ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Metzia 113
BAVA METZIA 112-115 - these Dafim have been dedicated anonymously l'Iluy
Nishmas Tzirel Nechamah bas Tuvya Yehudah.
(a) We learned in our Mishnah (regarding 'Avar Zemano, Eino Nishba
ve'Notel') 'Im Yesh Eidim she'Tav'o Harei Zeh Nishba ve'Notel'. When the
Tana says 'Im Yesh Eidim ... ', Rav Asi explains, he means - that witnesses
testified now that he claimed before the time expired.
(b) We know that the Socher did not pay after the Sachir claimed, says
Abaye - because the Tana is speaking when he claimed in front of the
witnesses right up to the last moment.
(c) This does not mean, says Rav Chama bar Ukva, that the Sachir will now be
believed whenever he claims that he has yet been paid, even years later -
only until the end of the following day.
(a) The Tana of our Mishnah forbids a creditor who was not paid until after
the due date expired - to claim a Mashkon himself, only through a Sheli'ach
(b) We learn from the Pasuk "ba'Chutz Ta'amod" - that one is not permitted
to enter the debtor's house to claim a Mashkon. One waits outside, and it is
the debtor who chooses what he wants to give, and gives it to the man
waiting outside (we will see shortly to who this refers).
(c) When the Tana says 'Hayu Lo Sh'nei Keilim, Notel Echad, u'Mani'ach
Echad', he means - that if the creditor received two vessels (which together
are equivalent in value to that of the debt), one, a day object, the other,
a night object, he retains the one, whilst returning the other.
(d) Consequently, if the Mashkon comprises a sheet and a plow - he returns
the sheet each night and the plow each day.
(a) We learn from the Pasuk "Hashev Teshivenu *Lo*"(in connection with a
Mashkon) - that if the debtor dies, the creditor does not need to return the
Mashkon to his heirs.
(b) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel even restricts the Din of returning it to the
debtor himself - by confining the obligation to the first thirty days, after
which, the creditor may sell it under the auspices of Beis-Din.
(c) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel gives a time limit of thirty days - because
that is the regular time limit that they give, as we shall see in the next
(a) When Shmuel says 'Menatech Nituchi', he means - that the Sheli'ach
Beis-Din is permitted to take as a Mashkon anything that the debtor has on
him as he walks in the street. he is not permitted to enter his house.
(b) We extrapolate from there, 'Aval Memashkenin Lo' (meaning that he is not
permitted to enter his house). On the other hand, we extrapolate from our
Mishnah 'ha'Malveh es Chavero Lo Yemashchenu Ela be'Beis-Din' - that a
Sheli'ach Beis-Din *is* permitted to enter the debtor's house to take a
(c) To reconcile his own statement with the Tana, Shmuel amends the Mishnah
to read 'Lo Yenatchenu Ela be'Beis-Din'.
(d) We try to prove that the Mishnah must concur with Shmuel, because,
having taught us that the creditor is forbidden to enter his house ('Ein
Memashkenin'), why would the Tana find it necessary to add 've'Lo Yikanes
le'Beiso ... ' (unless he is referring to a Sheli'ach Beis-Din)? We reject
this proof however - by amending the Mishnah, adding 'Afilu Nituchi Nami Lo,
Gezeirah Shema Yikanes Le'toch Beiso ... ', a Chidush regarding the
(a) The La'av ''Lo Yachbol' Rechayim va'Rachev" ...
1. ... entails - not entering the debtor's house to take his millstones ...
(b) Rav Yosef thinks that this La'av must pertain to the Sheli'ach Beis-Din
(posing a Kashya on Shmuel) - because the creditor is forbidden to enter the
debtor's house to take *anything* (so he would not require a Pasuk to forbid
2. ... implying - that to take other things, he may.
(c) Rav Papa B'rei de'Rav Nachman (or B'rei de'Rav Yosef) however, refutes
this Kashya too - by establishing the La'av by the creditor (despite the
prevalent La'av to take *anything* from his house) and not to the Sheli'ach
Beis-Din, and the Pasuk is teaching us that if he takes the millstones, he
transgresses an additional La'av.
(a) The Tana of another Beraisa learns from the fact that the Torah finds it
necessary to add "ve'ha'Ish Asher Atah Nosheh Bo Yotzi", after having said
"ba'Chutz Ta'amod", 'Le'rabos Shelia'ch Beis-Din'. Initially, we establish
"ve'ha'Ish" together with the phrase that follows it "ve'Ha'Ish va'Asher
Atah Nosheh Bo, Yotzi ... " (a Kashya on Shmuel).
(b) To answer the Kashya, we establish "ve'ha'Ish" with the previous
phrase - "ba'Chutz Ta'amod ve'ha'Ish, va'Asher Atah Nosheh Bo Yotzi".
(a) The Beraisa establishes the double Lashon in the Pasuk "Im Chavol
Sachbol Salmas Re'echa, Lo Savo el Beiso La'avot Avoto" - with regard to the
Sheli'ach Beis-Din and the creditor himself respectively.
(b) Shmuel justifies his opinion in light of this Beraisa - by presenting a
(c) The Tana (who permits the Sheli'ach Beis-Din to enter the debtors house)
requires him to leave two beds and either a sheet for an erstwhile rich man
or a mat for a poor one - even if the debtor has a wife and two children,
since the Beraisa specifically precludes the Sheliach from having to leave
anything for the debtor's wife and children.
(a) The Beraisa states 'Ke'shem she'Mesadrin le'Ba'al-Chov, Kach Mesadrin
be'Erchin'. 'Mesadrin' means - leaving the basic needs of the debtor.
(b) The wording of the Beraisa is clearly inverted - since the Torah
discusses Mesadrin in the Parshah of Erchin, and it is Ba'al-Chov that we
learn from Erchin, and not voce-versa.
(c) We learn from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Michah" "Michah" 'Ke'shem
she'Mesadrin be'Erchin, Kach Mesadrin le'Ba'al-Chov'.
(a) The reason that the Tana requires the Sheli'ach Beis-Din to leave *two*
beds is because of a statement of Shmuel, who said - that he could cure any
illness, but he did not know what to do for someone who ate a bitter date on
an empty stomach or who wore a wet linen belt around his loins.
(b) The third thing that Shmuel included in his list was - someone who went
to bed after having eaten without first walking four Amos.
(c) The Sheli'ach Beis-Din needed to leave the debtor two beds - one on
which he reclined as he ate, the other, a bed to sleep on, which he would
place at least four Amos away from the one on which he ate.
(d) When that Beraisa expert cited a Beraisa 'Ke'Shem she'Mesadrin
be'Erchin, Kach Mesadrin be'Ba'al-Chov', Rav Nachman objected - because he
had quoted the author as Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, according to whom one
sells everything after thirty days, so it goes without saying that one is
(a) We know that, in the opinion of Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, one sells
everything, because if one were to sell only those things that he does not
need, leaving him with things that he does - then one would not sell
anything, because Raban Shimon ben Gamliel is one of those Tana'im who holds
that all Jews are princes, in which case, there is nothing that is not fit
for every Jew.
(b) The Tana Kama in a Mishnah in Shabbos considers mustard-seeds and Luf (a
kind of legume) because they are not edible in their raw state. Based on the
above S'vara, Raban Shimon ben Gamliel permits the latter - because Luf is
fit for ravens, and seeing as princes used to breed ravens, every Jew is
worthy of doing so, and Luf is potentially useful to him.
(c) Rebbi Shimon too, who, in a Mishnah in Shabbos, subscribes to the above
opinion, permits any Jew to anoint his wounds with rose-oil, considers all
Yisrael princes. The Tana Kama - permits princes to do so, because they
anoint themselves with rose-oil during the week, too.
(d) And so do Rebbi Yishmael and Rebbi Akiva. The Tana Kama of a Beraisa
requires a debtor who is wearing an expensive suit to sell it and to buy a
cheaper one, and to use the difference to pay off his debt. Rebbi Yishmael
and Rebbi Akiva (in two independent Beraisos) say - that each and every Jew
is worthy of wearing such a suit (so we do not force him to sell it).
(a) Selling the debtor's expensive items and buy cheaper ones, as we
initially thought according to Raban Shimon ben Gamliel is feasible with
regard to the sheet and the cushion mentioned in our Mishnah. With regard to
a plow (which were standard in those days) - the Tana must be speaking about
a debtor who owns a silver plow, and who would then be obligated to sell it
in order to purchase a wooden one.
(b) According to those who hold Mesadrin (Shitah Mekubetzes), the creditor
cannot argue that *it is not his job* to feed the debtor - because now that
the Torah has written "u'Lecha Tih'yeh Tzedakah" (with regard to returning
the Mashkon whenever the debtor needs it), he *is*.