ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Metzia 7
(a) We already discussed the Mishnah 'ha'Sefeikos Nichnasos le'Dir
le'His'aser'. The Tana cannot be referring to Safek Bechoros - because the
Torah writes in Bechukosai (in connection with Ma'aser Beheimah) "ve'Hayah
Kodesh", and not an animal that is Kodesh already.
(b) He must therefore be referring to Safek Pitrei Chamor. What makes a
Safek Pidyon Pe'ter Chamor different in this regard than a Safek Bechor is -
the fact that the lamb of Pidyon Pe'ter Chamor has no Kedushah.
(c) This ruling is based on a statement of Rav Nachman Amar Rabah bar
Avuhah, who stated that someone who has ten Safek Pidyon Pe'ter Chamor in
his house - is obligated to separate ten lambs to redeem them, which he then
Ma'asers and eats.
(a) We finally resolve the She'eilah of the bathhouse (where one of the
disputants declared it Hekdesh, and the Rabbanan stopped frequenting it)
from a case that occurred with Rav Huna, who quoted Rav Nachman, who ruled -
that if someone declares money that one cannot extract in Beis-Din Hekdesh,
his declaration is invalid.
(b) The problem with the obvious inference (that when it comes to money that
one *can* extract in Beis-Din, then his Hekdesh is valid [which would
resolve our She'eilah of the bathhouse]) is that it clashes with a statement
of Rebbi Yochanan, who rules - that if Reuven robbed Shimon who has not yet
been Meya'esh - then neither of them can declare the stolen article Hekdesh,
Reuven, because it is not his, and Shimon, because it is not under his
(c) We reconcile the case of the bathhouse and Rav Nachman's ruling with
Rebbi Yochanan - by establishing the former by a bathhouse, which is Karka
and the latter by a bath-tub, which is Metaltelin.
(d) The distinction between a bathhouse that is Metaltelin and one that is
Karka is based o the fact - that whereas the former remains in the owner's
domain (as long as he is able to extract it Halachically from the current
holder), the latter is in the domain of whoever has it in his possession,
and not of the owner (even if he is able to extract it ... ).
(a) Rav Tachlifa quoting a Beraisa says that if two people are holding a
Talis - then each one takes whatever he is holding in his hand, and the
rest, they divide.
(b) Rebbi Avahu, in front of whom he was quoting the Beraisa, - signalled to
him that they require a Shevu'ah, too.
(c) According to Rav Tachlifa, our Mishnah, which says nothing about each
one taking whatever he is holding, must be speaking - when they are holding
the tassels at the edge of the Talis.
(a) Rav Mesharshaya extrapolates from Rav Tachlifa - that when the seller
takes hold of three finger-breadths of the purchaser's Sudar, he has
fulfilled "ve'Nasan le'Re'eihu" and effected the Kinyan, because the piece
of cloth that he is holding is considered as if it was detached (like the
piece of Talis that each one is holding according to Rav Tachlifa).
(b) A Mashehu will not however, suffice - because a Kinyan Sudar requires a
vessel, as we learned in Kidushin, and the minimum size of a garment is
(c) Rav Chisda says that if a woman is holding the Get, but the strings are
still in the hands of her husband - then as long as he can pull the Get to
him with the strings, she is not divorced.
(d) We cannot say there too, that since the woman is holding the Get, it is
as if it was detached from the string - because whereas a Kinyan constitutes
giving the object, the criterion of a Get is 'K'riysus' (a distinct
(a) Rava says that if the Talis is made of gold, they divide it. He is not
coming to exclude anything with that statement - only to extend the Din of
our Mishnah to a golden Talis.
(b) Of course the material of which the Talis is made makes no difference.
The Tana however, is speaking in a case when there is a golden patch in the
middle, but slightly to one side. We might have thought - that Reuven, to
whom the gold is closer, can insist on dividing the Talis widthways, in
which case he will receive the entire golden patch. The Chidush is that
Shimon can counter that they divide it lengthwise, so that they each receive
half the gold.
(a) According to ...
1. ... Rebbi, if Reuven and Shimon are holding on to a Sh'tar, Reuven claims
that he is the creditor who he lost it and subsequently found it, whereas
the debtor counters that it was indeed Reuven's Sh'tar, but that he had
repaid his debt, Reuven had returned him the Sh'tar and that he was the one
to have lost it, the Sh'tar is confirmed by its signatories. Raban Shimon
ben Gamliel says - 'Yachloku'.
(b) In the Reisha, Rebbi rules that the Sh'tar is confirmed by its
signatories. If the Beraisa was speaking about a confirmed Sh'tar, he would
concede 'Yachloku' like out Mishnah. But Rava Amar Rav Nachman establishes
the Beraisa by an unconfirmed Sh'tar.
2. ... the Tana Kama, if the Sh'tar falls into the hands of the Dayan, it
can never be claimed. Rebbi Yossi says - that it needs to be confirmed by
(c) When Rebbi says ''Yiskayem be'Chosamav' - he (does not mean that if the
witnesses do confirm the Sh'tar, then the creditor takes all. What he) means
(is) that if they don't confirm the Sh'tar, he gets nothing, in spite of the
fact that the debtor admits to having written the Sh'tar (because the debtor
[who after all, is the one to validate it in the first place] is believed
when he claims that he paid).
(d) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel however, holds - that once the debtor admits to
having written the Sh'tar, he is no longer believed to claim that he paid.
Consequently, he rules 'Yachloku', whether the witnesses confirm the Sh'tar
(a) According to the Tana Kama of the Beraisa, if the Sh'tar falls into the
hands of the Dayan, it can never be claimed. In fact however, there is no
difference between a Sh'tar that is found by a Dayan or one that is found by
anybody else. We therefore establish the Seifa - when the Sh'tar is found by
a third person (any third person), and it had a Henpek (meaning that it has
been verified by the Beis-Din and contains their official stamp).
(b) The reason that the Sh'tar is not returned is in spite of the fact that
it has been verified by Beis-Din (not because of it).
(c) Rebbi Yossi is not worried that the Sh'tar may have been paid - because
a debtor who receives the Sh'tar upon payment normally takes precautions and
tears it up immediately.
(a) In another Beraisa, the Tana'im discuss a Sh'tar Kesuvah that is found
in the street. The finder must return it to the woman, even if she is
already divorced - provided the husband admits that it has not yet been
(b) According to Rebbi Yossi, the criterion for returning the Kesuvah is -
that she is not yet divorced (because then, it has probably not yet been
(c) We see from this Beraisa that Rebbi Yossi is concerned that a lost
Sh'tar may have been paid. To solve the discrepancy in Rebbi Yossi - we
switch the opinions in the first Beraisa, in which case, it is now Rebbi
Yossi who holds 'Lo Yotzi'u Olamis'.
(d) However, this creates a problem with the Rabbanan, who are now of the
opinion that we are *not worried* that a lost Sh'tar might be paid, whereas
in the Beraisa, they hold that we *are*.
(a) We conclude that the Rabbanan are indeed not concerned that a lost
Sh'tar may have been paid, and that the sole opinion in the second Beraisa
is Rebbi Yossi, who maintains - that it is only after the woman is divorced
that we believe the husband when he claims that the Sh'tar has been paid,
but not if they are still married.
(b) According to Rav Papa, Rebbi Yossi is indeed not concerned that a lost
Sh'tar may have been paid, like the original version of his statement in the
first Beraisa. In that case, when in the second Beraisa, Rebbi Yossi
differentiates between whether the Sh'tar Kesuvah was found before the
divorce or afterwards, he is really saying to the Rabbanan - 'In my opinion,
it makes no difference, because either way, the Kesuvah ought to be returned
(even if the husband claims that it has been paid). But won't you at least
concede that as long as they are married, the Sh'tar must be returned, and
the husband is not believed to say that it has been paid'?
(c) The Rabbanan do not in fact concede this to Rebbi Yossi - because they
suspect that, in the course of the marriage, the husband may have given her
'Tzareri' (bundles of money to put away as advance payment of her Kesuvah)
(d) ... to spare his children from having to pay her Kesuvah in the event of
(a) Ravina reverts to the original explanation, switching the opinions in
the first Beraisa. He reconciles the Rabbanan in the second Beraisa with the
Rabbanan in the first - by switching the husband's claim that the Kesuvah
has already been paid (which they *would not believe*), to where he claims
that he wrote her a new Kesuvah, which they *do*.
(b) Rebbi Yossi - does not believe that claim either, because if he had
written her a second Kesuvah, there would have been a 'Kol' and everyone
would have known about it (Shitah Mekubetzes).
(a) Rebbi Elazar establishes Raban Shimon ben Gamliel in the Reisha of the
Beraisa, who rules (in the case where the creditor and the debtor enter
Beis-Din holding the Sh'tar) 'Yachloku' - when they are either both holding
the Toref, or the Tofes.
(b) The ...
1. ... Toref of a Sh'tar - is the main part of the document, containing the
names, the amount and the date.
(c) Rebbi Yochanan says - 'Le'olam Cholkin'.
2. ... Tofes - contains the rest of the data.
(d) What Rebbi Yochanan really mean when he says 'Yachloku' is - that
'Cholkin' applies even when the Toref is in the middle. What
makes us so certain that he is not coming to argue with Rebbi Elazar is -
the Beraisa which teaches that each disputant takes whatever he is holding.
(a) When Rebbi Yochanan says that 'Cholkin' pertains to even when the Toref
is in the middle - he is referring to a case where it slightly to one side,
and the Chidush is that the one who is closest to it, cannot insist that
they divide it length-ways ... , as we explained above.
(b) According to Rebbi Elazar, who holds that if one of them is holding the
Toref and the other, the Tofes, each takes what he is holding, the debtor
gains by this (not just a bottle-stopper, but) - a fair reduction in the
debt. Because they do not just cut the Sh'tar in two, but assess the
independent value of the Toref and of the Tofes, and, assuming that the
debtor is holding the Tofes, he pays the difference.
(c) The advantage that the Toref has over the Tofes is - the fact that it
contains the date, which enables the creditor to claim from Meshubadim,
making the Sh'tar more valuable.
(d) Despite the fact that the ...
1. ... Toref contains the main points of the Sh'tar, the Tofes has its own
intrinsic value - seeing as the basic Toref is repeated in the Tofes (but
not the date).
2. ... Tofes contains the signature, and not the Toref, the Toref
nevertheless has its own intrinsic value - due to the fact that we are
speaking where the debtor confessed to having written the Sh'tar, and
according to Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds 'Modeh bi'Sh'tar she'Kasvo,
Ein Tzarich Le'kaymo'.
(a) We try to prove that 'Yachloku' in the Beraisa must also mean value-wise
(meaning that they sell it and share the proceeds or that one of them takes
the Sh'tar, and pays the other, half its value) from 'Shenayim Ochzin
be'Talis' in our Mishnah - because otherwise, of what use is a cut-up Talis?
(b) We refute ...
1. ... this proof - by pointing out that a cut-up Talis might make a
perfectly good Talis for a small child.
(c) We cannot prove that 'Cholkin' means 'li'D'mei', from the case in our
Mishnah where the two disputants claimed the cow that they were riding -
because a cow can be Shechted and shared by two people.
2. ... a similar proof from Rava, who rules 'Cholkin' in the case of a
golden Talis too - on the grounds that a small golden Talis (may not be
appropriate for a regular child, but it) is fit for a young prince.
(d) We finally prove it - from the case where they ride into Beis-Din on a
donkey which they both claim is theirs and which would have n use if it
were cut into half.