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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Bava Metzia 17

BAVA METZIA 11-17 - This study material has been produced with the help of the Israeli ministry of religious affairs.



(a) Rava, quoting Rav Nachman, will discuss some Halachos of 'Huchzak Kafran'. According to Rav Yosef bar Minyumi, if following Beis-Din's ruling ...
1. ... 'Tzei Ten Lo', the debtor claims that he subsequently paid - *he is believed* (with a Shevu'as Hesses).
2. ... 'Chayav Atah Liten Lo' - he is *not*.
(b) The basis for this distinction is - the fact that 'Tzei Ten Lo' is *a final ruling*, whereas 'Chayav Atah Liten Lo' is *not* (and the debtor would be unlikely to have paid before Beis-Din have issued a final ruling).

(c) The Din with regard to Beis-Din subsequebtly writing a Sh'tar Adrachta on behalf of the creditor is - that when the debtor is believed, Beis-Din will write one, and whe he is not, they will not.

(a) Rav Z'vid Amar Rava says - that he is believed when he later claims that he paid, even after 'Chayav Atah Liten Lo'.

(b) He therefore presents the distinction between 'Tzei Ten Lo' or 'Chayav Atah Liten Lo' in the following way. Whether in a case where, after Beis-Din had ruled 'Tzei Ten Lo' or 'Chayav Atah Liten Lo' the debtor claimed Para'ti, and then witnesses testified that it was not true, he is Huchzak Kafran (after 'Tzei Ten Lo'), or not (after 'Chayav Atah Liten Lo').

(c) The reason that after 'Chayav Atah Liten Lo', he is not Huchzak Kafran is - because he can argue that, due to the fact that Beis-Din had not actually obligated him yet, he was only trying to evade his self-imposed payment until Beis-Din finally ordered him to pay. Consequently, he will be believed (with a Shevu'as Hesses), should he subsequenty claim 'Para'ti'.

(a) Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi Yochanan rules that if the debtor denies having borrowed the money ('Lo Hayu Devarim me'Olam') and refuses to pay after witnesses testify that he did - he is Huchzak Kafran, and is no longer believed to claim 'Para'ti' without a Shevu'ah.

(b) This is borne out by an incident where Shabsa'i the son of Rebbi Merinus, denied having entered a valuable article of clothing in his daughter-in-law's Kesuvah. After witnesses testified that he had indeed entered that article of clothing into the Kesuvah - Rebbi Chiya ruled that he was 'Huchzak Kafran'.

(a) Rebbi Avin Amar Rebbi Ila'a Amar Rebbi Yochanan said - that someone who is obligated to swear and claims that he already swore, in spite of the witnesses who testify that he did not, is Huchzak Kafran (and that, unless he swears in front Beis-Din, he will no longer be believed should he subsequently claim that he fullfilled his obligation.

(b) Rebbi Avahu qualifies Rebbi Yochanan's statement - by restricting it to a Shevu'ah which Beis-Din obligated him to pay (but not to one that he took upon himself) ...

(c) ... because a person tends to make concessions with regard to self-imposed Shevu'os.

(d) When Rebbi Avin heard about Rebbi Avahu's qualification - he commented that this is what he actually said in the name of ... Rebbi Yochanan.

(a) Rebbi Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan rules that if someone finds a Sh'tar with a Henpek in the street which is dated on the same day - he should return it to the creditor.

(b) We do not suspect that the debtor may have paid - because people do not normally repay their debts on the day that they borrow.

(c) Rebbi Asi also quoted Rebbi Yochanan as saying that a Sh'tar which was used to borrow with and the loan was repaid, cannot be re-used - because the Shibud of the Sh'tar has already been used up.

(d) He did not rather attribute it to the fact that it is a Sh'tar Mukdam (in which case it will be forbiden to use it even for the same debt, let alone another one) - because the Tana is speaking about a Sh'tar that is dated on the same day that it was found.

(a) Rebbi Zeira asked Rebbi Asi from Rebbi Yochanan's latter ruling, which implies that people do pay their debts on the same day to which he replied - that he never said that nobody pays on the same day, but that it is unusual, in which case we would not take the possibility of it happening into account.

(b) Rav Kahana disagrees. According to him, Rebbi Yochanan does suspect that the Sh'tar may have been paid even on the same day as it is dated - and he only says 'Yachzir' in a case where the debtor admits that he has not paid.

(c) And the Chidush, according to Rav Kahana, is - that we are not concerned that the debtor may be trying to use the same Sh'tar for a second loan, even though this is illegal, as we explained earlier.

(d) We are not afraid that the debtor might do this in order to save himself the Sofer's fees - because the creditor, afraid that Beis-Din will cancel the entire Sh'tar, and stop him from claiming from the purchasers, will not let him get away with it.

(a) We established the Mishnah earlier in the Perek 'Matza Sh'tarei-Chov, Im Yesh Bahen Acharayus Nechasim, Lo Yachzir', when the debtor admitted that he was Chayav to pay. The Tana is worried - that the Sh'tar may have been written in Nisan, but the loan did not take place until Tishri, with the result that the creditor will claim from the purchasers illegally.

(b) Even according to Rebbi Yochanan, the Tana does not assume that the creditor will not allow the debtor to get away with his ruse, (like he did in the previous case) - because here the creditor himself stands to gain (in that he will be able to claim from the purchasers from an earlier date [whereas in Rebi Yochanan's case, it is only the debtor who stands to gain]).




(a) Rebbi Chiya bar Aba Amar Rebbi Yochanan states that someone who claims that he has paid a Ma'aseh Beis-Din is not believed. 'Ma'aseh Beis-Din' - incorporates any T'nai Beis-Din such as Kesuvah and Mazon ha'Ishah ve'ha'Banos.

(b) The reason for this ruling is - because every Ma'aseh Beis-Din is considered as if the claimant was holding a Sh'tar (even when he is not).

(c) When Rebbi Chiya bar Aba asked Rebbi Yochanan whether his ruling was not synonymous with the Mishnah in Kesuvos 'Hotzi'ah Get ve'Ein Imo Kesuvah, Govah Kesuvasah', he replied - that if he had not removed the piece of clay, they would not discovered the jewel (meaning that if he had taught them this ruling, they would not have realized what the Mishnah meant).

(a) Abaye refutes Rebbi Yochanan's reply to Rebbi Chiya bar Aba. Even if 'Para'ti' *would* apply to Ma'aseh Beis-Din, he counters - our Mishnah would speak in a town where it was not customary to write a Kesuvah. Otherwise, unless his wife produced her Kesuvah, the husband would be believed to claim that he had already paid.

(b) Besides the fact that her husband can claim 'Para'ti', the woman might not be able to claim her Kesuvah without the Sh'tar Kesuvah - because we are afraid that she will later produce it and claim again.

(c) Abaye repudiates his own rebuttal however, by referring to a widow from the betrothal. If, on principle, the man was believed to claim 'Para'ti' in a place where they wrote a Kesuvah (unless she produced her Kesuvah) the problem would be - that an Almanah min ha'Eirusin, for whom one does not write a Kesuvah, will have to claim her Kesuvah with the witnesses of her husband's death, and the heirs will always be able to claim that they have paid.

(a) Mar Keshishah B'rei de'Rav Chisda queried the very concept of an betrothed woman being paid a Kesuvah. There is no proof from the Mishnah in Kesuvos 'Nisarmelah O Nisgarshah, Bein min ha'Eirusin u'Vein min ha'Nisu'in Govah es ha'Kol', that an Arusah receives a Kesuvah - because that Mishnah could be speaking when her betrothed wrote her one (but not about 'Ma'aseh Beis-Din').

(b) If the Mishnah speaks when her husband wrote her a Kesuvah (but normally, an Arusah does not receives one), the Chidush is - to preclude the opinion of Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah, who holds that an Arusah whose husband wrote her a Kesuvah and died, does not receive a Kesuvah, because he only wrote it on the understanding that he marries her, but not otherwise. The above Mishnah holds otherwise.

(c) the Lashon of the Mishnah 'Govah es ha'Kol' - which means even what is over and above the Manah or Masayim (i.e. what her betrothed added initial sum)?

(d) We prove from here - that the Tana must indeed be speaking when her husband specifically wrote her a Kesuvah, because otherwise, she only receives Manah or Masayim. So what does 'ha'Kol' mean?

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