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Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Eruvin 71

ERUVIN 71 - sponsored by a generous grant from an anonymous donor. Kollel Iyun Hadaf is indebted to him for his encouragement and support and prays that Hashem will repay him in kind.



(a) In the Beraisa 'Mes Ger Mi'be'od Yom, Af Al Gav she'Hichzik Yisrael Acher bi'Nechasav, Oser' - Rav Nachman interprets the word 'Oser' to mean only until he makes Bitul, but not after that (as we just explained earlier).

(b) Beis Shamai say that Bitul Reshus can only be performed *before* Shabbos, but not *on* Shabbos.

(a) To say that, if the convert died 'Mi'be'od Yom, *Af Al Pi* she'Hichzik Yisrael Acher bi'Nechasav, Oser' - suggests that the same should apply if another Jew would not have acquired the convert's property before Shabbos. But how can that be? Why should the Jew be forbidden to carry when there is nobody else living in the Chatzer?

(b) Rav Papa therefore amends the Beraisa to read 'Af Al Pi she'Lo Hichzik', which he explains to mean that, although the man did not acquire the property until after Shabbos arrived, he nevertheless forbids carrying there. The principle of 'Kol she'Mutar le'Miktzas Shabbos' ... will not apply here, since the man who acquired the property had the option of acquiring it *before* Shabbos entered, the Reshus was in abeyance and 'Mutar le'Miktzas Shabbos' only applies when the Heter is absolute..

(c) The case of 'K'lach Eitzel Yafos' - concerns Terumah: If the owner says to someone whom he discovers taking Terumah from his crops (without having been appointed a Shli'ach) 'Why don't you go and take better quality?' Then, if there are better quality crops, then we assume that he meant what he said, revealing his intention of appointing him a Sheli'ach retroactively. Here too, says Ula, Beis Hillel permit Bitul Reshus on Shabbos, for the same reason - because when he is Mevatel Reshus, he demonstrates that he agrees with the Eruv retroactively.

(d) The Gemara concludes that according to Beis Shamai, Bitul Reshus is a transaction, which may not be performed on Shabbos (since it resembles making a purchase, which is forbidden on Shabbos); whereas according to Beis Hillel, it is no more than 'Siluk Reshus' (a withdrawal from one's Reshus), which is not similar to making a purchase.

(a) According to Rav, Reuven joining Shimon and Levi's wine business, means that all three neighbors pour their wine into one barrel. That is when no Eruv is required, but not when the wine is placed in *two* barrels.

(b) If the Mishnah was speaking even by *two* vessels (to absolve them from an Eruv even *there*) argues Rava in support of Rav - then why would there be a difference between wine and wine (which the Tana absolves from the need to make an Eruv) and wine and oil (which he does not).

(c) Abaye rejects Rava's proof on the grounds that - the Mishnah may well absolve wine and wine from an Eruv, even when it is in *two* vessels, because they *can* be poured into *one*; whereas wine and oil can*not*.

(a) 'Rebbi Shimon Omer, Echad Zeh ve'Echad Zeh, Einan Tzerichin Eruv'. our Mishnah is speaking, says Rabah, not by neighbors who are making *one* Eruv, but by neighbors who are making *two* (and when each of the two outer courtyards open into a Mavoy. Rebbi Shimon in fact, follows his own reasoning, because in 'Mi she'Hotziuhu', he permits the residents of a Chatzer to participate in a Shituf Mavu'os with the Chatzer and Mavoy on one side, and with the Chatzer and Mavoy on the other side (permitting them to combone with him, but not with each other). - He does not forbid them to combine with him for fear that they may combine with each other. Similarly in our case, Rebbi Shimon permits the middle courtyard to carry in each of the neighbor's courtyards, and they in his, on account of the partnership - irrespective of whether they are both wine or oil, or whether the one is wine and the other, oil.

(b) Although the outer neighbors are permitted to carry in the middle Chatzer, they are not permitted to carry in each other's (since they did not make a joint Shituf (in the original case of Rebbi Shimon, and a joint partnership, in ours).

(c) The Rabbanan now hold that, when the outer neighbors used wine and shared the same vessel as their middle neighbor, then it is as if they had combined to make a Shituf Mavu'os; whereas if they combined one with wine and the other with oil, which are not fit to combine, then each of the neighbors remains independent, and it is not considered as if they had combined.

(d) When Rebbi Shimon says 'Ein Tzerichin le'Arev' - he is referring to the neighbors i.e. the Reuven with Shimon and Reuven with Levi, but not to Shimon and Levi, who are prohibited from carrying in each other's courtyard unless they make an Eruv.




(a) According to the Rabbanan, if a Tevul Yom touches oil that is floating on wine (both of which are Terumah), he renders the oil Pasul but not the wine, because they are *not* considered joined; whereas Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri holds that both are Pasul, because they *are*.

(b) Our Mishnah now speaks when they poured the oil and the wine into the same barrel - Rebbi Shimon holds that, since both the wine and the oil were poured into one barrel, the Shutfus of the middle one with the other two becomes one Shutfus (as far as *he* is concerned), and serves as an Eruv, permitting him to carry into both of his neighbors' Chatzeros; whereas according to the Rabbanan, since the wine and the oil do not combine, it cannot be considered to be one Shutfus and cannot therefore serve as an Eruv.

(a) According to Rabah - the Machlokes between Rebbi Elazar ben Tadai and the Rabbanan speaks when they bought a barrel of wine in partnership; Rebbi Elazar ben Tadai holds 'Ein Bereirah' (since neither of them has provided his own wine, it is as if they gave money, and the Eruv is invalid); the Rabbanan hold 'Yesh Bereirah'.

(b) For Eruv Chatzeros one requires bread (because the essence of Eruv is *to combine the houses*, whose main function is residence - and a person fixes his residence over bread, not over wine); whereas for Shituf Mavu'os (whose main function is *to combine the courtyards*, wine is also eligible.

(c) Rav Yosef explains the Machlokes with regard to making a Shituf Mavu'os with wine (similar to the way that Rabah learnt above on Amud Aleph - to explain the Machlokes between the Tana Kama and Rebbi Shimon); the Rabbanan learn that one *can rely on the Shituf Mavu'os made with wine to double as an Eruv Chatzeros* (to permit them to carry from one Chatzer to the other); whereas Rebbi Elazar ben Tadai holds that one *cannot*.

(d) Rebbi Meir rules that if the residents of the various courtyards in each of the Mavu'os made their own Eruv, they will nevertheless require a separate Shituf, and vice-versa. Now surely, when Rav ruled both like Rebbi Meir and like Rebbi Shimon ben Tada'i that was because he maintained that they are both saying the same thing - that one cannot rely on a Shituf Mavu'os to double as an Eruv Chatzeros (like Rav Yosef explained).

(a) When Abaye queries Rav Yosef's proof on the grounds that Rav would then need to issue the same ruling twice - he is referring to the need to rule like Rebbi Elazar ben Tadai; having already ruled like Rebbi Meir (who, we will establish later, is speaking when *bread* is being used), that a Shituf Mavu'os on *bread* does not double as an Eruv Chatzeros, is it not then obvious that a Shituf Mavu'os on *wine* will not be effective for an Eruv Chatzeros?

(b) In one place the Rabbanan argue with Rebbi Meir (with regard to a Shituf Mavu'os doubling as an Eruv Chatzeros) when bread is used, but agree with him by wine, whereas in our Mishnah they (different Rabbanan) argue with him by wine too. Consequently, to have ruled like Rebbi Meir completely, would have meant issuing *two* rulings Lechumra, and that is something that is not done by Eruvin. That is why Rav first ruled like Rebbi Elazar ben Tadai by wine, and only then, did he add 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Meir', with regard to a Shituf Mavu'os on bread. In this way, he is issuing two independent rulings Lechumra, rather than one double ruling.

(a) One *may* use bread for a Shituf Mavu'os - in fact, bread is even better than wine.

(b) According to those who establish the Machlokes between the Rabbanan and Rebbi Meir argue - Rebbi Meir requires a separate Eruv Chatzeros, because we simply cannot rely on a Shituf for an Eruv, and not on an Eruv for a Shituf (The Beraisa actually says 'she'Lo Leshakach Toras Eruv min ha'Tinokos', a good reason why a Shituf will not double as an Eruv; it is unclear however, why an Eruv should not double as a Shituf - unless that is, we extend the principle of 'she'Lo Tishtakach' to Shituf Mavu'os.)

(a) The Gemara initially understand - to mean 'O Me'arvin' - in the courtyard with bread, 'O Mishtatfin' - with wine (since both of these are the normal way of making an Eruv and a Shituf respectively. So we see that the Rabbanan argue by wine too.

(b) Rav Gidal quoting Rav however, establishes even 'O Mishtatfin' by bread (and not by wine).

(c) 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Meir' - means that we rule like him even to the point of announcing it publicly; 'Minhag ke'Rebbi Meir' - means that we rule like him only when someone actually comes to ask what the Din is, but not publicly; whereas 'Nahagu ke'Rebbi Meir' - means that if someone did rule like Rebbi Meir, we do not make him withdraw his ruling, but initially, we rule like the Rabbanan.

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