chi'. The Chachamim ('Yachloku') - are uncertain whether 'Holech
ki'Z'chi', and whether 'Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Meis'.
(a) The final opinion is that of Rebbi Shimon ha'Nasi, who cites an episode
when the ruling was 'Yachzeru le'Yorshei Meshale'ach'. He actually concurs
with the opinion of Rebbi Nasan and Rebbi Ya'akov, and - based on the
principle 'Ma'aseh Rav' he is coming to prove that they are right.
(b) We conclude however, that the Tana'im argue in the case of a
Shechiv-Mera. They all agree with regard to the gift of a healthy man - that
'Holech La'av ki'Z'chi'.
(c) In fact, they argue over the same point as Rebbi Elazar and the Rabbanan
in another Beraisa. According to Rebbi Elazar, a Shechiv-Mera who
distributes his property requires a Kinyan (Kesef, Sh'tar or Chazakah for
property; Meshichah for movable objects); whereas the Chachamim hold - that
they are both acquired automatically with his words alone.
(a) The Chachamim attempted to prove their point from the case concerning
the dying mother of the B'nei Ruchal - who bequeathed her expensive brooch
to her daughter without any form of Kinyan, and whose words the Chachamim
(b) The brooch was worth - twelve Manah.
(c) Rebbi Elazar repudiated the Chachamim's proof - on the grounds that the
B'nei Ruchal were Resha'im who were cursed and whose words were therefore
not discussed in the Beis-Hamedrash. Consequently, the case became misquoted
(because really a Kinyan had taken place).
(d) Rebbi Elazar branded them as Resha'im - because they allowed thorns to
grow in their vineyards, thereby transgressing (at least, in his opinion)
the La'av of Kil'ayim be'Kerem.