THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
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1) THE "TUM'AH" OF A "PARAH ADUMAH"
QUESTION: The Gemara (end of 81b) cites a Beraisa in which Rebbi Shimon says
that a Parah Adumah can become Tamei with Tum'as Ochlin once it is
slaughtered. It becomes Tamei with Tum'as Ochlin because it is considered a
food, since, if a better Parah is found, the first one may be redeemed and
RASHI (DH v'Amar) asks why Rebbi Shimon must say that a Parah Adumah can
become Tamei because it is considered a food. Even if it is not considered a
food, it can become Tamei (and be Metamei other things), because the Torah
(Bamidbar 19:7-8) explicitly states that every Parah Adumah makes a person
and Kelim become Tamei!
2) WHO MAY SLAUGHTER HIS ANIMAL FIRST
Rashi's question is difficult to understand. The Mishnah in Parah (8:3)
states clearly that a Parah Adumah is only Metamei the Kohen who burns it or
the Kohanim who are involved in the burning process. Those who merely
*touch* it do not become Tamei! Therefore, Rebbi Shimon's reason is still
necessary! What is Rashi's question? (TOSFOS 81b, DH Parah)
ANSWER: TOSFOS explains that Rashi's intention is not to say that the Torah
teaches that a Parah Adumah is Metamei people who touch it. Rather, Rashi
means that since the Parah Adumah makes people who *burn* it become Tamei,
it should also make *foods* that touch it become Tamei even before it is
burned (that is, it should be considered a Rishon l'Tum'ah, which can be
Metamei foods, but not people, through contact), based on the rule that
"anything which, in the future, will make people Tamei, makes food Tamei
now" (Chulin 121a).
QUESTION: The Mishnah (82a) teaches that when one person purchases a mother
animal from a seller, and another person purchases the animal's child from
the seller, the one who bought the first animal has the right to slaughter
it first, and the buyer of the second animal must wait for another day to
slaughter his animal.
3) SLAUGHTERING A GRANDMOTHER ANIMAL, A MOTHER ANIMAL, AND A CHILD ANIMAL ON
THE SAME DAY
The Gemara quotes a Tosefta that states that if the second buyer preempted
the first buyer and slaughtered his animal first, "he is Zariz (zealous) and
he gains; he is Zariz because he did not transgress an Isur, and he gains
because he gets to eat the flesh of his animal."
How can the second buyer be called "Zariz" if he wrongly slaughtered his
animal first? The first buyer had the right to slaughter his animal first,
and by preempting him, the second buyer has caused the first buyer a loss,
since he now must wait until a different day in order to slaughter his
animal (the second buyer is not liable, though, since the damage he caused
ANSWER: The ROSH quotes a Tosefta that adds that the first buyer has
precedence over the second buyer only when they bought the two animals from
the same seller. When each buyer bought his animal from a different seller,
neither one has any precedence over the other, and whoever slaughters his
animal first gains, and the other one must wait until a different day. This
is what the Tosefta quoted by the Gemara here means; it is referring to a
case in which the two buyers bought their animals from different sellers.
The reason for this difference is explained by the TUR (YD 16). When the two
buyers bought the animals from the same seller, it is assumed that the
seller sold to the first buyer the right to slaughter his animal first
(since the seller himself had that right). When the buyers bought the
animals from two different sellers, neither seller had the right to sell the
first buyer the right to slaughter his animal first. Whoever slaughters his
animal first is called "Zariz" because he thereby avoids the possibility of
transgressing the Isur of "Oso v'Es Beno."
The TAZ (YD 16:9) points out that when the buyers bought the animals from
the same seller, if the second buyer slaughters his animal first (without
the consent of the first buyer), then he indeed is considered a sinner. (Z.
OPINIONS: The Mishnah states that one who slaughters a mother animal and her
two calves on the same day receives two sets of Malkus, because he performed
two forbidden acts of Shechitah. One who slaughters the two children first
and afterwards the mother, however, receives only one set of Malkus, because
he performed only one forbidden action.
The Mishnah continues and says that one who slaughters an animal (the
grandmother), and then slaughters its grandchild, and then slaughters its
child (the mother) on the same day receives only one set of Malkus,
according to the Chachamim. RASHI (DH Sofeg) explains that this is because
he transgressed only one prohibition (that of "Oso v'Es Beno") with only one
Hasra'ah, and through only one action.
Sumchus argues and maintains that he is punished with two sets of Malkus.
The Gemara (82b) explains that Sumchus maintains that one who eats two
k'Zeisim of Chelev in one moment of forgetfulness must bring two Korbanos.
Rashi there (DH b'He'elem) explains that just as one must bring two Korbanos
even though both k'Zeisim were eaten in the same moment of forgetfulness,
so, too, one receives two sets of Malkus, according to Sumchus, even though
there was only one Hasra'ah and only one Isur. Since the Isur was
transgressed two times (the grandmother and the mother were slaughtered on
the same day, and the mother and the child were slaughtered on the same
day), the person receives two sets of Malkus, even though there was only one
Hasra'ah and one act of Shechitah.
Does Sumchus argue with the Chachamim only in the second case of the
Mishnah, in which one slaughters three generations of animals on one day, or
does he also argue in the first case of the Mishnah, in which one slaughters
two children and then their mother on the same day?
(a) RASHI (82b, DH d'Af Al Gav) and TOSFOS (82a, DH Sumchus) write that
Sumchus also argues in the first case of the Mishnah. A person who
slaughtered the two children and afterwards the mother receives two sets of
Malkus, because even though he did only one action of Shechitah, he
transgressed two Isurim of "Oso v'Es Beno" with that action. Rashi cites the
Tosefta that states explicitly that one who slaughters five children and
afterwards their mother on the same day is punished with five sets of Malkus
according to Sumchus.
(b) The RAN (28a of the pages of the Rif, DH Masnisin), however, states that
Sumchus agrees with the Chachamim in the first case of the Mishnah. In that
case, not only is there only one action, but there is also only one title
("Shem") of Isur being performed -- the two Isurim have the same title --
"Beno v'Oso," slaughtering a child and afterward slaughtering the mother on
the same day. In contrast, in the second case there are two "Shemos" of Isur
being performed -- slaughtering the grandmother and the mother is "Oso v'Es
Beno," while slaughtering the child and its mother is "Beno v'Oso."
How, though, does the Ran refute Rashi's proof from the Tosefta that states
explicitly that one receives multiple sets of Malkus even in the first case
according to Sumchus?
The CHIDUSHEI CHASAM SOFER answers this question based on the words of the
RAMBAN in MILCHAMOS HASHEM (27b of the pages of the Rif). The Ramban writes
that the reason why the Torah prohibits slaughtering a mother and child on
the same day is in order to prevent us from acting in a cruel manner. The
Ramban states the same principle in his commentary on the Torah (Devarim
22:6), but he mentions there that there is a dispute among Tana'im whether
we know the reason for this Mitzvah or whether it is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv
whose reason has not been revealed to us.
The Chasam Sofer asserts that if the reason for the Isur of "Oso v'Es Beno"
is in order that we not be cruel, then it makes no difference whether the
mother is slaughtered before the child, or whether the child is slaughtered
first; the level of cruelty is the same. In addition, one who slaughters two
children and then their mother is acting with even more cruelty.
The Ran maintains that the Mishnah and the Tosefta argue whether we know the
reason for this Isur or whether it is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv. The Tosefta
maintains that the reason for the Mitzvah is to avoid being cruel.
Therefore, one who slaughters five children and then their mother on the
same day has done five acts of cruelty and, according to Sumchus, receives
five punishments. The Mishnah, though, maintains that we do not know the
reason for the Isur, and, therefore, even Sumchus agrees that when one
slaughters two children and then their mother on one day, one receives only
one set of Malkus.
The Ran maintains that the Halachah does not follow the view of the Tosefta,
and therefore he explains that in our Mishnah, Sumchus argues only in the
second case, where there are two different transgressions being committed.
4) MULTIPLE SETS OF "MALKUS" WITH ONLY ONE "HASRA'AH"
OPINIONS: The Gemara gives two explanations for the Beraisa that says, "One
who sows Kil'ayim, Kil'ayim, receives Malkus." The first explanation is that
the Beraisa is referring to a case in which a person plants two types of
Kil'ayim at one time, with one Hasra'ah, and it is expressing the view of
Sumchus, who maintains that one receives two sets of Malkus for each
transgression. The second explanation is that the Beraisa is referring to a
case in which a person plants two types of Kil'ayim at two different times,
with two Hasra'os, and it is expressing the view of the Rabanan, who are
teaching that there are multiple forms of Kil'ayim for which one can be
Chayav (in contrast to the view of Rebbi Yoshiyah, who maintains that there
is only one form of Kil'ayim).
5) HITTING TWO PEOPLE AT THE SAME TIME
How would Sumchus and the Rabanan rule in a case in which a person plants
two type of Kil'ayim at two different times, but with only one Hasra'ah? How
many sets of Malkus would he receive?
(a) TOSFOS (DH Ela) asserts that the number of sets of Malkus depends only
on the number of Hasra'os that are given. If there is only one Hasra'ah,
then the Rabanan maintain that only one set of Malkus is given, regardless
of how many times the sin was repeated (as we see from the Mishnah that
discusses a Nazir who drank multiple cups of wine).
(b) RASHI (DH b'Vas Achas) seems to be emphasizing that "b'Vas Achas" means
that the two acts were done exactly at the same time, and for this reason
Sumchus maintains that he receives a second set of Malkus even when there
was only one Hasra'ah. This implies that if the two acts were done
separately, then Sumchus would agree that one does *not* receive a second
set of Malkus (unless there was a second Hasra'ah), since the first Hasra'ah
does not apply to the second act. (M. Kornfeld)
QUESTION: The Gemara cites a Beraisa that states that if a person is a
"Safek Ben Tish'ah l'Rishon, Safek Ben Shiv'ah l'Sheni" (i.e. he is not sure
which of two men is his real father) and that person hits both possible
fathers at once, he is Chayav. If he hits one after the other, then whether
or not he is Chayav depends on whether or not "Hasra'as Safek" is considered
a proper Hasra'ah.
In what way does the child hit both possible fathers at the same moment?
RASHI in Yevamos (101a, DH b'Vas Achas) explains that he takes a long stick,
swings it, and hits both men at the same time.
RASHI here (DH b'Vas Achas) suggests a more basic explanation of how the son
hits both possible fathers at the same time. He simultaneously hits one of
the men with one hand, and the other man with his other hand.
RASHI in Makos (16a, DH b'Vas Achas) offers an even simpler explanation. The
son hits both possible fathers in the normal manner (with his dominant hand,
one after the other), but he does so "Toch Kedei Dibur" -- within a very
short amount of time, so that the Hasra'ah applies to both acts of hitting.
Why does Rashi give a different explanation in each place for how a person
is able to hit two men at the same time ("b'Vas Achas")? What advantage does
each explanation have over the other? (See NEHOR SHRAGA to Yevamos 101a and
ANSWER: Apparently, Rashi had a different problem with each explanation, and
in the different Sugyos he chose to explain "b'Vas Achas" in different ways
in order to avoid the problems with the other two ways of explaining it.
Since each explanation had its own advantage, each time Rashi chose the
explanation that he felt was the best explanation at that time. The
advantages of each approach may be as follows:
(a) The simplest explanation is that the son hit both men "Toch Kedei
Dibur." Rashi's basis for explaining that the two acts were done "Toch Kedei
Dibur" is because we find that the Hasra'ah does not have to come
immediately before the act of the Aveirah, but it may come a few seconds
before the Aveirah, as long as it is within "Toch Kedei Dibur" of the
Rashi here in Chulin and in Yevamos rejects that explanation, because he
understands that the Hasra'ah only works "Toch Kedei Dibur" when a single
act was done within a few seconds of the Hasra'ah. To be Chayav for a second
act, a second Hasra'ah is necessary, even though that second act was also
done "Toch Kedei Dibur" of the first Hasra'ah. That is why Rashi here and in
Yevamos does not explain that "b'Vas Achas" means that both beatings
occurred within "Toch Kedei Dibur."
(A source for this understanding may be found in Makos 20b, where the Gemara
writes that if a person pulls out his hair in mourning (Kore'ach Korchah)
five times one after the other with only a single Hasra'ah before them, he
receives only one set of Malkus. The Gemara implies that even if all of his
acts were done "Toch Kedei Dibur," only one set of Malkus is administered.
See Tosfos there, and Insights to Nazir 38:2.)
(b) The reason Rashi in Yevamos says that "b'Vas Achas" means that the son
uses one stick to hit both men at the same time, and he does not say that
the son uses both of his hands to hit both men at the same time, is because
using both of his hands would be considered to be two different actions.
Even if those two actions happened simultaneously, the Hasra'ah would only
apply only to one action. To make him Chayav for two actions, two Hasra'os
Alternatively, Rashi holds "Iy Efshar l'Tzamtzem" -- it is not possible for
two events to occur at exactly the same time. When the son hit the two men
with his two hands, one action had to precede the other, and thus he would
not be Chayav for hitting them "b'Vas Achas." When he hits them both with a
single swing of a stick, though, it is one action, and for that the Hasra'ah
is able to make him Chayav for the two different results of the single
(c) Rashi here in Chulin says that the son hit the two men with his two
hands. Why does Rashi not say that he hit them both with one stick? Rashi
here chooses to give the simpler case of hitting two men with two different
hands, rather than hitting two men with one stick.
Rashi here apparently maintains that there is no way to explain the case
according to those who say "Iy Efshar l'Tzamtzem." If one cannot be
Metzamtzem, then even hitting two people with a single stick will not cause
the Hasra'ah to apply to both hits, since one of the two people inevitably
was hit before the other. The fact that the two hits came from a single
swing is not sufficient reason for the Hasra'ah to apply to both hits,
according to Rashi. The fact that they were brought about by the same
*swing* does not make them into a single action; two hits are always called
two actions. Since the only way to explain the Beraisa that discusses
hitting both men at the same time is if the hits occur at the same moment,
this Beraisa must hold that it is Efshar l'Tzamtzem.
(The mechanics behind the difference in opinion expressed in Rashi in Chulin
and in Yevamos might involve whether Hasra'ah means warning a person not to
do a particular *action* (Rashi in Yevamos), or not to do a particular
*Aveirah* (Rashi in Chulin). According to the former, a single Hasra'ah can
apply to two Aveiros that stem from a single action, while according to the
latter it cannot.)