ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Chulin 14
CHULIN 14-15 - Two weeks of study material have been dedicated by Mrs.
Estanne Abraham Fawer to honor the fourth Yahrzeit of her father, Reb
Mordechai ben Eliezer Zvi (Weiner), who passed away 18 Teves 5760. May the
merit of supporting and advancing Talmud study during the week of his
Yahrzeit serve as an Iluy for his Neshamah.
(a) Our Mishnah rules that - although someone who Shechts on Shabbos or on
Yom Kipur - is Chayav Kareis, his Shechitah is nevertheless Kasher.
(b) Rav Huna, quoting ... in the name of Rav ruled - that the animal is
nevertheless forbidden on that day, causing the B'nei Yeshiva to establish
the Mishnah like Rebbi Yehudah.
(c) Even though there is no way in which he will be permitted to cook it,
the Tana nevertheless needs to teach us that the animal is forbidden for the
duration of Shabbos - where the owner intends to eat it raw.
(d) Rav derives his statement - from the fact that the Tana mentions Yom
Kipur together with Shabbos, to teach us that, like Yom Kipur, it may not be
eaten for the duration of that day.
(a) Rebbi Aba suggests that Rav is referring to Rebbi Yehudah in the Mishnah
in Beitzah, where the Tana Kama permits cutting up a pumpkin for an animal
or a carcass for dogs, on Shabbos. Rebbi Yehudah - forbids it, unless it
died before Shabbos.
(b) That ties up with Rav's ruling - inasmuch as here, like there, the
animal is Muktzah because it was not ready for human consumption when
Shabbos entered, and therefore remains forbidden the whole Shabbos, just
like it is there.
(c) Abaye rejects Rebbi Aba's connection however, in that - whereas there,
the pumpkin was originally designated for human consumption, and is now
being used for animals, in our Mishnah, the animal was originally designated
for human consumption, and that is what it is being used for now.
(d) We try to refute Abaye's distinction - by arguing that an animal in its
lifetime stands to be used for rearing babies (and not for eating, as we
originally thought), which places it on a par with the pumpkin, in that when
Shabbos came in, it was designated for rearing children and is Muktzah
because it now became fit for human consumption.
(a) The problem with this is - if Rebbi Yehudah really holds that an animal
is Muktzah because it is designated for rearing babies, then how could he
possibly eat meat on Yom-Tov (which is a Mitzvah de'Rabbanan)?
(b) We answer that an animal is designated both for rearing and for eating.
That explains ...
1. ... Rebbi Yehudah eating meat on Yom-Tov - since the moment it is
Shechted (before Yom-Tov) it becomes clarified retroactively that it was
designated to be eaten ('B'reirah').
(c) We reject this answer however, on the grounds - that Rebbi Yehudah does
not hold of 'B'reirah' as we shall now prove.
2. ... why the animal is Muktzah in our Mishnah, according to Rav - because
when Shabbos entered without the animal having been Shechted, it became
clarified retroactively that it was designated for rearing babies.
(a) We try to prove that Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of 'B'reirah', by
citing a Beraisa, which discusses someone who purchased a hundred Lugin of
wine from Kutim just before Shabbos. He is obligated to separate - two
Lugin for Terumah Gedolah, a fraction less than ten Lugin for Ma'aser Rishon
and a little more than that less than ten Lugin for Ma'aser Sheini.
(b) Rebbi Meir rules that - the purchaser is obligated to separate ...
1. ... Terumah and Ma'aser Rishon - after Shabbos. After designating the
Terumah and Ma'aser verbally immediately, he may drink from the wine on
Shabbos, leaving over sufficient to separate what he designated, after
(c) The Chachamim did not allow him to rely on Bereirah with regard to
Ma'aser Sheini, like they do by Terumah and Ma'aser Rishon - since it is
possible to redeem it there and then.
2. ... Ma'aser Sheini - by transferring the Kedushah of Ma'aser Sheini
immediately on to a Ma'aser Sheini coin.
(a) Rebbi Yehudah, Rebbi Yossi and Rebbi Shimon - forbid the purchaser to
rely on B'reirah (and if he is unable to separate the Ma'asros before
Shabbos comes in, then he is not permitted to drink the wine until after
Shabbos), presumably because they hold 'Ein B'reirah'.
(b) We counter this proof however - on the basis of the reason that they
themselves gave in the Beraisa - where they asked Rebbi Meir whether he is
not afraid that the bottle containing the wine which is left over, breaks
before the owner has had a chance to separate Terumah (in which case, he
will have eaten Tevel [and not because they do not hold of B'reirah]).
(c) Rebbi Meir replied - that he will worry about that when the bottle
(a) So we quote Rebbi Yehudah in the Beraisa cited by Ayo, with reference to
another Beraisa. The Chachamim there rule that someone who places an Eruv
on the east side of the town and one on the west ...
1. ... because he is not sure on which side the Chacham who will Darshen on
Shabbos will arrive - and stipulates that whichever Eruv is required should
take effect, the appropriate Eruv will indeed take effect (retroactively,
due to the principle of 'B'reirah').
(b) Rebbi Yehudah there disagrees with the latter ruling, but agrees with
the former one.
2. ... in a case where two Chachamim are arriving, and he has not yet
decided which D'rashah he will attend - again a similar stipulation will
take effect, when he makes his choice on Shabbos.
(c) Rebbi Yehudah's distinction is difficult to understand - seeing as the
former case involves B'reirah, no less than the latter one.
(d) Rebbi Yochanan therefore establishes the Beraisa when the Chachamim
concerned had already arrived when Shabbos came in.
(a) Rebbi Yochanan's interpretation of the Beraisa refutes the proof that
Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of B'reirah - because his reason in either case
no longer has anything to do with B'reirah (since the stipulation is based
on a lack of knowledge, which has nothing to do with B'reirah, and his
reason in the Seifa is because one is not permitted to make two
contradictory Eruvin simultaneously, only either one or the other.
(b) Rav Yosef connects Rav to a Mishnah in Shabbos, which discusses the Din
of broken vessels on Shabbos. The Tana Kama permits the use of such vessels
that broke - provided they can still be used (e.g. broken pieces of a
kneading-trough to cover a barrel, and broken pieces of glass to cover a
(c) According to Rebbi Yehudah - they must be potentially usable for a task
similar to the one for which they were originally made (e.g. broken pieces
of a kneading-trough to contain a stew, and broken pieces of glass, oil.
(d) This will explain Rav's ruling, forbidding the Shechted animal for the
duration of Shabbos - since in the same way, the Shechted animal too, which
was fit for plowing in its lifetime, becomes fit only for eating once it is
Shechted, and ought therefore to be Muktzah.
(a) Abaye refutes Rav Yosef's explanation however, on the grounds that -
whereas on the one hand, a vessel that breaks on Shabbos and that cannot be
used for a similar task to its original one, is 'Nolad'; on the other hand,
an animal in its lifetime (which is designated for eating, as we explained
earlier) is already considered a food, and Shechting it is like breaking up
a food into pieces ('Uchla de'Ifras'), which Rebbi Yehudah does not consider
(b) So we turn to a Mishnah in Shabbos. The Tana Kama there rules - that ...
1. ... squeezing fruit is prohibited on Shabbos?
(c) Rebbi Yehudah qualifies the Tana Kama's ruling - by confining it to
fruit that was designated for its liquid. Juice that seeped from fruit that
was designated to eat, is permitted.
2. ... liquid that seeped out of food by itself on Shabbos is forbidden (to
prevent the owner from squeezing it Lechatchilah on Shabbos).
(d) According to Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel - Rebbi Yehudah concedes to the
Chachamim that the juice that seeped out from baskets of grapes and olives
is forbidden, even if they were designated to eat - because most people
designate them for their liquid (and we are afraid that this owner too, will
change his mind and squeeze them for their liquid). By the same token, Rebbi
Yehudah will forbid the Shechted animal on Shabbos, to prevent the owner
from Shechting it Lechatchilah on Shabbos.
(a) We reject this explanation however, on the basis of the fact that it is
Rav's statement that we are attempting to corroborate - and Rav specifically
stated that Rebbi Yehudah did not differentiate between other fruit and
grapes and olives ...
(b) ... leaving us with the problem as to which Rebbi Yehudah Rav is
(a) So Rav Sheishes (perhaps it ought to be Rav Shisha) b'rei de'Rav Idi
cites a Beraisa in Shabbos, where Rebbi Yehudah allows moving a new
earthenware lamp - but not a new one, because it is 'Muktzah Machmas
Miy'us'. This is due to the fact that people tend to be Maktzeh it (remove
it from their minds [the source of Muktzah]) because it is ugly.
(b) Likewise, we assume that, according to Rebbi Yehudah, they are also
Maktzeh live animals when Shabbos enters, precisely because of the Isur
(c) We refute this proof too, however - by suggesting that it is not because
Rebbi Yehudah holds 'Muktzah Machmas Miy'us', that he must also hold of
'Muktzah Machmas Isur'.
(d) And similarly, we refute the proof (that Rebbi Yehudah is the one who is
stringent with regard to Muktzah), from another Beraisa, where he forbids
moving a lamp that was lit on that Shabbos (even after it has gone out,
because of 'Muktzah Machmas Mitzvah' - by suggesting that Rebbi Yehudah is
stringent there only because the owner was physically Maktzeh the lamp, but
it does not follow that he is equally stringent by an animal, whose Muktzah
would be automatic.