ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Metzia 8
(a) On the assumption that each of the two men picked up the Talis on behalf
of both of them (we will see later from which part of the Mishnah he derives
this), Rami bar Chama extrapolates from our Mishnah that if Reuven picks up
a Metzi'a for Shimon, Shimon acquires it automatically ('ha'Magbihah
Metzi'ah la'Chavero, Kanah Chavero') - because if that was not the case
then, as far as each one is concerned, the other half of the Talis is still
lying on the ground (and how could he acquire it?).
(b) Rava refutes Rami bar Chama's proof on the grounds that, even if we were
to hold 'Lo Kanah Chavero', they would both acquire the Talis - because
'Migu de'Zachi le'Nafsheih, Zachi Nami le'Chavreih' (seeing as each one
wishes to acquire half the Talis himself, he also acquires the other half on
behalf of his friend).
(c) Rava proves the distinction between the two above concepts from - the
fact that if Reuven stole on behalf of himself and his partner Shimon - the
latter would be liable to pay half, whereas had Shimon appointed Shimon a
Sheli'ach to steal on his behalf, he would be Patur.
(a) We refute Rava's proof from the 'Migu de'Zachi le'Nafsheih . ... ' that
if a Cheresh and a Pike'ach pick up a Metzi'ah together, since the Cheresh
acquires half, so does the Pike'ach - on the grounds that since there is
nobody picking up the other half on behalf of the Pike'ach, how can he
possibly be Koneh? The Cheresh acquires his half however, because Chazal
instituted that a Cheresh acquires because of Darkei Shalom.
(b) So we assume that the Cheresh is Koneh but not the Pike'ach, and the
'Migu' referred to by Rava is - that just as when two Charashin pick up an
article, Chazal specifically state that they both acquire it, so too will
one Cheresh acquire it if a Pike'ach picks up the other end.
(c) We refute this explanation too however, on the grounds - that logically,
since the Pike'ach does not acquire the article, the Cheresh cannot acquire
it either ('Migu de'Lo Zachi le'Nafsheih, Lo Zachi Nami le'Chavreih' [see
Maharam]). Neither will the Cheresh pick a quarrel, because seeing that the
Pike'ach does not acquire it, he does not expect to acquire it either.
(d) Chazal instituted that two Charashin should be Koneh - to avoid them
picking a quarrel with anyone who takes the article away from them?
(a) When Rami bar Chama extrapolates from our Mishnah 'ha'Magbihah Metzi'ah
la'Chavero, Kanah Chavero' (and Rava 'Migu de'Zachi le'Nafsheih ... '), it
cannot possibly be from ...
1. ... the Reisha 'Shenayim Ochzin be'Talis' - because that speaks when each
one claims that he found the article and picked it up on his own behalf (and
not on behalf of his disputant [and the Shevu'ah is a Takanas Chachamim,
like Rebbi Yochanan explained earlier]).
(b) Nor can we be referring to the case of 'Zeh Omer Kulah she'Li, ve'Zeh
Omer Chetzyah she'Li', even assuming that the Tana is speaking in a case of
purchasing - because he then needs to teach us that even the one who claims
'Chetzyah she'Li' *is not believed* without a Shevu'ah, because he could
have claimed 'Kulah she'Li' (like a Meishiv Aveidah).
2. ... the second case 'Zeh Omer Kulah she'Li ve'Zeh Omer Kulah she'Li' -
because we need this case to teach us the Din by a purchase (as we learned
(c) The reason for this is - because if he *was*, then the swindler would
always be encouraged to claim 'Chetzyah she'Li', in order to avoid having to
(d) Rami bar Chama (and Rava) cannot be referring to the case of 'Hayu
Sheneihem Rochvin al-Gabei Beheimah ... ' either - because the Tana needs
that case to teach us that riding an animal acquires the animal just like
(a) So we finally learn 'ha'Magbihah Metzi'ah la'Chavero, Kanah Chavero' or
'Migu de'Zachi le'Nafsheih ... ' from the Seifa of our Mishnah 'bi'Z'man
she'Hein Modin O she'Yesh Lahen Eidim, Cholkin be'Lo Shevu'ah'.
(b) The Tana must be referring to a case of Metzi'ah, and not of purchase -
because then it would not be teaching us anything.
(a) Rav Yehudah heard two things from Shmuel concerning Rachuv and Manhig
(riding the animal and leading it). He heard - that one of them acquires,
and the other one doesn't, and he couldn't remember which was which.
(b) We initially think that it cannot have been a question of one being
Koneh independently and the other one, not - because since we know that
Manhig (which is synonymous with Meshichah) is certainly Koneh, there would
be no place for such a She'eilah.
(c) What he must therefore have heard from Shmuel was - that if one of the
disputants was Rachuv, and the other, Manhig, one of them is Koneh, and the
other one, not. Because on the one hand ...
1. ... the Rachuv enjoys an advantage over the Manhig - inasmuch as he is
holding the animal, whilst on the other ...
2. ... the Manhig enjoys an advantage over the Rachuv - inasmuch as the
animal is moving because of him. Note, that the Sugya initially speaks about
a rider who is not using his legs to make the animal move.
(a) Rav Yosef, quoting Rav Yehudah himself, resolved the Safek. What does
the Tana Kama in the Mishnah in Kil'ayim says - that both the person who is
leading an ox and a donkey that are harnessed together and the one who is
sitting on the wagon they are pulling, receive Malkos.
(b) Rebbi Meir exempts the latter. Shmuel reverses the two opinions -
because he personally holds that sitting in the wagon is not Koneh, and is
therefore not a partner in any act that the animals perform. Consequently,
he prefers to establish that opinion as being the majority one.
(c) Rav Yehudah extrapolated from that statement of Shmuel - that even
Rachuv alone is not Koneh, in which case there is nothing more to ask (see
Tosfos DH 'Rachuv Lechudeih').
(a) Abaye asked Rav Yosef - why having often told them of this conclusion
based on the Mishnah in Kil'ayim, he had said it in his own name, and not in
the name of Rav Yehudah.
(b) Rav Yosef proved that he had heard it from Rav Yehudah (though in all
likelihood Rav Yosef, who is known to have suffered a memory loss, had
forgotten to mention it to his Talmidim) - from the fact that he remembered
asking him how he could possibly extrapolate 'Rachuv' from 'Yoshev
be'Karon', seeing as the former holds the reins, whereas the latter,
(c) Rav Yehudah replied - by citing Rav and Shmuel who said that 'Mosirah'
is not Koneh (in which case there is no difference between Yoshev be'Karon
(d) According to the second Lashon - it was Abaye who posed the Kashya, and
Rav Yosef who answered by citing Idi.
(a) The ruling regarding Mosirah is corroborated by Rebbi Chelbo Amar Rav
Huna - who made a distinction between a sale on the one hand, where Mosirah
is Koneh, and a Metzi'ah and acquiring from a deceased Ger on the other,
where it is not.
(b) And Idi explained to Rava - that this distinction in inherent in the
very word 'Mosirah', which implies handing over from one person to another
(which is the essence of the Kinyan).
(a) We learned in our Mishnah that if the two disputants claimed the animal
they were riding or leading, they divide it with a Shevu'ah. According to
Shmuel, the author cannot be Rebbi Meir (of the Mishnah in Kil'ayim) -
because since we already know that he holds that Yoshev is Koneh, it is
obvious that Rochev is Koneh too, and we would not need the extra Mishnah
here to teach us that.
(b) Assuming then, that the author is the Rabbanan, this poses a Kashya on
Shmuel, who holds that Rochev is not Koneh. To answer this Kashya, Shmuel
establishes the Mishnah - when the rider also 'led the animal with his legs'
(he made it walk, by digging his legs into its flanks).
(c) Nevertheless, in spite of having mentioned 'Manhig, the Tana finds it
necessary to add 'Rachuv' (which is always a kind of Manhig) - to teach us
that even though the Rachuv is holding the animal as well as leading it and
the Manhig is not, the latter's Chazakah establishes his ownership no less
than the former's (see Tosfos DH 'Mahu').