ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Kama 42
BAVA KAMA 42 - - dedicated by Reb Gedalia Weinberger of Brooklyn, N.Y. in
memory of his father, Reb Chaim Tzvi ben Reb Shlomo Weinberger (Yahrzeit: 18
Adar). Reb Chaim Tzvi, who miraculously survived the holocaust, always
remained strongly dedicated to Torah and its study.
(a) In another Beraisa, Rebbi Yossi Hagelili learns from "u'Ba'al ha'Shor
Naki", 'Naki mi'D'mei V'lados'. He is referring - to a case where the ox
gored a pregnant woman, killing her babies.
(b) Rebbi Akiva asks on Rebbi Yossi Hagelili - that since we already have
the Pasuk "Ki Yinatzu *Anashim*, ve'Nagfu Ishah Harah" - from which we can
extrapolate "Anashim", 've'Lo Sh'varim', why does Rebbi Yossi Hagelili
require another Pasuk?
(c) To answer this Kashya, Rav Ula B'rei de'Rav Idi interprets "Anashim"
differently. Based on his D'rashah "Anashim", 've'Lo Shevarim Dumya
la'Anashim', he confines the P'tur by animals to a Mu'ad (similar to a
person, who is always a Mu'ad), but a Tam will be Chayav (and it is with
regard to a Tam that Rebbi Yossi Hegelili Darshens "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki",
'Naki mi'D'mei V'lados').
(d) Rava objects to Rav Ula B'rei de'Rav Idi's D'rashah - because it is
illogical to be more stringent with a Tam than with a Mu'ad.
(a) Rabah's version of Rav Ula B'rei de'Rav Idi's D'rashah ("Anashim",
've'Lo Shevarim Dumya la'Anashim') is - that he too, learns that a Mu'ad is
Patur in the above case, but he adds 'Kal va'Chomer le'Tam'. And "u'Ba'al
ha'Shor Naki" comes to restrict the exemption to a Tam (but a Mu'ad remains
Abaye and Rava therefore, come up with a different version of "Anashim",
've'Lo Shevarim Dumya la'Anashim'. The case where we would have obligated an
animal that killed, to pay for the babies, even though a person in the
equivalent case would be Patur is - if with the same stroke, he also killed
the woman, in which he would be Chayav Miysah. Consequently, based on the
principle 'Kam Leih be'de'Rabah Mineih' he would be Patur from paying.
(b) We learn from the same Pasuk "ve'Chi Yinatzu Anashim", "Anashim", ve'Lo
Sh'varim' - that if an animal shames a person, the owner is Patur from
(c) Abaye asks on Rabah why we do not say by Bo'shes too, that only a Tam is
Patur, but a Mu'ad is Chayav. We know that this is not the case - because if
it had been, then Rebbi Yossi Hagelili should have said 'Patur mi'D'mei
(a) Rav Ada bar Ahavah queries Abaye and Rava's answer. According to him,
even a person would be Chayav in the case of "Ki Yinatzu Anashim", even if
killed the woman with the same stroke, because he holds like Rebbi Shimon.
Rebbi Shimon says that if someone meant to kill Reuven and he struck Shimon
by mistake (the case discussed by the Torah) - he is Patur from Miysah and
liable to pay.
(b) He is not Patur from paying anyway, due to Tana de'Bei Chizkiyah (who
exempts even someone who killed be'Shogeg from paying for the damage) -
because Rav Ada bar Ahavah does not hold like Tana de'Bei Chizkiyah.
(c) Rav Ada bar Ahavah finally establishes "Anashim", 've'Lo Shevarim Dumya
la'Anashim' - when the animal actually meant to kill the woman, in which
case a person would be Patur (because of 'Kam Leih bi'de'Rabah Mineih'), but
an animal is Chayav (which is why Rebbi Yossi Hagelili requires "u'Ba'al
ha'Shor Naki" to exempt animals too).
(d) When Rav Chagai came from the south, he brought with him - a Beraisa in
support of Rav Ada bar Ahavah.
(a) In yet another Beraisa, Rebbi Akiva says "Ba'al ha'Shor Naki", 'Naki
mi'D'mei Eved'. Despite the Din of thirty Shekalim that one has to pay if
one's ox gored an Eved - Rebbi Akiva makes this D'rashah, which is referring
to a *Shor Tam*, whereas the Din of thirty Shekalim pertains specifically to
(b) We ask why Rebbi Akiva does not ask on himself the same Kashya that he
asked earlier on Rebbi Eliezer (when he Darshened 'Naki me'Chatzi Kofer').
Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak resolves this problem - by establishing the case
when the owner went and Shechted the animal before Beis-Din managed to stone
(c) Rebbi Akiva nevertheless asked this Kashya on Rebbi Eliezer. It
certainly occurred to Rebbi Akiva that if this answer was good enough for
him, then it is good enough for Rebbi Eliezer too - only he thought that
Rebbi Eliezer might have a better answer.
(a) Rebbi Eliezer on the other hand, did not establish the case when the
owner Shechted it first, like Rebbi Akiva - because in such a case, where
the animal is actually Chayav Miysah (as opposed to *his* case, 'Miskaven
La'harog es ha'Beheimah .. ', where it is not), we do not need a Pasuk to
exempt the owner from having to pay if he Shechted it first.
(b) The problem with Rebbi Akiva now is - that, in that case, how could *he*
present this answer?
(c) Rav Asi quoted a great man who explained Rebbi Akiva. His name was -
Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina.
(a) Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina based his answer on another statement of
Rebbi Akiva - where he said that if a Shor Tam injured a person - the owner
has to pay Nezek Shalem min ha'Aliyah.
(b) This would answer the Kashya that we asked on Rebbi Akiva ('Naki
mi'D'emei Eved') adequately - because the Kashya was based on the fact that
a Shor Tam pays mi'Gufo ... , and now we see that, according to Rebbi Akiva
(in this case), he pays min ha'Aliyah.
(c) Rebbi Zeira refutes this however, on the basis of a Beraisa - where
Rebbi Akiva learns from the Pasuk "ka'Mishpat ha'Zeh Ya'aseh Lo" - that if
an ox kills a child, the owner pays mi'Gufo and not min ha'Aliyah (even
though he pays Nezek Shalem).
(d) When Rebbi Zeira said 'Tavra Rebbi Akiva li'Gezizeih', he meant - that
he broke the power of his fist (meaning that he compromised on his original
Chidush; Nezek Shalem, yes, but min ha'Aliyah, no).
(a) Rava finally explains that Rebbi Akiva requires "Ba'al ha'Shor Naki", to
preclude from the 'Havah Amina' that the owner of the Tam would have to pay
min ha'Aliyah by Eved more than by any other case of Nezek - because the
owner has to pay thirty Sheloshim should his Mu'ad ox kill him, even if he
is worth only one.
(b) We know for sure that Rava's explanation is the right one - because it
has the support of a Beraisa.
(c) Before concluding that Eved by Tam is even more stringent than Mu'ad (as
we just explained), the Tana gives two reasons why we really should not
require a Pasuk to exempt him from D'mei Eved. One of them is because an
Eved should not be any different than a ben Chorin (where Tam pays mi'Gufo).
The second reason is - because it is even a 'Kal va'Chomer' from a ben
Chorin, whose full value one has to pay, yet there is a difference between a
Tam and a Mu'ad, how much more so in the case of an Eved, where one only
pays thirty Shekalim.
(a) In a Beraisa, Rebbi Akiva discusses the Hekesh "ve'Heimis Ish O Ishah".
The Pasuk cannot be coming to obligate a Mu'ad that killed a woman just like
when it killed a man - because that we already know from the previous Pasuk
"ve'Chi Yigach Shor es Ish O es Ishah".
(b) In fact, the Pasuk is comparing a woman to a man - with regard to the
Din of Yerushah, to teach us that the Kofer for killing a woman goes to her
heirs (and not to her husband), just like the Kofer for killing a man goes
to his heirs.
(c) Rebbi Akiva learns from the Pasuk "ve'Yarash Osah" - that a husband
inherits his wife.
(d) We actually derive this from the word "li'She'eiro" mentioned in the
Pasuk, and 'She'eiro' means his wife. The Torah cannot be saying that the
man's property goes to his wife), as is implied by the Pasuk - because the
Torah also writes there "mi'Mishpachto" (and not "mi'Mishpachtah").
(a) Resh Lakish reconciles the two D'rashos of Rebbi Akiva (that, on the one
hand, her property goes to her husband, and on the other, her Kofer goes to
her heirs) - by differentiating between her regular property, which goes to
her husband, and Kofer, which goes to her heirs, because a husband only
inherits what the woman actually had when she died, but not what falls due
only after her death.
(b) We learn from the sequence of the Pasuk "ve'Heimis Ish O Ishah ha'Shor
Yisakel ve'Gam Be'alav Yumas. Im Kofer Yushas Alav" - that the Chiyuv Kofer
only falls due after the ox is killed, which in turn, can only be carried
out after the Nizak actually dies.
(c) If not for this Pasuk, we would have thought - that the obligation to
pay Kofer takes effect as soon as Beis-Din have assessed the Nizak for
death, even though he is still alive (in which case, the Kofer would not
then be considered 'Ra'uy' [what will fall due after death], but Muchzak
[what is due already]).
(d) The Tana of the Beraisa rules that someone who strikes a pregnant woman
and kills her babies, must pay the woman her Nezek and Tza'ar, and the value
of the babies to her husband. In the event that ...
1. ... her husband has died - his heirs receive the D'mei V'lados.
2. ... the woman has died - her heirs receive her Nezek and Tza'ar.
(a) In the event that the woman was a Shifchah Meshuchreres or a Giyores,
and neither she nor her husband are still alive - the Mazik may retain the
Nezek, the Tza'ar and the D'mei V'lados. Generally, it is a matter of 'Kol
ha'Kodem Zachah' ('First come, first served!'). Here however, where the
Mazik already has the ox in his possession, he automatically acquires it.
(b) Rabah and Rav Nachman reconcile this Beraisa, where we see that the
woman's Yorshin inherit her and not her husband with Rebbi Akiva's D'rashah
from "ve'Yarash Osah" (from which he learns that it is the husband who
inherits his wife) - by establishing the current Beraisa by a divorcee, who
has no husband.
(c) We learn from the Pasuk "Ka'asher Yashis Alav *Ba'al ha'Ishah*" - that
the babies belong to the Bo'el, even if he was not married to the woman. And
that explains why the woman does not receives a share in the babies in any
of the above cases.