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ERUVIN 81 - sponsored by a generous grant from an anonymous donor. Kollel Iyun Hadaf is indebted to him for his encouragement and support and prays that Hashem will repay him in kind.
1) A NEARLY PERFECT LOAF
QUESTION: In the Mishnah (80b), Rebbi Yehoshua states that the loaf of
bread used for making an Eruv must be whole. In the Gemara, Rebbi Yochanan
ben Shaul adds that the loaf of bread may be missing "Kedei Chalasah" or
"Kedei Dimu'ah" and still be used for an Eruv.
2) GIVING MONEY TO A BAKER IN ORDER TO BE INCLUDED IN THE ERUV
The smallest Shi'ur for Chalah is 1/48th of the total. The amount of
Terumah that makes something Dimu'a is 1/100th of the total. If a piece
the size of 1/48th of the loaf may be missing from the loaf, why does
Rebbi Yochanan ben Shaul add that it can even be missing 1/100th? 1/100th
is much smaller than 1/48th!
(a) RASHI explains that the Gemara is not referring to a loaf that is
missing any piece which is 1/48th or 1/100th of the loaf. Rather, the
Gemara means that the loaf is missing that amount because one had to
remove it for the Mitzvah (to fulfill the Mitzvah of Chalah, or to remove
the Dimu'a). Since that part was taken off of the loaf in order to make
the bread useable, it is not considered as though the bread is lacking.
HALACHAH: The SHULCHAN ARUCH (OC 366:6) rules like the ROSH, that a loaf
missing 1/48th is a valid Eruv, even if that amount was not taken for the
sake of a Mitzvah.
Why, then, does the Gemara say one can remove "*Kedei* Chalasah," if it is
the actual Chalah that was removed? It should have said "Chalasah," alone,
and not "*Kedei* Chalasah!" By adding the extra word "*Kedei* Chalasah,"
the Gemara is teaching that if one takes off more Chalah than necessary,
the loaf of bread may not be used for the Eruv, because the inferior loaf
will cause ill feeling among the other neighbors who contributed to the
Eruv. If one, however, removed the minimum amount of Chalah, then the
other will realize that the bread is lacking only because Chalah was taken
from it and they will not get upset. (Tosfos DH Kedei).
(b) The ROSH and RITVA challenge this explanation. How are the other
residents to know why a little piece of bread was cut off from the loaf?
They do not know whether it is missing because Chalah was taken from it,
or because it is a broken, and inferior, bread. Therefore, they explain
that no matter why the bread is missing a piece, it may be used for an
Eruv is the piece is only "Kedei Chalasah" or "Kedei Dimu'ah." Kedei
Chalasah means 1/48th of the bread; Kedei Dimu'ah *also* means approx.
1/48th of the bread. Dimu'ah does not refer to the amount of Terumah that
forbids Chulin, but rather to the amount of Terumah that one must take
from his fruits in the first place (as in the verse Mele'ascha
*v'Dim'acha*, which refers to Terumah). The average amount of Terumah that
is separated from produce is 1/50th, which is very close to the amount of
Chalah separated from dough (1/48th). The Gemara is merely expressing the
same measure with two examples, and it does not mean that Chalah or
Terumah was actually taken. The Gemara's point is that such a small amount
missing from the bread does not cause enmity.
What about Lechem Mishnah on Shabbos? How much may be missing from a loaf
for it to be valid for Lechem Mishnah?
The KORBAN NESANEL (on the Rosh 7:12:3), says that the ruling of the Rosh
applies only to bread being used to make an Eruv. Bread being used for
Lechem Mishnah on Shabbos, though, is considered whole only if it is
missing part of it as a result of a Tikun done to it; that is, part is
missing due to the removal of Chalah from it (like Rashi said in our
However, the SHA'AREI TESHUVAH (OC 274:1) cites from HAR HA'KARMEL (#2)
that *even* if the piece was broken off in order to separate Chalah from
the bread, it is not considered a "whole" loaf with regard to Lechem
QUESTIONS: In the Mishnah, Rebbi Eliezer and the Chachamim argue
concerning a case where one gives money to a baker in order for the baker
to give a loaf of bread on his behalf to the Eruv. The Chachamim maintain
that the person who gives the money to the baker is *not* included in the
Eruv. The buyer expects his money to acquire for him a loaf of bread, but
since "Ein Ma'os Konos" he does not acquire the bread through the act of
giving money alone. Rebbi Eliezer maintains that the Eruv works for that
person because "Ma'os Konos" and he successfully acquired the loaf of
bread which the baker gave to the Eruv on his behalf.
RASHI (DH Lo Zachu) explains that since the baker received money from this
person, when the baker is Mezakeh bread to everyone in the Chatzer, he did
not have intention to be Mezakeh a portion to this person. Consequently,
the person does not have a share in the Eruv (because "Ein Ma'os Konos"
and because the baker did not have in mind to be Mezakeh to him).
(a) The Mishnah says that the reason giving money to the baker does not
work for his inclusion in the Eruv is because "Ein Me'arvin l'Adam Ela
mi'Da'ato," an Eruv cannot be made for someone without his consent. What
does this case have to do with his consent? The reason he is not included
in the Eruv is because "Ein Ma'os Konos!"
(b) Rashi seems to relate to the above question (DH Lo Zachu). He explains
that "he did not want to be Koneh." Apparently, Rashi means that the man
who gave the money to the baker did not want the baker to give him a
*present* of a loaf of bread. Rather, he wanted to *purchase* the loaf
with his money -- and his money cannot be Koneh it for him, so the loaf is
not his. Even if the baker is Mezakeh him a loaf, he will not be Koneh
since he has "refused" to receive the Zikuy by virtue of giving money to
purchase the loaf. (Rashi repeats this more clearly on 81b, DH she'Ein.)
This is what the Mishnah means by saying that one cannot make the loaf
become a person's Eruv against his will.
But if that is true, why did Rashi at first suggest *another* reason that
the person was not Koneh the loaf -- that the *baker* did not intend to be
Mezakeh a portion of the loaf to the person who paid for the Eruv, since
he thought the man had already purchased his portion. Such reasoning is
not necessary! Even if the baker had intended to give the buyer another,
free loaf of bread, the buyer should not be Koneh it since he has
"refused" to accept any bread other without payment! (TOSFOS, ROSH)
The PIRYO B'ITO discusses this Rashi at great length (after calling it the
most difficult Rashi in the Maseches) and sums up the various forced
answers suggested by the Acharonim. Perhaps we may better understand Rashi
based on what we have observed in the past about Rashi's general approach
in Eruvin, as follows.
(a) We have pointed out (see Insights to 51:2 and 65:2) that often in
Maseches Eruvin, Rashi's commentary appears to be a combination of two
different versions of his comments. (That is, his first edition and second
edition follow one another in our versions of Rashi, without even a break
in between them to denote that they are two completely different
explanations. This caused the MAHARSHAL to erase part of Rashi's comments,
in a number of places in Eruvin, since they did not seem to conform to the
rest of Rashi's words in the Sugya. See the above Insights, also Rashi 43a
DH Halachah, and numerous other places.)
Rashi here appears to be another such instance. Apparently, Rashi
approached the Sugya at two different times with two different
explanations. The words "d'Keivan d'Ma'os" begin the second explanation of
The second explanation of Rashi conforms to the way TOSFOS (DH Lo) and the
other Rishonim explain. It is also the way Rashi explains later on 81b (DH
sh'Ein). This appears to be Rashi's later and preferred explanation.
According to to this approach, when a person gives money to buy a portion
of the Eruv, it is implicit that he does *not* want someone to be Mezakeh
to him his portion in the Eruv, but he wants to purchase it with money.
Consequently, if he thinks that he is Koneh the bread because he paid for
it, he will *not* acquire it when the baker attempts to be Mezakeh it to
him, because it is not being given to him with his consent. This is also
the meaning of the Mishnah when it says "sh'Ein Me'arvin l'Adam Ela
mi'Da'ato" -- since the person does not have intent to acquire a portion
in the bread as a gift, the Eruv cannot be made for him.
In his first explanation, Rashi learned differently. It is not the
purchaser whose intent to buy, and not receive as a gift, prevents him
from joining the Eruv. Rather, it is the *baker* who is making a mistake.
The baker thinks that the person who gave him money is already included in
the Eruv because he bought a portion, and therefore the baker does not
have intention to be Mezakeh it to him. If so, what does this have to do
with "Ein Me'arvin l'Adam Ela mi'Da'ato?"
The answer is that when the Mishnah says "sh'Ein Me'arvin..." it is
teaching something entirely new, as if it said "v'Ein Me'arvin" and not
"*sh'Ein* Me'arvin." (The letter 'Shin' in the Mishnah is often
interchanged with a 'Vav,' see Eruvin 44b and the marginal note on the
Mishnah, and Tosfos Yom Tov, there based on Beitzah 8a). These words have
nothing to do with the previous Halachah in the Mishnah, according to
Rashi's first explanation of the Sugya. (See the TIFERES YISRAEL on the
Mishnayos who explains the Mishnah in this way as well.)