ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Metzia 9
(a) We ask on Shmuel (who holds that Rachuv is not Koneh) from the Beraisa,
which equates Meshichah and Hanhagah with regard to a camel or a donkey.
'Meshichah' constitutes - pulling the animal from the front (which is how
one normally drives a camel; Hanhagah, from the back, which is how a donkey
is usually driven.
(b) This is the opinion of the Tana Kama. According to Rebbi Yehudah - if
one is Moshech a donkey or Manhig a camel, one is not Koneh it.
(c) The Kashya on Shmuel stems from the fact - that the Tana discusses these
two Kinyanim, to the apparent exclusion of Rachuv (even when he is Manhig
(a) We answer that the Tana Kama specifically mentions Meshichah and
Hanhagah (and omits Rachuv) - in order to preclude the S'vara of Rebbi
Yehudah (i.e. to validate even the reverse).
(b) The Tana Kama cannot simply state that Meshichah and Hanhagah are
effective both by a camel and by a donkey. He is forced to connect Meshichah
to the camel and Hanhagah to the donkey (one of them deliberately, and the
other one, to balance the first one) - because he only validates the reverse
in the case of one of them (either Meshichah by a donkey or Hanhagah by a
camel), but not by the other. And we don't know which is which.
(c) Others ask on Shmuel from the Tana Kama's words 'be'Midah Zos Kanu',
which seemingly comes to preclude Rachuv - to which we reply that the Tana
is not coming to preclude Rachuv, but the reverse (as we explained in the
(d) Even though this statement of the Tana Kama precludes the reverse, he
nevertheless differs from Rebbi Yehudah - in either Meshichah by a Chamor or
Manhig by a camel, as we explained in the first Lashon.
(a) In the case where Reuven is riding the animal and Shimon is holding the
reins - the Tana rules that Reuven acquires the animal and Shimon, the
(b) According to Shmuel - 'Rachuv' means leading it with his legs.
(c) In light of this, we initially amend the statement 'Zeh Kanah Chamor,
ve'Zeh Kanah Mosirah' to mean - that Reuven acquires the donkey plus half
the reins, and Shimon acquires half the reins.
(d) We object to the ruling that Shimon acquires the reins because he is
holding them - in view of the fact that one does not acquire an object until
one has picked it up entirely, and in this case, seeing as Shimon only
picked-up half the reins, and the other half remained where it was, he is
not the reins at all.
(a) The problem with the previous ruling (enabling Reuven to acquire half
the reins through Shimon's Kinyan on the reins (even according to Rami bar
Chama, who holds 'ha'Magbihah Mezti'ah la'Chavero, Kanah Chavero') is - that
is only if he picked it up on behalf of his friend, which is not the case
here (where Shimon picked up the Talis in order to acquire it).
(b) So Rav Ashi further amends the Beraisa, to read that Shimon acquires
what he is holding - whereas Reuven acquires only the bridle-harness, which
one acquires together with the donkey.
(a) Rebbi Avahu reinstates the original wording of the Beraisa. According
to him, Shimon will acquire the reins - by virtue of the fact that when he
picks-up the one end from the ground, it is easy to pull the other end
(b) If Reuven first picked up one end of a Talis from the floor, and Shimon
then picked up the other end from a pillar - both of them will acquire the
(c) We know that the first one is not Koneh the entire Talis (like he ought
to according to Rebbi Avahu) - because then the Din of two people picking up
a Metzi'ah is subject to how the object is lying, and we know of no Tana who
makes such a distinction.
(d) This proves - that Rebbi Avahu's explanation is nothing more than a
(a) When Rebbi Eliezer in a Beraisa states that someone who rides an animal
in town or leads it in the field, acquires it, he is coming to preclude
riding in town, which is not Koneh.
(b) It is not customary to ride an animal in town - because it is considered
to lack modesty.
(a) We conclude that 'Rochev' means Manhig be'Raglav, and that Rebbi Eliezer
is referring to two different kinds of Manhig. According to Rav Kahana, one
does not acquire the animal by riding it in town - because people do not
usually ride animals in town as we explained.
(b) Rav Ashi disproves Rav Kahana from the Din of someone who picks up a
purse on Shabbos - and acquires it even though people do not usually pick up
purses on Shabbos (in other words, time and location do not affect
Kinyanim - notwithstanding certain Kinyanim, which Chazal only instituted in
(c) So Rav Ashi establishes Rebbi Eliezer (not by the case of Metzi'ah,
but) - by the case of purchase, where the seller specified that the
purchaser must acquire it in the way that people normally do.
(d) We cite three exceptions to Rebbi Eliezer's ruling. The purchaser will
acquire the animal even through riding it in town, if 'he' is ...
1. ... riding in a main road - because then, in order not to become
separated from his animal, everyone tends to ride rather than lead the
2. ... a man of high esteem - for whom it is undignified to lead his animal.
3. ... a woman - who feels safer on the animal's back.
4. ... a man with no self-respect - who sees nothing wrong with riding in
(a) Rebbi Elazar asked what the Din will be if Reuven says to Shimon
'Meshoch Beheimah Zu Li'knos Keilim she'Alehah'. However the wording of the
She'eilah is erroneous - because Reuven failed to instruct Shimon to acquire
the vessels. Consequently, he is merely telling him to have in mind to
acquire them, but that he is not giving them to him.
(b) So we amend the wording to 'Meshoch Beheimah Zu u'K'ni Keilim
she'Alehah', and Rebbi Elazar's She'eilah is whether the recipient will
acquire the vessels by means of the Kinyan on the animal (even though he is
not acquiring the animal itself).
(c) Rava comments on the She'eilah - that clearly Rebbi Elazar takes for
granted that if he meant to acquire the animal as well, he would certainly
acquire the vessels. That is not such a simple matter however. He ought not
to acquire the vessels ...
1. ... even if he means to acquire the animal as well - because a walking
Chatzer is not Koneh.
(d) We know that a walking Chatzer is not Koneh - because Kinyan Chatzer
stems from the Pasuk in Mishpatim "ve'Im Himatzei Simatzei be'Yado",
'Le'rabos Gago, Chatzero ve'Karfifo' (which, like "Yado", cannot move
without his consent).
2. ... even if the animal is standing still - because a Chatzer that is able
to walk is not Koneh even if it is static.
(a) We finally justify the She'eilah, by establishing that it is possible to
acquire the vessels together with the animal - when the animal is trussed
(b) Despite the fact that a walking Chatzer is not Koneh ...
1. ... Rava explained to Rav Papa and Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua the
accepted Halachah that fish which leap into a boat belong to the owner - on
the grounds that a ship is not a walking Chatzer, since it is basically
static, and it is the water which moves it (a definition will presumably not
apply to modern ships which are propelled by a motor).
2. ... Rav Ashi explained to Ravina the Halachah (cited in the Mishnah in
Gitin) that if a man throws a Get into the basket that his wife is carrying
in the street, she is divorced - because the basket (like the ship) is
static, and it is the woman who is moving.
(a) Our Mishnah rules in a case where following a request from Reuven to
pick up a Metzi'ah on his behalf, Shimon picks it up ...
1. ... and promptly declares that he acquired it for himself - that it
belongs to Shimon.
(b) The latter Halachah will apply even according to those who hold
'ha'Magbihah Metzi'ah la'Chavero, Lo Kanah Chavero' - because 'Mah
Nafshach', if Shimon acquired the article, then he gave it to Reuven as a
gift, and if he did not, then Reuven acquired it from Hefker, when he took
it from Shimon's hand.
2. ... hands it to him, and then declares that he acquired it first - that
it belongs to Reuven.
(a) According to Rebbi Eliezer in the Mishnah in Pe'ah, if a rich man picks
up Pe'ah on behalf of a poor man, the latter acquires it - This Halachah
does not extend to the owner of the field, based on the Pasuk in Kedoshim
"Lo Selaket, le'Ani" from which we learn that even if the owner is a poor
man, he is forbidden to take Pe'ah from his own field.
(b) The Rabbanan hold - that the poor man does not acquire it (until it
reaches his hand). Consequently, any other poor man may help himself to it
(c) Ula Amar Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi confines the Rabbanan's ruling to a
rich man acquiring on behalf of a poor one. According to him ...
1. ... Rebbi Eliezer permits the poor man to keep the Pe'ah - because he
applies two 'Migus' ('Migu' that he could declare his property Hefker and
become eligible to take Pe'ah, and 'Migu de'Zachi le'Nafsheih, Zachi Nami
(d) The Rabbanan concede to Rebbi Eliezer in the case of a poor man picking
up the Pe'ah on behalf of another poor man - because that only requires one
'Migu', and the Rabbanan do not argue with the concept of 'Migu de'Zachi
le'Nafsheih, Zachi Nami le'Chavreih'.
2. ... the Rabbanan rule he may not, because they only apply one 'Migu' at a
time, but not two.
(a) We learned in our Mishnah that where Shimon, in apparent compliance with
Reuven's request, picks up the Metzi'ah that Reuven asked him to pick up on
his behalf, and declares that he acquired it for himself, it is his.
According to Ula, Shimon claims that he originally picked up the article on
his own behalf (as we explained in our Mishnah). Rav Nachman, interprets the
Mishnah to mean - that it is *now* that Shimon wishes to acquire the object,
even though originally, he picked it up on behalf of Reuven.
(b) Rav Nachman extrapolates from this - that the Tana holds 'Hamagbihah
Metzi'ah la'Chavero, Lo Kanah Chavero', even in a case where there is a
(c) He then goes on to prove from here that the Rabbanan must argue with
Rebbi Eliezer even in the case of *a poor man* picking up Pe'ah on behalf of
a poor man (because they do not hold of 'Migu de'Zachi le'Nafsheih ... ').
Otherwise, who will be the author of our Mishnah (seeing as both Rebbi
Eliezer and the Rabanan hold ' ... Zachi Nami le'Chavreih')?
(d) Even according to Rav Nachman, however - even the Tana of our Mishnah
holds of 'Migu de'Zachi le'Nafsheih ... ', provided he also acquires it
partially for himself (because our Sugya is speaking specifically when
Shimon acquires the article or the Pe'ah on behalf of Reuven exclusively).
(a) Ula answers that the Tana must be speaking when Shimon said that he
picked up the object initially on Reuven's behalf, as we explained, and he
proves this from the Tana's use of the word 'Techilah' in the Seifa (where
he said, after having giving it to Reuven 'Ani Zachisi Bah Techilah'). The
problem with this per se would be - that it is obvious, and hardly needs to
be mentioned, since otherwise, how could Shimon possibly expect to acquire
the article that he already gave to Shimon?
(b) Ula therefore concludes - that the Tana must insert 'Techilah' in the
Seifa, to reveal that the Reisha too, speaks when he said 'Techilah'.
(c) Rav Nachman, to counter Ula's proof - explains that the Tana inserts
'Techilah' in the Seifa, implying that the Reisha speaks when he did not say