THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
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1) "ME'ILAH" FOR "CHELEV" OF A KORBAN
QUESTION: The Mishnah teaches that the prohibition of "Me'ilah," deriving
personal benefit from property of Kodshim, applies to the Chelev of a
Korban. RASHI (DH Mo'alin) explains that this is because the Chelev of a
Korban is an item of Kodshim that is entirely for Hashem (as it is burned
on the Mizbe'ach), and it is not given to the Kohanim.
2) THE LOGIC FOR "SHNEI CHESUVIM HA'BA'IM K'ECHAD MELAMDIN"
The Gemara quotes Rebbi Yanai who explains that the source that Me'ilah
applies to Chelev is from the verse (Vayikra 4:10) that teaches that just
as the Chelev must be removed from the ox brought as a Korban Shelamim,
so, too, it must be removed from the cow brought by the Kohen Gadol as a
Korban Chatas ("Par Kohen Mashi'ach"). This teaches that just as Me'ilah
applies to the cow of the Kohen Gadol, so, too, it applies to the ox
brought as a Korban Shelamim.
RASHI (DH Mena Hani Mili) explains that Rebbi Yanai is teaching that
Me'ilah applies even to the Chelev of Kodshim Kalim such as Shelamim. Even
though there is no Me'ilah for Kodshim Kalim while the animal is alive
because it is still the property of its owner and not of the Beis
ha'Mikdash (as Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili says in Bava Kama 12b), nevertheless
after the animal has been slaughtered and the blood has been sprinkled on
the Mizbe'ach, the Isur Me'ilah does apply.
Rebbi Yanai's statement here seems to contradict his statement in Me'ilah
(15a). Rebbi Yanai there says that one is liable for Me'ilah only for
using Kodshim of Bedek ha'Bayis (Kodshim that are the property of the Beis
ha'Mikdash but that do not have the type of Kedushah that enables them to
be offered on the Mizbe'ach) and for using a Korban Olah. Rebbi Yanai
derives this from the verse, "Nefesh Ki Sim'ol Ma'al v'Chat'ah..." -- "A
person who commits Me'ilah and sins unintentionally against the Kodshim of
Hashem" (Vayikra 5:15), which teaches that Me'ilah applies only to Kodshim
that are exclusively Hashem's. Kodshim of the Mizbe'ach that are shared in
part by the Kohanim and in part by the owners do not have Me'ilah.
Rebbi Yanai in Me'ilah is saying that Me'ilah does not apply whenever the
owner has a share in the Kodshim, but here he says that Me'ilah applies
even for Kodshim Kalim (part of which the owner is entitled to keep)! How
are we to reconcile these two statements of Rebbi Yanai?
(a) TOSFOS (DH Amar Rebbi Yanai) writes that Rebbi Yanai here is saying
that Me'ilah applies only mid'Rabanan. Mid'Oraisa, Me'ilah applies only to
Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis and Korban Olah.
(b) The TIFERES YAKOV answers that there are two different sages named
Rebbi Yanai. Rebbi Yanai in Me'ilah is "Rebbi Yanai me'Chavarta," Rebbi
Yanai from the city of Chavarta.
(This is in contrast to the explanation of RASHI there (Me'ilah 15a, DH
Amar Rebbi Yanai), who explains that the word is not "me'Chavarta" ("from
the city of Chavarta") but rather it is "Mechavarta," which means that "it
is clearly correct." Rebbi Yanai is saying that it is clear that Me'ilah
applies only to Kodshim of Bedek ha'Bayis and Korban Olah.)
The Tiferes Yakov adds that Rebbi Yanai mentioned in Me'ilah is not the
same Rebbi Yanai who is quoted in Temurah (32b) as saying, "There is no
Me'ilah stated explicitly in the Torah other than Me'ilah of the Korban
Olah." Rebbi Yanai there agrees that Me'ilah does apply to other types of
Kodshim; he merely says that those forms of Me'ilah are not written in the
Torah explicitly, but rather they are derived from Derashos. According to
Rebbi Yanai in Temurah, Me'ilah does apply to Kodshim Kalim, while
according to Rebbi Yanai in Me'ilah, Me'ilah does not apply to Kodshim
Kalim, but only to Bedek ha'Bayis and Korban Olah. (D. Bloom)
QUESTIONS: The Gemara mentions the dispute regarding the principle of
"Shnei Chesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad Ein Melamdin" -- when the Torah expresses
a certain law in two different areas of Halachah, we do not learn from
there to all other subjects, but rather we say that the Halachah is
limited to those two subjects alone.
(a) What exactly does this rule mean? Does it mean that we need an
entirely new source to show that the law applies to other areas, or does
it mean that the law certainly does not apply to other areas?
(b) What is the logic behind this principle?
(a) The NODA B'YEHUDAH (EH 1:78) explains that RASHI and TOSFOS in
Kidushin (35a, DH Ela) differ with regard to the meaning of "Shnei
Chesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad Ein Melamdin."
1. RASHI maintains that when a law is expressed in two places in the
Torah, we *cannot learn* that law to any other subject through a Binyan
Av. Rather, an entirely new source is necessary to teach that law.
(b) RASHI in Kidushin (24a, DH Ein Melamdin) explains the logic behind the
opinion that "Shnei Chesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad Ein Melamdin." He explains
that when two verses express the same Halachah regarding two different
subjects, we cannot apply the Halachah elsewhere through a Binyan Av,
because the fact that the Torah found it necessary to repeat the law the
second time shows that the Halachah is *not* meant to be applied
automatically in all situations.
2. TOSFOS, however, explains that the rule of "Shnei Chesuvim ha'Ba'im
k'Echad" proves that the law mentioned in the two places does *not apply*
anywhere other than the two instances in which it is mentioned. We cannot
apply the Halachah of these verses to any other subject, even with a
Hekesh or other Limud.
However, not everyone agrees with the rule of "Shnei Chesuvim... Ein
Melamdin." There is an opinion that maintains that we *do* apply a
Halachah to all other subjects when the Torah teaches it with regard to
two subjects (see Insights to Kidushin 34:2). What is the logic for the
opinion that we *do* apply the Halachah to all situations when the Torah
teaches it in two places?
The SEFER KERISUS 5:1:1 (cited by HALICHOS OLAM 4:4:2) explains that the
Gemara teaches that when a law is derived from a Kal v'Chomer, the verse
still goes out of its way to write it explicitly ("Tarach v'Chasav Lah
Kera"). Similarly, when a law is learned through a Binyan Av, the verse
still goes out of its way to write it (TOSFOS in Shabbos 131b, DH Iy; RAN
in Nedarim 3a, DH Lindor). Therefore, when we find that the Torah says the
Halachah another time even though we can learn it from a Binyan Av, it is
because "Tarach v'Chasav Lah Kra," and thus we can still learn from the
first place in which it is written that it applies to all other
situations. If, however, the Torah writes it a *third* time, then "Ein
Melamdin," we cannot learn from it to all other situations, because the
verse would not go out of its way to repeat the Halachah *twice* when it
could be learned from a Binyan Av.
2) THE ORDER OF THE CHAPTERS
QUESTION: The new chapter (ha'Or veha'Rotev) discusses the laws of Tum'as
Ochlin. What, though, do these laws have to do with the rest of Chulin,
which discusses what foods may or may not be eaten? This chapter seemingly
belongs in Taharos, not here in Chulin.
(a) TOSFOS (DH ha'Or) explains that after the Mishnah (77a) in the fourth
chapter teaches that a Shilyah is not Metamei as a Neveilah, it continues
to teach other laws of Tum'ah and Taharah here in the ninth chapter.
Tosfos explains that the reason this chapter does not follow immediately
after the fourth is because once the Tana teaches the laws of Oso v'Es
Beno (74a), the Tana continues with the rest of the laws of Oso v'Es Beno.
Included in the laws of Oso v'Es Beno is the concept of Shechitah
she'Einah Re'uyah, a topic that is relevant to the laws of Kisuy ha'Dam.
Since the laws of Kisuy ha'Dam apply to birds and wild animals, the Tana
teaches the laws of Gid ha'Nasheh which apply to an animal but not to a
bird. Once the Tana discusses the prohibition of eating a Gid ha'Nasheh
that was cooked together with other foods, the Tana continues with the
laws of mixtures of foods in the eighth chapter. Finally, the Mishnah
returns to the theme of Tum'ah and Taharah in the ninth chapter.
(b) The ME'IRI lists this chapter as the eleventh chapter of Chulin,
preceding the twelfth chapter, Perek Shilu'ach ha'Ken. He explains that it
was supposed to be the twelfth and last chapter of Chulin, since it is not
really related to the other laws of Chulin. However, in order to end the
Masechta with the positive teaching of "v'Ha'arachta Yamim," the Tana
concludes with Perek Shilu'ach ha'Ken. (Z. Wainstein)