ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Kama 45
(a) The Tana of the Beraisa draws a distinction between an owner who, after
his ox killed someone, sold it, Shechted it or declared it Hekdesh before it
had been sentenced to stoning - in which case these transactions are valid,
and afterwards - in which case they are not.
(b) He also says that if a Shomer returned the ox that gored someone to
death to its owner ...
1. ... before the sentence - the return of the ox is valid, and he is Patur
(c) Rabbi Ya'akov disagrees - with the previous ruling. According to him,
the Shomer is Patur in both cases.
2. ... after the sentence - it is not, and he remains liable.
(d) Assuming the basis of their Machlokes to be whether one can say to the
owner of Isurei Hana'ah 'Harei she'Lecha Lefanecha', other practical
ramifications of this Machlokes will be - whether a Shomer may return
someone's Chametz to him after Pesach, or whether he must replace it.
(a) Rabah concludes that in fact, even the Tana Kama concedes that one can
say to the owner of Isurei Hana'ah 'Harei she'Lecha Lefanecha', and the Tana
Kama's reason for saying 'Hichziro Shomer le'Beis Ba'alav Eino Muchzor' is -
because, based on the fact that an ox cannot be sentenced in its absence,
the owner can say to the Shomer 'You had no right to take my ox to Beis-Din,
thereby causing it to be sentenced' (whereas in the case of Chametz after
Pesach, the Shomer did not perform any act to deprive the owner of the
opportunity of eating it before Pesach).
(b) Rebbi Ya'akov, on the other hand, holds - that the ox can be sentenced
even in its absence, in which case, the Shomer cannot be blamed for the
(c) Rabah knows that this is the Rabbanan's reason and not because they hold
that one cannot say to the owner 'Harei she'Lecha Lefanecha' - because if
that was the case, then they should have argued with Rebbi Ya'akov in the
case of Chametz after Pesach.
(d) Neither can Rabah's reason in the Rabbanan is because the Shomer failed
to return the owner's ox to him, thereby depriving him of the possibility of
saving it (as the Lashon suggests) - because then, the same would apply to
Chametz after Pesach (and why would the Rabbanan then agree that he can say
'Harei she'Lecha Lefanecha'?). And besides, on what basis would Rebbi
Ya'akov then argue with the Rabbanan, seeing as even though the ox was
sentenced in its absence, the Shomer should nevertheless be guilty for not
returning the ox earlier.
(a) Rebbi Ya'akov, who maintains that it is possible to conclude the Din of
an ox even in its absence, counters the Rabbanan's proof from the principle
'ke'Miysas ha'Ba'alim, Kach Miysas ha'Shor' - by pointing out that the logic
behind the Din that one cannot sentence a person in his absence is, because
this deprives him of the opportunity to defend himself, a logic that does
not apply to an ox.
(b) We learn from the Pasuk "Ad Omdo Lifnei ha'Eidah la'Mishpat" - that a
person cannot be sentenced in abstentia.
(a) We have learned in a Beraisa that the four Shomrim take the place of the
owner. The difference whether the ox that they are guarding and that killed
someone is a Tam or a Mu'ad will be - that the former is Patur from Kofer,
the latter, Chayav. Either way, the ox is stoned.
(b) The Shomrin does the Tana exempt from reimbursing the owner for the loss
of his ox is - the Shomer Chinam.
(c) We ask 'Mah Nafshach', if they guarded the ox, then they should all be
Patur, and if they did not, they should all be liable, and we answer - by
establishing the Beraisa when they did indeed guard the ox, but only
superficially. Such a Shemirah is sufficient with respect to a Shomer
Chinam, but not with respect to the other Shomrim.
(a) The Beraisa currently under discussion goes neither like Rebbi Meir nor
like Rebbi Yehudah. It cannot go like ...
1. ... Rebbi Meir - who says 'Socher ke'Shomer Chinam, because in that case,
the Tana ought to have listed Socher together with Shomer Chinam as being
Patur from reimbursing the owner for the loss of his ox.
(b) We initially establish the Beraisa like Rebbi Eliezer - who holds that a
Mu'ad requires 'a knife', and no amount of Shemirah will suffice. And as far
as a Socher is concerned, he will hold 'Socher ke'Shomer Sachar', like Rebbi
2. ... Rebbi Yehudah - who says that a superficial Shemirah will suffice for
a Mu'ad, in which case the Shomrim ought to be Patur from paying for the
damages of a Mu'ad ox, so why does the Tana say declare them Chayav?
(c) Abaye establishes the author as Rebbi Meir, and he answers the Kashya on
this with the words 'ke'de'Machlif Rabah bar Avuhah' - who switches the
opinions of Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah. Consequently, the Tana is
justified in listing exclusively the Shomer Chinam as being Patur from
reimbursing the owner; and as far as a Mu'ad is concerned, he holds that a
Mu'ad requires a proper Shemirah, and the Shomer who made a Shemirah
Pechusah will be liable, exactly as stated in the Beraisa.
(a) Rebbi Elazar obligates a Shomer Chinam to pay should the ox he is
looking after cause damage. In the event that the ox is injured however, he
exempts him from paying.
(b) If the Shomer Chinam ...
1. ... accepted full responsibility (in the case of a regular ox) - he would
be Chayav in both cases.
(c) Rava establishes Rebbi Elazar's case when he did indeed accept
responsibility, and the reason that he is Chayav for the one and Patur from
the other is - because he is also speaking when the Shomer realized
initially that the ox was a a 'Nagchan' (a goring ox). Consequently, we
assume that when he undertook responsibility, he did so having in mind to
keep the animal in check, but not to guard against others goring it (since
that hardly seemed necessary).
2. ... did not accept the responsibility for damages - he would be Patur in
(a) Rebbi Meir in our Mishnah, obligates the owner to pay for damages done
by one's ox after he tied it by its reigns or locked the door in front of
it - because we are speaking when the ox was able to break loose and when
the door would not stand up to a regular wind This is a Shemirah Pechusah,
and will not suffice, according to Rebbi Meir.
(b) Rebbi Yehudah disagrees. He learns from the Pasuk "ve'Lo Yishmerenu
Be'alav" - that even a minimal Shemirah will suffice for a Mu'ad.
(c) Rebbi Eliezer is the most stringent of all. In his opinion '(Mu'ad) Ein
Lo Shemirah Ela be'Sakin'.
(a) Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah argue over the interpretation of the Pasuk
"ve'Lo Yishmerenu" (written in connection with Mu'ad).
The basic premise
over which they argue (that will determines their respective
interpretations) is - whether 'S'tam Shevarim be'Chezkas Shimur Kaymi'
(Rebbi Yehudah), or not (Rebbi Meir).
(b) 'S'tam Shevarim be'Chezkas Shimur Kaymi' means - that an owner generally
applies a minimal Shemirah to his ox (in which case, the Torah need not
instruct him to do so).
(c) Based on the premise 'S'tam Shevarim La'av be'Chezkas Shimur Kaymi',
Rebbi Meir subsequently interprets "ve'Lo Yishmerenu" to mean - a proper
Shemirah (seeing as it has already necessitated a Shemirah Pechusah by a
(d) Rebbi Meir learns that a Tam also requires a a proper Shemirah - via a
'Gezeirah-Shavah' ('Negichah le'Tam, Negichah le'Mu'ad').
(a) Based on the premise 'S'tam Shevarim be'Chezkas Shimur Kaymi', and that
the Torah therefore obligates a proper Shemirah by a Tam, Rebbi Yehudah
interprets "ve'Lo Yishmerenu" to mean -another proper Shemirah. However, we
have a principle that when we have two consecutive inclusions, the second
one actually comes to exclude, in which case, the Torah is precluding a
Mu'ad from a proper Shemirah.
According to Rav Ada bar Ahavah, even though Rebbi Yehudah exempts a Mu'ad
from a proper Shemirah, the owner will nevertheless be liable to pay half -
because every Mu'ad retains a Tzad Tamus.
(b) He does not Darshen the Gezeirah-Shavah ('Negichah le'Tam, Negichah
le'Mu'ad'), like Rebbi Meir - because of "ve'Lo Yishmerenu", which serves as
a 'Miy'ut', precluding a Tam from a Shemirah Pechusah.
(c) Despite the fact that we need "ve'Lo Yishmerenu" to teach us the initial
Chiyuv by a Mu'ad, we nevertheless Darshen the 'Miy'ut' - because for the
initial D'rashah, the Torah could have written "ve'Lo Yishmor". It adds "nu"
to teach us the 'Miy'ut'.
(d) The most lenient opinion of all is that of Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov. On
the presumption that he follows the basic D'rashah of Rebbi Yehudah, Rebbi
Eliezer ben Ya'akov learns that even a Tam requires only a Shemirah
Pechusah - from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' 'Negichah le'Tam, Negichah le'Mu'ad'
(which Rebbi Yehudah rejected).
(a) According to Rav, Ha'ada'ah on an ox's right horn does not cover its
left one. The reverse will not be true - because the right horn being the
stronger one, an ox that is Mu'ad for its left horn is certainly Mu'ad for
its right one.
(b) Rav cannot be referring to the Din of how much the owner has to pay -
because if, as we have already learned, 'Mu'ad le'Adam Eino Mu'ad
li'Beheimah', it goes without saying that Mu'ad le'Keren Yemin (which is the
stronger one, as we just explained), is not Mu'ad le'Keren S'mol.
(c) He must therefore be referring to Shemirah - whether a Shemirah Pechusah
will suffice or not.
(d) Rav cannot hold like ...
1. ... Rebbi Meir - because in his opinion, both a Tam and a Mu'ad require a
2. ... Rebbi Yehudah, according to Rav Ada bar Ahavah - because, according
to him, every Mu'ad contains a Tzad Tamus, and Rav could just as well have
cited the right horn (to teach us that even a Mu'ad remains obligated to pay
(a) Ultimately, Rav holds like - Rebbi Yehudah, only he disagrees with Rav
Ada bar Ahavah.
(b) In fact, he is coming to teach us - that it is only from one horn to
another that Tamus remains, but not in one horn.