(Permission is granted to print and redistribute this material
as long as this header and the footer at the end are included.)


brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld

Ask A Question about the Daf

Previous daf

Chulin, 12


OPINIONS: The Gemara says that if one person separates Terumah from the produce of another person, his act is not valid, and the fruits he separated are not Terumah, unless the owner of the produce specifically appointed him as his agent to separate Terumah. The Gemara in Kidushin (41b) derives this from the verse, "Ken Tarimu Gam Atem..." -- "Thus you also shall offer an offering to Hashem of all your tithes" (Bamidbar 18:28). The word, "Atem" ("you"), teaches that an agent may separate Terumah, as long as he is like "you," meaning that he does so with the knowledge and consent of the owner.

The TERUMAS HA'DESHEN (1:188) discusses a similar case. The Terumas ha'Deshen was asked about a case in which a maidservant made a batch of dough which was obligated to have Chalah separated from it. Normally, the woman of the house would come and separate Chalah when the dough was ready. However, the woman of the house was not available when the dough became ready, and the dough was in danger of being ruined if left out any longer. The maidservant separated the Chalah without the owner's knowledge. Was her act of Hafrashas Chalah valid, even though the owner did not appoint her as a Shali'ach to separate Chalah?

(a) The TERUMAS HA'DESHEN rules that the maidservant is permitted to separate Chalah on her own accord, without being appointed to do so by the owner of the dough. He explains that this is because of the principle, "Zachin l'Adam she'Lo b'Fanav" -- one may perform an act, or acquire an object, on behalf of another person when that act or object is beneficial to him, even without the beneficiary's knowledge. Furthermore, if, as many Rishonim maintain, the principle of "Zachin" works through Shelichus ("Zechiyah mi'Ta'am Shelichus" -- conducting a transaction on behalf of someone else without his knowledge works because of Shelichus, in that the person conducting the transaction is considered to be the Shali'ach of the beneficiary), then the worker indeed is acting as the Shali'ach on behalf of the owner when she separates Chalah from the owner's dough. In addition, it is common for a woman to sometimes let her maidservant separate Chalah, and thus we assume that it is her desire for her maidservant to do so when the Chalah would otherwise be ruined. The Terumas ha'Deshen therefore states that the maidservant is considered a Shali'ach even without receiving the express consent of the owner of the dough, and she may separate Chalah even if there is only a slight chance that the dough will become ruined before the owner is able to attend to the Chalah.

The Terumas ha'Deshen questions his ruling, though, from our Gemara. The Gemara here teaches that if a person overheard an owner of produce instructing a Shali'ach to separate Terumah, and the eavesdropper went and separated the Terumah himself, his act is invalid. According to the Gemara, a maidservant should *not* be able to separate Chalah unless she is specifically appointed to do so, even if she knows that the owner of the dough wants the Chalah to be separated!

The Terumas ha'Deshen answers that there is a difference between the case of Terumah and the case of Chalah. With regard to Terumah, there are three different amounts (one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, and one-sixtieth) that may be separated as Terumah. The Shali'ach probably knows the amount that the owner wants him to separate, while the eavesdropper does not, and therefore it cannot be said that the eavesdropper is performing the will of the owner. In contrast, with regard to Chalah, there is one standard amount of a k'Zayis of Chalah which is always separated, and, therefore, we may assume that the worker is separate Chalah according to the will of the owner. In addition, in the case regarding Terumah, there is no risk of loss of the produce, while in the case regarding Chalah, there is a risk that the dough will get ruined if Chalah is not separated from it now.

(b) The KETZOS HA'CHOSHEN (243:8) questions the ruling of the Terumas ha'Deshen from the words of TOSFOS and the RASHBA in Nedarim (36b). The Gemara in Nedarim discusses whether or not one may separate Terumos and Ma'aseros from his own produce on behalf of his friend's produce, so that his friend will not be required to separate it from his own produce. Perhaps his act of separating Terumah on behalf of his friend's produce is valid, because it is benefits his friend, and "Zachin l'Adam she'Lo b'Fanav." On the other hand, perhaps his friend prefers to do the Mitzvah himself. Tosfos and the Rashba there ask that the Gemara teaches that Terumah can be separated by a Shali'ach only when he is appointed with the knowledge of the owner of the produce. How, then, can the Gemara suggest that one may separate Terumah for his friend based on the principle of "Zachin l'Adam" when the owner's knowledge is lacking?

Tosfos and the Rashba answer that the owner's knowledge is necessary only when one separates the Terumah for his friend from his *friend's* produce. Since he is taking fruits from his friend's produce, it is necessary that his friend know about it and consent to his act. The Gemara in Nedarim is discussing a case in which one is separating Terumah from his *own* produce on behalf of his friend's produce, and therefore his friend's knowledge is not required, since the act is beneficial to him. One may only be "Zocheh *l'Adam* she'Lo b'Fanav," but one may not be "Zocheh *me'Adam* she'Lo b'Fanav." The Gemara in Nedarim is asking whether one may give a gift to the owner of the produce by exempting his produce from Terumah. In this case, one is granting something (the produce used as Terumah) *to* the owner of the fruits. In the case of Terumah that is separated from the owner's produce without his knowledge, the produce is being taken "me'Adam," from the person who needs the Terumah separated. There is no principle that permits a person to change the status of someone else's possessions just because he is doing so for the other person's benefit. As long as one is taking Terumah for his friend from his friend's produce, he is required to be appointed by the owner. Only when he is taking it from his own produce does the law of "Zachin" apply.

The Ketzos ha'Choshen explains that the law of "Zachin" applies only when he is actually giving something to his friend. If he is only performing a beneficial service for his friend, then he must be appointed by his friend as a Shali'ach. Therefore, even when it is clear that his friend is interested in the transaction taking place, the law of "Zachin" does not apply.

Similarly, the Ketzos ha'Choshen explains, Tosfos and the Rashba would rule that a maidservant may not separate Chalah from the dough of the owner without the owner's consent. The Ketzos ha'Choshen rules, based on this, that one may not separate Chalah from another person's dough, even if the dough will get ruined if he does not separate Chalah now.

(The Ketzos ha'Choshen has another difficulty with the ruling of the Terumas ha'Deshen. Why is the maidservant in such a rush to separate Chalah? The woman of the house can separate Chalah *after* the dough is baked! The Ketzos ha'Choshen understands that the Terumas ha'Deshen's logic must be that it is a Mitzvah to separate Chalah when the mixture has not yet been baked. Nevertheless, since it may be done after the Chalah is baked, when the woman of the house is not available, the maidservant should bake the dough and wait for the owner to come to separate Chalah!)

How, though, does the Terumas ha'Deshen understand the Tosfos and Rashba? The Terumas ha'Deshen seems to understand that these Rishonim are not defining the laws of "Zachin." Rather, they merely are explaining that the act of separating Terumah for one's friend's produce is not considered a clearly beneficial act, and therefore Shelichus is necessary. Only when he takes the Terumah from his own produce do we say that it is a real Zechus, a real benefit, and therefore the law of "Zachin" applies. According to this logic, there exist situations in which one is just making a transaction for his friend without giving him anything tangible, and yet it is a real Zechus and the law of "Zachin" applies. The case of separating Chalah is an example of such a situation, since Chalah must be separated at this point and the owner has nothing to lose because there is a standard amount that everyone separates as Chalah. (See Insights to Nedarim 26:2 for further discussion about the view of Tosfos.)

HALACHAH: The REMA (YD 328:3) cites the ruling of the Terumas ha'Deshen and says that if the dough will spoil if not baked, then it is permitted to separate Chalah from the dough without explicit permission from the owner. He explains that since it is beneficial for the owner, the worker may act as his Shali'ach even without being appointed, based of the principle of "Zachin l'Adam she'Lo b'Fanav." A maidservant, the Rema continues, may separate Chalah from the owner's dough whenever she wants, since she normally is given permission to do so. The TAZ agrees, but he adds that on Erev Shabbos, when it is the practice of Jewish women to personally separate Chalah, a maidservant should not separate Chalah unless the dough will get ruined.

However, the BACH and SHACH write that the Terumas ha'Deshen seems to rule that one may separate Chalah without the owner's permission only when the dough will otherwise be ruined. Therefore, they write that a maidservant should separate Chalah only when the dough will get ruined otherwise. However, they agree that, b'Di'eved, if the woman of the house finds that her maidservant already separated Chalah, then the Chalah is valid as long as the owner gives her retroactive consent. This is also the opinion of the ARUCH HA'SHULCHAN (YD 328:7).


QUESTION: The Mishnah (2a) states that the Shechitah of a Cheresh, Shoteh, or Katan is valid when an adult stands over them and supervises their Shechitah. The Gemara assumes that a Cheresh, Shoteh, and Katan are unable to have their own Kavanah, and, consequently, the Mishnah is saying that the act of Shechitah does not require specific Kavanah. The Gemara says that the Mishnah is following the view of Rebbi Nasan, who does not require specific intent during Shechitah. Rebbi Nasan rules that even if a person threw a knife at a wall and, on its way, it cut the Simanim of an animal in the manner of Shechitah, the Shechitah is valid.

TOSFOS (DH Man Tana) asks that this seems to contradict a Mishnah in Gitin (22b). The Mishnah there states that a even a Cheresh, Shoteh, and Katan may write a Get. The Gemara asks how can such people write a Get if they have no intellectual capacity of Da'as? The Gemara there is apparently bothered by the fact that they cannot write a Get with the proper intentions. The Gemara answers that they may write a Get only when an adult stands over them and instructs them to write it Lishmah. This suffices to make the writing of the Get considered Lishmah, because a Cheresh, Shoteh, and Katan can have Kavanah to write it Lishmah when someone instructs them how to do so. This implies they *are* able to have the proper intentions as long as someone supervises them. Why, then, does our Gemara assume that the Mishnah holds that a Katan cannot have Kavanah? The Gemara in Gitin says that a Katan *can* have Kavanah when an adult supervises him! (See SHITAH MEKUBETZES, who explains Tosfos question this way.)


(a) TOSFOS answers that the Mishnah here and the Mishnah in Gitin use two different terms when discussing the adult that supervises the Katan. The Mishnah here says that the Shechitah is valid, b'Di'eved, when "Acherim Ro'in Osan" -- "others see them." This wording implies that others need only to see that they perform the Shechitah correctly, but they do not need to interact with the Cheresh, Shoteh, or Katan and explain to them what to do or what to think. This means that the Cheresh, Shoteh, or Katan has no Kavanah when he performs the Shechitah. The Mishnah in Gitin, however, says that there is a "Gadol Omed Al Gabav" -- "an adult standing over him." This wording implies that the adult instructs and guides the one writing the Get, and determines that the Get was written Lishmah. In such a case, everyone agrees that a Cheresh, Shoteh, or Katan can have the proper intentions.

(b) The RASHBA answers that we see from the first statement of the Mishnah here that Shechitah does not require Kavanah. The Mishnah clearly states that the reason why a Cheresh, Shoteh, or and Katan may not slaughter an animal unsupervised is because we suspect that they will not perform the Shechitah properly. This implies that even Eliyahu ha'Navi would come and tell us that they indeed slaughtered the animal properly, we would be permitted to eat from their Shechitah, even though it was not done with any Kavanah.

The SHITAH MEKUBETZES points out that this explanation -- which depends on the fact that the first statement of the Mishnah says that we suspect that they will not slaughter properly -- seems to contradict the Gemara later (31a). The Mishnah there says that if a knife fell and cut the Simanim of an animal in the manner of Shechitah, the Shechitah is not valid. The Gemara infers from this that if a person *threw* the knife down and it cut an animal's Simanim, the Shechitah is valid. Rava there says that this follows the view of Rebbi Nasan, who does not require Kavanah for Shechitah. The Gemara then quotes the last part of the Mishnah here (2a) that says that when others watch the Shechitah of the Cheresh, Shoteh, and Katan, their Shechitah is valid, and the Gemara points out that Rava here, too, said that this follows the view of Rebbi Nasan. The Gemara asks why Rava needs to tell us in both cases that the Mishnah is following the view of Rebbi Nasan.

The Shitah Mekubetzes asks that according to the Rashba, the Gemara there should not quote the last part of the Mishnah here, but rather it should quote the first part of the Mishnah here, that states that the only reason the Shechitah of a Cheresh, Shoteh, or Katan is suspect is because he might not have done the Shechitah properly (and not because of his lack of Kavanah)!

(c) The Rashba quotes another answer in the name of his Rebbi, RABEINU YONAH. When an act can be done by an agent on behalf of another person only if Shelichus is put into effect (such as the writing of a Get, which -- in order to be written by anyone other than the husband -- must be done through Shelichus), a Katan can perform that act when a Gadol stands over him, because we view the Katan and Gadol as a team. The Gadol takes care of the Kavanah aspect of the Get, while the Katan writes the Get. Both are considered an extension of the husband to write a valid Get. In contrast, this "team" element does not apply to a Mitzvah which does not need the concept of Shelichus in order for one person to do it on behalf of another person, such as Shechitah (if one person slaughters another person's animal without permission, the Shechitah is still valid). In such a case, we cannot combine the intent of one person and the action of another. The only thing we take into account during the Shechitah is the person doing the action. Since the Mishnah says that the Shechitah of a Katan is valid, and the fact that there is a Gadol watching him does not add Kavanah to the act, it must be that the Mishnah does not require the Shechitah to be done with Kavanah. (See HE'OROS B'MASECHES CHULIN, where RAV ELYASHIV shlit'a asks that this seems to contradict the opinion of Rabeinu Yonah as recorded in TESHUVOS HA'RASHBA 1:26). (Y. Montrose)

OPINIONS: The Gemara here discusses three distinct categories of intentions, "Machshavah": "Ma'aseh Im Machshavah" -- an act accompanied by specific intent, "Machshavto Nikeres Mitoch Ma'asav" -- specific intent that is apparent from the person's act, and "Machshavah." To what exactly do these three terms refer?

(a) RASHI explains that the first category, "Ma'aseh Im Machshavah," refers to an act that is accompanied by speech clarifying the intent of the act. "Machshavto Nikeres Mitoch Ma'asav" refers to an action that demonstrates intent but is not accompanied by speech. "Machshavah" refers to speech that is not accompanied by an act (see Insights to Zevachim 2:1, Menachos 2:2).

(b) TOSFOS rejects these definitions. According to Tosfos, "Ma'aseh Im Machshavah" refers to an act, with or without speech, that demonstrates the person's intentions *clearly*. "Machshavto Nikeres Mitoch Ma'asav" refers to an act, with or without speech, that demonstrates a person's intentions *somewhat*, but not entirely. (c) "Machshavah" refers to speech alone (in this regard Tosfos agrees with Rashi).

Next daf


For further information on
subscriptions, archives and sponsorships,
contact Kollel Iyun Hadaf,