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Chulin, 117


QUESTION: The Mishnah teaches that the prohibition of "Me'ilah," deriving personal benefit from property of Kodshim, applies to the Chelev of a Korban. RASHI (DH Mo'alin) explains that this is because the Chelev of a Korban is an item of Kodshim that is entirely for Hashem (as it is burned on the Mizbe'ach), and it is not given to the Kohanim.

The Gemara quotes Rebbi Yanai who explains that the source that Me'ilah applies to Chelev is from the verse (Vayikra 4:10) that teaches that just as the Chelev must be removed from the ox brought as a Korban Shelamim, so, too, it must be removed from the cow brought by the Kohen Gadol as a Korban Chatas ("Par Kohen Mashi'ach"). This teaches that just as Me'ilah applies to the cow of the Kohen Gadol, so, too, it applies to the ox brought as a Korban Shelamim.

RASHI (DH Mena Hani Mili) explains that Rebbi Yanai is teaching that Me'ilah applies even to the Chelev of Kodshim Kalim such as Shelamim. Even though there is no Me'ilah for Kodshim Kalim while the animal is alive because it is still the property of its owner and not of the Beis ha'Mikdash (as Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili says in Bava Kama 12b), nevertheless after the animal has been slaughtered and the blood has been sprinkled on the Mizbe'ach, the Isur Me'ilah does apply.

Rebbi Yanai's statement here seems to contradict his statement in Me'ilah (15a). Rebbi Yanai there says that one is liable for Me'ilah only for using Kodshim of Bedek ha'Bayis (Kodshim that are the property of the Beis ha'Mikdash but that do not have the type of Kedushah that enables them to be offered on the Mizbe'ach) and for using a Korban Olah. Rebbi Yanai derives this from the verse, "Nefesh Ki Sim'ol Ma'al v'Chat'ah..." -- "A person who commits Me'ilah and sins unintentionally against the Kodshim of Hashem" (Vayikra 5:15), which teaches that Me'ilah applies only to Kodshim that are exclusively Hashem's. Kodshim of the Mizbe'ach that are shared in part by the Kohanim and in part by the owners do not have Me'ilah.

Rebbi Yanai in Me'ilah is saying that Me'ilah does not apply whenever the owner has a share in the Kodshim, but here he says that Me'ilah applies even for Kodshim Kalim (part of which the owner is entitled to keep)! How are we to reconcile these two statements of Rebbi Yanai?


(a) TOSFOS (DH Amar Rebbi Yanai) writes that Rebbi Yanai here is saying that Me'ilah applies only mid'Rabanan. Mid'Oraisa, Me'ilah applies only to Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis and Korban Olah.

(b) The TIFERES YAKOV answers that there are two different sages named Rebbi Yanai. Rebbi Yanai in Me'ilah is "Rebbi Yanai me'Chavarta," Rebbi Yanai from the city of Chavarta.

(This is in contrast to the explanation of RASHI there (Me'ilah 15a, DH Amar Rebbi Yanai), who explains that the word is not "me'Chavarta" ("from the city of Chavarta") but rather it is "Mechavarta," which means that "it is clearly correct." Rebbi Yanai is saying that it is clear that Me'ilah applies only to Kodshim of Bedek ha'Bayis and Korban Olah.)

The Tiferes Yakov adds that Rebbi Yanai mentioned in Me'ilah is not the same Rebbi Yanai who is quoted in Temurah (32b) as saying, "There is no Me'ilah stated explicitly in the Torah other than Me'ilah of the Korban Olah." Rebbi Yanai there agrees that Me'ilah does apply to other types of Kodshim; he merely says that those forms of Me'ilah are not written in the Torah explicitly, but rather they are derived from Derashos. According to Rebbi Yanai in Temurah, Me'ilah does apply to Kodshim Kalim, while according to Rebbi Yanai in Me'ilah, Me'ilah does not apply to Kodshim Kalim, but only to Bedek ha'Bayis and Korban Olah. (D. Bloom)

QUESTIONS: The Gemara mentions the dispute regarding the principle of "Shnei Chesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad Ein Melamdin" -- when the Torah expresses a certain law in two different areas of Halachah, we do not learn from there to all other subjects, but rather we say that the Halachah is limited to those two subjects alone.
(a) What exactly does this rule mean? Does it mean that we need an entirely new source to show that the law applies to other areas, or does it mean that the law certainly does not apply to other areas?

(b) What is the logic behind this principle?

(a) The NODA B'YEHUDAH (EH 1:78) explains that RASHI and TOSFOS in Kidushin (35a, DH Ela) differ with regard to the meaning of "Shnei Chesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad Ein Melamdin."
1. RASHI maintains that when a law is expressed in two places in the Torah, we *cannot learn* that law to any other subject through a Binyan Av. Rather, an entirely new source is necessary to teach that law.

2. TOSFOS, however, explains that the rule of "Shnei Chesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad" proves that the law mentioned in the two places does *not apply* anywhere other than the two instances in which it is mentioned. We cannot apply the Halachah of these verses to any other subject, even with a Hekesh or other Limud.

(b) RASHI in Kidushin (24a, DH Ein Melamdin) explains the logic behind the opinion that "Shnei Chesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad Ein Melamdin." He explains that when two verses express the same Halachah regarding two different subjects, we cannot apply the Halachah elsewhere through a Binyan Av, because the fact that the Torah found it necessary to repeat the law the second time shows that the Halachah is *not* meant to be applied automatically in all situations.

However, not everyone agrees with the rule of "Shnei Chesuvim... Ein Melamdin." There is an opinion that maintains that we *do* apply a Halachah to all other subjects when the Torah teaches it with regard to two subjects (see Insights to Kidushin 34:2). What is the logic for the opinion that we *do* apply the Halachah to all situations when the Torah teaches it in two places?

The SEFER KERISUS 5:1:1 (cited by HALICHOS OLAM 4:4:2) explains that the Gemara teaches that when a law is derived from a Kal v'Chomer, the verse still goes out of its way to write it explicitly ("Tarach v'Chasav Lah Kera"). Similarly, when a law is learned through a Binyan Av, the verse still goes out of its way to write it (TOSFOS in Shabbos 131b, DH Iy; RAN in Nedarim 3a, DH Lindor). Therefore, when we find that the Torah says the Halachah another time even though we can learn it from a Binyan Av, it is because "Tarach v'Chasav Lah Kra," and thus we can still learn from the first place in which it is written that it applies to all other situations. If, however, the Torah writes it a *third* time, then "Ein Melamdin," we cannot learn from it to all other situations, because the verse would not go out of its way to repeat the Halachah *twice* when it could be learned from a Binyan Av.


QUESTION: The new chapter (ha'Or veha'Rotev) discusses the laws of Tum'as Ochlin. What, though, do these laws have to do with the rest of Chulin, which discusses what foods may or may not be eaten? This chapter seemingly belongs in Taharos, not here in Chulin. ANSWERS:
(a) TOSFOS (DH ha'Or) explains that after the Mishnah (77a) in the fourth chapter teaches that a Shilyah is not Metamei as a Neveilah, it continues to teach other laws of Tum'ah and Taharah here in the ninth chapter. Tosfos explains that the reason this chapter does not follow immediately after the fourth is because once the Tana teaches the laws of Oso v'Es Beno (74a), the Tana continues with the rest of the laws of Oso v'Es Beno. Included in the laws of Oso v'Es Beno is the concept of Shechitah she'Einah Re'uyah, a topic that is relevant to the laws of Kisuy ha'Dam. Since the laws of Kisuy ha'Dam apply to birds and wild animals, the Tana teaches the laws of Gid ha'Nasheh which apply to an animal but not to a bird. Once the Tana discusses the prohibition of eating a Gid ha'Nasheh that was cooked together with other foods, the Tana continues with the laws of mixtures of foods in the eighth chapter. Finally, the Mishnah returns to the theme of Tum'ah and Taharah in the ninth chapter.

(b) The ME'IRI lists this chapter as the eleventh chapter of Chulin, preceding the twelfth chapter, Perek Shilu'ach ha'Ken. He explains that it was supposed to be the twelfth and last chapter of Chulin, since it is not really related to the other laws of Chulin. However, in order to end the Masechta with the positive teaching of "v'Ha'arachta Yamim," the Tana concludes with Perek Shilu'ach ha'Ken. (Z. Wainstein)

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