THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
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1) SENDING A THIGH WITH A NOCHRI
QUESTION: The Mishnah (93b) states that one may send the thigh of an
animal to a Nochri even though the Gid ha'Nasheh has not been removed,
because when the Gid is still attached it is easily recognizable. RASHI
explains that we are not concerned that the Nochri will sell the thigh to
a Jew, because even if he does sell the thigh to a Jew, the Jew will be
able to see that there are no signs that the Gid was removed and he will
know that he must remove it himself.
The Gemara (93b) says that in places where all of the Shochtim are Jewish
(see Rashi DH bi'Mekom), an announcement is made whenever a Tereifah
animal is found in the butcher shops. Rashi (94a, DH Ela) explains that in
these places (where such an announcement is made) a Jew is permitted to
buy meat from a Nochri on a day there is no announcement, because all of
the Shochtim are Jewish and thus we may assume that there is no Tereifah
meat in the market today.
The Gemara asks that in such a place it should be forbidden to send a
whole thigh to a Nochri, because we should be concerned that the Nochri
will cut up the thigh and sell it to a Jew (who is permitted to buy it
from a Nochri, since no announcement was made) who will not realize that
the Gid ha'Nasheh is still inside, and he might eat it. The Gemara answers
that we are not concerned for such a thing, because it is evident to a Jew
that a Nochri cut up the thigh, and, therefore, the Jew will not think
that the Gid has been removed. Rashi (DH Chituchah d'Oved Kochavim)
explains that when a Jew cuts open the thigh, he cuts it where the Gid
ha'Nasheh is located.
Why is it permitted for the second Jew to buy the thigh from the Nochri?
There is a rule that any meat that was not constantly watched from the
time that the animal was slaughtered is prohibited, because it might have
been exchanged by a Nochri for Tereifah meat ("Basar she'Nis'alem Min
ha'Ayin," or "meat that has disappeared from the eye's view"). Why are we
not concerned for this?
ANSWER: Rashi writes that his teacher ruled that when a Jew appoints a
Nochri to be a messenger to take a thigh to his friend, the thigh does not
become Asur due to the law of "Basar she'Nis'alem Min ha'Ayin" (Chulin
95a), even when there is no Chotam (seal) on the meat. As long as the meat
was cut up in the way that Jews cut meat after removing the Gid ha'Nasheh,
it is permitted, because a Nochri has a distinct way of cutting up the
meat that is clearly recognizable. (Other limbs of an animal, however,
become forbidden because of "Basar she'Nis'alem Min ha'Ayin," unless there
is a Chotam on the meat.)
The RAN (33a of the pages of the Rif) writes that we may derive from the
principle that the Nochri has a distinct way of cutting up the thigh that
anything that is unusual for a Nochri to do is considered a valid Siman
(sign) that a Jew did it (such as when the veins of the foreleg and the
veins near the chest were removed from the cut of meat; see ROSH, end of
7:17), and we are not concerned that the Nochri might have learned how to
do it like a Jew. The Ran writes in the name of Rashi that one therefore
may send a thigh with a Nochri to a Jew even when the Gid ha'Nasheh was
already removed and there is no seal on the meat.
It appears from the Ran that this practice is permitted even l'Chatchilah.
However, the words of Rashi here imply that it is permitted only b'Di'eved
(if the meat had already been sent with a Nochri, one may eat it, but one
may not send it with a Nochri l'Chatchilah). This distinction is discussed
by the Poskim. The TUR (YD 65) maintains that the practice is permitted
l'Chatchilah, according to the BACH's understanding (DH u'Mah she'Kasav
Aval). The Bach explains that since Tosfos (DH Chitucha) states that there
is only a distant possibility that the Nochri exchanged the Kosher thigh
with a Tereifah thigh that was also given to him by a Jew, there is no
reason to be concerned that such a thing happened, and one may send a
thigh with a Nochri even l'Chatchilah.
The Ran states that despite this leniency, in a place where one is not
permitted to buy meat from a Nochri, it is forbidden to send a thigh with
a Nochri to another Jew even b'Di'eved, even when it is cut in the way
that Jews are accustomed to cut it. In a place where Jews may not buy meat
from Nochrim, we are afraid that a Jew bought meat that he assumed was
Kosher, and he removed all of the forbidden fats and veins. He then
discovered that the meat came from a Tereifah animal, and he therefore
sold it to a Nochri. Since the likelihood of such a situation is high, we
must be concerned that this happened and thus one may not buy meat from a
Nochri, even when it is cut in the way that Jews cut it. However, when a
Jew was expecting to received a deveined thigh from another Jew, we are
not concerned that a different Jew sold a Tereifah thigh to the Nochri and
the Nochri exchanged the Kosher thigh with the Tereifah one, since this is
highly unlikely. (D. Bloom)
2) SENDING A "YERECH" TO A NOCHRI
QUESTION: The Beraisa (end of 94a) states that when a Jew sends a whole
thigh (Yerech) of an animal to another Jew, he does not need to remove the
Gid ha'Nasheh first. When he sends a piece of a thigh, he must remove the
Gid. In contrast, when he sends it to a Nochri, he does not need to remove
the Gid, whether he sends a whole thigh or a piece of a thigh.
3) HALACHAH: "GENEIVAS DA'AS"
Abaye understand that the Beraisa is teaching that one may send to a
Nochri a whole or cut thigh in a place where the practice in the market is
*not* to announce the presence of Neveilos, in which case a Jew will not
purchase meat there thinking that it is Kosher. Rava understands that the
Beraisa is teaching that one may send a thigh to a Nochri where it is the
practice to make such announcements and such an announcement indeed was
made on that day. In such a case, there is no concern that a Jew will
unknowingly buy a non-Kosher piece of meat.
However, it seems that it should be prohibited to give to a Nochri such a
thigh for the two reasons mentions earlier in the Gemara (beginning of
94a) when it explains why the Mishnah (93b) does not permit sending a cut
thigh to a Nochri without removing the Gid ha'Nasheh. The Gemara says that
we are concerned that perhaps a Jew is watching the Nochri receive the
Yerech from a Jew, and he will mistakenly assume that the Yerech is Kosher
and he will buy it from the Nochri. Second, it is prohibited because the
Jew is fooling the Nochri into thinking that the piece of meat is Kosher,
and one is not allowed to trick a Nochri. Why, then, does the Beraisa
permit sending a cut thigh to a Nochri when the Gid ha'Nasheh has not been
(a) RASHI (DH Gezeirah) explains that the Beraisa argues with the Mishnah
and is not concerned about Jewish buyers watching the transaction (nor
about fooling a Nochri), since the thigh is being sent as a private gift
to the Nochri in his home, and not to the Nochri in the public
(b) TOSFOS (DH Amar) suggests that Abaye and Rava understand the Mishnah
differently than the Gemara earlier understands it. They learn that the
Mishnah is discussing a market in which the custom is not to announce the
presence of Neveilos. Since no Jew would buy meat there, there is no
concern that a Jew will think that meat sent to a Nochri is Kosher.
With regard to the concern that the sender is fooling the Nochri, leading
him to think that it is Kosher meat, such a concern applies only to a
*sale* where the Nochri pays money for meat that he thinks is Kosher, when
he is actually receiving non-Kosher meat. The concern for fooling the
Nochri does not apply when sending him a present.
(c) Tosfos cites RABEINU TAM who explains that the concern that a Jew will
purchase the meat from the Nochri, or that the Nochri will be fooled,
applies only when the Jew who sends him the meat explicitly specifies that
it is Kosher meat (when it really is not). This is the case in the
Mishnah. The Beraisa, in contrast, is discussing a case in which the Jew
does not say that the meat is Kosher. In such a case it is permitted to
send the thigh to a Nochri.
QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that in a place where the practice in the
market is to announce the presence of Neveilos and Tereifos, there is no
concern that a Jew will purchase meat there thinking that it is Kosher.
The Gemara asks what they announce in such a place when there is a
Tereifah. Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef says that they announce, "There is meat
for the Nochrim." The Gemara asks why they do not announce that there is
*Tereifah* meat for the Nochrim, and it answers that if such an
announcement would be made, then the Nochrim would not buy it, because
they know that no Jew would buy it (and it is a disgrace to them to eat
meat that a Jew would not buy).
The Gemara asks that by saying merely that there is meat for the Nochrim,
without saying that it is Tereifah, we are misleading them. The Gemara
answers that it is they who mislead themselves (since they do not ask
about the meat before they buy it).
This seems to contradict the Gemara earlier (94a) that teaches that it is
prohibited to open a barrel of wine as a sign of honor for a guest when
that barrel had already been sold to a storekeeper, because one is thereby
misleading the guest to think that he is being honored (since the wine,
once exposed, will spoil very quickly). If the guest thinks that one is
wasting an entire barrel to honor him, then he is merely misleading
himself! The guest did not ask why the barrel was opened, but he merely
assumed that it was opened in his honor! Why, then, should it be
prohibited to open the barrel?
(a) RASHI (DH Inhu) explains that it is prohibited to open a barrel for a
guest only when one explicitly tells the guest that the barrel is being
opened solely in his honor.
(b) TOSFOS (DH Inhu) explains that the two cases are different. In the
case of opening a barrel for a guest, there is no reason for the guest to
assume that the barrel was sold to a storekeeper (and is going to be
opened soon anyway). It is clear to the guest that when the host opens the
barrel, he is doing it in his honor, and it does not enter his mind that
he should ask about it. Therefore, when the host opens the barrel when the
guest arrives without mentioning that it was sold to a storekeeper, he is
misleading the guest.
In contrast, in the case of meat being sold to Nochrim in the marketplace,
it is very reasonable to assume that the meat is not Kosher. Since it is
so likely that the meat is not Kosher, there is no need to explicitly
state so. If a Nochri buys the meat thinking that it is Kosher (since no
announcement was made stating that it is not), then it is indeed the
Nochri's fault for making such an assumption.
The SHULCHAN ARUCH (CM 228:6) rules that one is not allowed to mislead
another person into thinking that he did something for him when he did
not, or that he plans to do something for him when he really has no such
plans. For example, one should not plead with his friend to be his guest
when he knows that his friend will not accept the invitation. If, however,
the act is one that his friend should realize is not being done
specifically for him, then one is not obligated to tell the friend and it
does not constitute "Geneivas Da'as."
(The DAMESEK ELIEZER adds that it is permitted for a person to falsely
impress an enemy in order to make peace with him; see Bava Metzia 87a.)