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Bava Metzia 82

BAVA METZIA 81-85 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.


(a) We try to establish Rebbi Eliezer (who considers the creditor a Shomer Chinam on the Mashkon that he receives from the debtor) by a Mashkon be'Sha'as Halva'ah (one that he received at the time of the loan), whereas our Mishnah (which considers him a Shomer Sachar) is speaking about a Mashkon she'Lo be'Sha'as Halva'ah.
What is the significance of a Mashkon she'Lo be'Sha'as Halva'ah? Why do we take for granted that Rebbi Eliezer concede to Rebbi Akiva there?

(b) On what grounds do we refute this explanation? Why can we not establish our Mishnah by a Mashkon she'Lo be'Sha'as Halva'ah?

(a) Why do we initially reject the suggestion that Rebbi Eliezer is speaking when the creditor lent the debtor money, and our Mishnah, when he lent him fruit?

(b) How do we answer this Kashya, in order to establish our Mishnah like Rebbi Eliezer?

(c) On what grounds do we finally reject this explanation?

(d) So how will we then establish our Mishnah?

(a) We suggest that Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Akiva argue over a statement of Shmuel.
What does Shmuel say in a case where Reuven lends Shimon a thousand Zuz against the handle of a scythe, which the creditor subsequently loses?

(b) In that case, Rebbi Eliezer does not hold of Shmuel's Din, Rebbi Akiva does. What will they both then hold in a case where the Mashkon is equivalent in value to the loan?

(c) But we conclude that neither Tana holds like Shmuel.
What would each one hold in Shmuel's case?

(a) So we suggest that they argue over Rebbi Yitzchak.
What does Rebbi Yitzchak extrapolate from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei (concerning the creditor's obligation to return a Mashkon on a daily basis) "u'Lecha Tih'yeh Tzedakah"?

(b) So how do we now propose to establish Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Eliezer?

(c) We conclude however, that this Machlokes has nothing to do with Rebbi Yitzchak.
Why not? What is the basic difference between Rebbi Yitzchak's case and the case over which they are arguing?

(d) What would Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Akiva say in Rebbi Yitzchak's case? Would they agree with him or not?

(a) We conclude that in fact, they argue over Shomer Aveidah.
What is then the basis of their Machlokes?

(b) What makes a Shomer Aveidah (and a Shomer Pikadon) a Shomer Sachar, according to Rebbi Akiva? On what principle is this based?

(c) Rabah and Rav Yosef too, argue over this point.
What does each one hold?

(d) Why do we not simply establish Rabah like Rebbi Eliezer and Rav Yosef like Rebbi Akiva?

(a) Why must Rabah hold like Rebbi Eliezer?

(b) If, in the case of Shomer Mashkon, the Tana'im are speaking when the creditor needs the Mashkon for his own purposes (as we will explain shortly), what is Rebbi Akiva's reasoning for declaring him to be a Shomer Sachar?

(c) On the other hand, how is it possible for Rav Yosef to hold like Rebbi Eliezer? Why might Rebbi Eliezer agree with Rav Yosef and still hold that a Shomer Mashkon is a Shomer Chinam?

Answers to questions



(a) Aba Shaul in our Mishnah permits a creditor to rent out the Mashkon that he received from a poor debtor, as long as he deducts the proceeds from the debt.
What does Rav Chanan bar Ami Amar Shmuel comment on Aba Shaul's statement?

(b) How, on the other hand, does he qualify Aba Shaul's ruling?

(c) What is ...

  1. ... a Mara?
  2. ... a Pesel?
  3. ... a Kardum?
(a) If a barrel that a porter is transporting breaks, the Tana Kama of our Mishnah obligates even a Shomer Sachar to swear.
What must he swear?

(b) What does Rebbi Elazar (ben Shamua) comment on the Tana Kama (Rebbi Meir)'s ruling?

(c) Rebbi Meir repeats his ruling in a Beraisa.
What does Rebbi Yehudah say there?

(d) What is Rebbi Meir's reason? Why is a Shomer Sachar at least, not Chayav?

(a) What does Rebbi Meir rule in the Mishnah in Bava Kama, in a case where, after dropping his jar in the street and it smashes, the owner leaves it lying there? Why is that?

(b) How does Rebbi Elazar (ben P'das, the Amora) reconcile the two contradictory rulings of Rebbi Meir?

(c) Rebbi Yehudah in the Beraisa here follows his own ruling in the Beraisa in Bava Kama.
What does *he* rule there?

(a) On what grounds then, does Rebbi Elazar (ben Shamua) query Rebbi Meir's ruling ...
  1. ... regarding a Shomer Sachar?
  2. ... even regarding a Shomer Chinam? In which case ought even he to be Chayav?
(b) According to Isi ben Yehudah, the Shomer Chinam might be Chayav even if he was transporting the barrel on sloping ground.
Why is that? What does Isi ben Yehudah say?

(c) How will Rebbi Meir answer Rebbi Elazar's Kashya from Isi ben Yehudah?

Answers to questions

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