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Bava Metzia 79

BAVA METZIA 76-79 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.



(a) If someone hired a donkey to transport him to a certain town, and the donkey died halfway, Rav rules - that he is obligated to pay half the rental, and all he has against the owner (for providing him with a weak animal) is complaints.

(b) Assuming that donkeys are easy to hire there, then there is no reason to complaint. If they are not, the problem with Rav's ruling is - that, seeing as he did not reach his destination, he ought not to have to pay rental at all.

(c) The reason that he does is - because the owner can claim that had the point that he reached been his destination, would he not have had to pay? (meaning that one pays rental per mileage, not for reaching one's destination).

(a) In the previous case, the hirer must have hired 'Chamor Zeh' - because had he hired Chamor S'tam, the owner would have been obligated to provide him with another donkey to complete his journey.

(b) The hirer cannot sell the carcass, and use the proceeds ...

1. ... to purchase another donkey - because Rav speaks when the are not sufficient to pay for another donkey.
2. ... to hire another donkey - because Rav holds 'Lo Mechalinan Karna' (that, even though the carcass of the donkey remains Meshubad to the hirer, he is not permitted to use up the Keren completely.
(c) Shmuel would say - that the hirer should sell the carcass and use the proceeds to hire another donkey, because he holds 'Mechalinan Karna'.

(d) Rav establishes our Mishnah, which rules 'Meisah, Chayav Le'ha'amid Lo Chamor' when the animal died whilst it was still in the owner's domain, and the owner is able to add some money out of his own pocket to purchase a new one.

(a) We learned in a Beraisa that if the tree that the debtor gave the creditor as a Mashkanta de'Sura (which cancels the debt when it is returned at the end of the fixed term) dried up or was cut down, neither Reuven nor Shimon is permitted to benefit from the wood. What they do is - sell the tree, and from the proceeds, they purchase a small plot of land, from which the creditor eats the fruit.

(b) What makes this a case of 'Kalya Karna' is - the fact that it goes back to the owner in the Yovel.

(c) We reconcile this with Rav, who just said that Reuven is forbidden to use up the Keren of something that is Meshubad to him, by citing Rav Chisda Amar Rav Ketina - who rules that a field that is sold for sixty years does not go back to the owner in the Yovel, and he learns this from the Pasuk "ve'ha'Aretz Lo Simacher li'Tzemisus", implying that Yovel only cancels sales that would otherwise be permanent, but not those that are temporary anyway.

(d) We use Rav Ketina's ruling to solve our problem, by establishing the Beraisa too, when they purchased the small plot for sixty years, so that Yovel will not cancel the sale. We refute this explanation however - by stressing that since the plot of land will have to be returned in sixty years anyway, it is still a case of Kalya Karna.

(a) We finally circumvent the problem - by establishing the Beraisa at a time when Yovel is not practiced, in which case the debtor will not lose the Keren.

(b) And we ...

1. ... try to prove from the basic ruling in the Beraisa - that the Tana must be speaking in a time when the Yovel is not practiced, and that 'Lo Mechalinan Karna', because otherwise, why is it necessary to sell the tree and purchase land? Why not allow the creditor to use the tree as firewood (a proof for Rav)?
2. ... refute this proof however, on the grounds - that sometimes, the days of the Mashkon will conclude before the arrival of the Yovel, in which case, the debtor too, will benefit from the plot of land until the Yovel arrives (because even Shmuel will concede that we will not finish off the Keren if it is possible for the debtor to derive benefit from it.
(a) Rebbi Nasan in a Beraisa rules, that in a case where someone hired a boat, which sunk halfway to its destination - if he has already paid, he cannot retrieve the money, whereas if he has not, then he does not need to pay.

(b) The Tana cannot be speaking by ...

1. ... 'Sefinah Zu ve'Yayin S'tam' - because then, why should the hirer not retrieve his money (seeing as he can argue that if the owner produces the original boat, he will provide more wine)?
2. ... 'Sefinah S'tam ve'Yayin Zu' - because then, there is no reason why he should not have to pay (seeing as the owner can argue that if he produces the original wine, he will gladly provide him with another boat).
(c) Rav Papa establishes Rebbi Nasan - by 'Sefinah Zu ve'Yayin Zu' (in which case whichever is the claimant has the underhand, since the Muchzak can counter that if he (the claimant) produces what he promised, then he will produce what he promised.

(d) Whereas in the case of 'Sefinah S'tam ve'Yayin S'tam' (where each one is able to fulfill his half of the condition, and provide what he promised) - the hirer must pay half, if he did not yet pay, and he retrieves half, if he did.




(a) The Beraisa rules that someone hires a boat and decides to unload it halfway to his destination - pays for half the journey and the owner has nothing against him but complaints.

(b) The Tana cannot be speaking when the owner is unable to find someone to replace the first hirer - because then why should the hirer not have to pay in full for the loss that he caused the owner?

(c) We try to resolve the problem, that if he *was* able to find a replacement, then what complaints could he possibly have, by suggesting - that perhaps his complaints are due to the depreciation of the boat caused by the previous hirer unloading his goods and the new hirer loading his.

(d) We refute that suggestion however on the grounds - that he would then have the right to charge the first hirer for the unexpected depreciation (and not just have complaints against him)?

(a) So we conclude that the Tana cannot be talking about the hirer unloading the boat halfway - but about the hirer taking on a new load in mid-journey.

(b) He might be complaining about the fact that the hirer changed from his original conditions, in which case - his complaint is based on the added time to the journey (bearing in mind that it was the owner who generally navigated the boat).

(c) Alternatively, his complaint might be - due to the extra ropes that he had to purchase in mid-journey, to cope with moving into mid-river, which is the result of the extra weight (the boats it seems, were pulled by animals walking along the river banks, attached to the boat by ropes). Note, that if, as Rashi writes, the hirer stipulated that he was free to load additional goods in mid-journey, it is difficult to see what complaints the owner could possibly have [see also Tosfos]).

(a) The Beraisa rules that someone who hires a donkey is permitted to place his cloak, his water-flask and food for the entire journey on its back. The donkey-driver (the owner) is allowed - barley, straw and food for that day only.

(b) The Tana cannot be speaking in a case when stocks are difficult to come by along the way - because if they were, the donkey-driver too, would be allowed to load his donkey for the entire journey, just like the hirer.

(c) Despite the fact that he is speaking when stocks are readily available, the hirer is permitted to place food for the entire journey - because it is not customary for merchants to purchase food on a daily basis, whereas it is the way of donkey-drivers to do so.

(a) The Tana rules that someone who hires a donkey ...
1. ... for a man to ride on - may not allow a woman to ride on it (because women generally weigh more than men).
2. ... for a woman to ride on - a man may ride on it (see Nimukei Yosef).
(b) If the donkey was hired for a woman, it make not the least difference whether the woman is ...
1. ... large or small ...
2. ... pregnant or with a feeding baby. 'A woman' covers all these contingencies.
(c) Rav Papa explains the fact that having informed us about a woman with a feeding baby, the Tana needed to add a pregnant woman - by explaining the Beraisa to mean both i.e. 'even a pregnant woman who is also feeding'.

(d) Abaye observes from here - that the weight of a fish is determined by the size of its stomach. Consequently, if the fish that one is purchasing has a bulging stomach, he should insist that the seller removes its innards before weighing it.

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