THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
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BEITZAH 31 - this Daf has been dedicated by Yechiel Wachtel of Har Nof,
Yerushalayim, l'Iluy Nishmas his father, Reb Shimon Eliezer ben Reb Yechiel
Wachtel (who passed away on 15 Elul 5757).
1) THE DISPUTE BETWEEN REBBI YEHUDAH AND REBBI YOSI ABOUT WOOD IN A "KARPAF"
QUESTION: The Mishnah states that one may bring in wood on Yom Tov from a
Karpaf (a large, enclosed area), even when the wood is scattered about
(because since the area is enclosed, we assume that one had intention before
Yom Tov to use the wood inside of it on Yom Tov). Rebbi Yehudah says that in
order for the wood to be permitted, the Karpaf must be near the city (and
only then do we assume that one had intention to use it). Rebbi Yosi says
that the Karpaf must have a lock, and then the wood may be used even if it
is far away and not near the city.
The Gemara asks what exactly Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yosi are saying. The
Gemara suggests two possibilities: (1) The first possibility is that Rebbi
Yehudah requires both that the Karpaf have a lock and be near the city, and
Rebbi Yosi says that it suffices to have either a lock (and be far away) or
to be near the city (without a lock). (2) The second possibility is that
Rebbi Yehudah says that the only determining factor is the distance of the
Karpaf from the city -- it must be nearby (even if it has a lock), and Rebbi
Yosi says that the only determining factor is that it must have a lock (even
if it is nearby).
The Gemara concludes that from Rebbi Yosi's word in the Mishnah we can infer
that he is saying "Tarti l'Kula" -- he holds of two leniencies.
The Gemara seems to be concluding like the first possibility, that Rebbi
Yehudah requires that the Karpaf be both nearby and have a lock, while Rebbi
Yosi holds of two leniencies -- the Karpaf may be either nearby, or have a
lock, but need not have both, and that is indeed how TOSFOS explains the
However, RASHI says that the Gemara is concluding with a *third*
explanation of the Machlokes. The Gemara is concluding that Rebbi Yehudah
holds that the only determining factor is the distance (the Karpaf must be
nearby), which is what the *second* possibility suggested was the opinion of
Rebbi Yehudah, while Rebbi Yosi holds that either being nearby or having a
lock is acceptable -- like the *first* possibility (see Chart #11)!
Why does Rashi say that the Gemara's conclusion is combining the first and
second possibilities of the Machlokes? The Gemara simply says that Rebbi
Yosi holds of two leniencies, which implies the first version of the
Machlokes. How does Rashi know that the Gemara is concluding that even Rebbi
Yehudah holds of one Kula (that the Karpaf does not need a lock if it is
nearby)? And if the Gemara only suggests two ways to understand the argument
in the Mishnah, why should Rashi posit that there is a third possibility?
ANSWER: The wording of Rebbi Yosi's statement as it appears in our Mishnah
is that it is permitted to bring in wood from "any area (Karpaf) into which
one enters with a key, *and* even if (v'Afilu) it is [far away] within the
Techum Shabbos." RASHI, in the end of the Mishnah, quotes this line of the
Mishnah with a slight difference: "even if (*Afilu*) it is [far away] within
the Techum Shabbos." That is, Rashi's Girsa of the Mishnah does not have the
letter "Vav" -- "and" -- before the word "Afilu." That is also the Girsa
recorded by the DIKDUKEI SOFRIM (#80), and the RIF (manuscript) and the
Cambridge manuscript of the Mishnah (footnote, ibid.).
However, when Rashi explains the *Gemara* the part of the Gemara that quotes
this part of the Mishnah to prove what Rebbi Yosi holds, Rashi (end of DH
Rebbi Yosi l'Kula, and end of DH O Dilma) records the phrase the way it
appears in our texts -- "*v'Afilu*!" Although Rashi's Mishnah apparently did
not have the extra "Vav," his Gemara deliberately added the "Vav." But why?
Rashi understands that the extra "Vav" denotes that the Gemara is presenting
a *two-part* proof. It is proving from the words of our Mishnah both what is
the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah and what is the opinion of Rebbi Yosi.
First, the Gemara cites the first half of Rebbi Yosi's statement, "any area
(Karpaf) into which one enters with a key," in order to prove one thing, and
then it cites the second half of Rebbi Yosi's statement, "even if (Afilu) it
is [far away] within the Techum Shabbos" to prove the second point. To
denote that there are *two* distinct points, each of which can be proven
from a different line of the Mishnah, the Gemara adds the letter "Vav"
before citing the second half of Rebbi Yosi's statement in the Mishnah. (The
CHIDUSHEI HA'ME'IRI quotes a Girsa of the Gemara that explicitly shows that
the Gemara is bringing separate proofs from each half of Rebbi Yosi's
statement, by adding the words, "*v'Od, Mai* Afilu...," clearly showing that
from the word "Afilu" and on it is citing a second proof.) What, though, is
the Gemara proving from each half of Rebbi Yosi's statement?
Rashi says that the first half of Rebbi Yosi's statement, "any area (Karpaf)
into which one enters with a key," implies that *normally* a Karpaf is not
locked and does not need a key. That proves that Rebbi Yehudah -- who
permits taking wood from a standard, unqualified Karpaf -- permits a Karpaf
even without a lock, as long as it is nearby.
The second half of Rebbi Yosi's statement, "even if (Afilu) it is [far away]
within the Techum Shabbos," teaches us that Rebbi Yosi holds that if the
Karpaf is nearby, then we rule more leniently, and it does not need a lock.
We find proof for this approach from two inferences in the words of Rashi.
When the Gemara concludes that "Rebbi Yosi Tarti l'Kula," (Rebbi Yosi holds
of two leniencies), Rashi explains (beginning of DH Tarti) that we learn
from Rebbi Yosi's words what both Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yosi hold (in that
order). Why does Rashi mention Rebbi Yehudah first? He should mention Rebbi
Yosi first, since the Gemara addresses his opinion explicitly ("Rebbi Yosi
Tarti l'Kula..."), and the proof to Rebbi Yehudah's is Rashi's own addition!
It must be that Rashi sees that the Gemara itself is making a two-part
inference from the Mishnah, and it is the *first* half of Rebbi Yosi's
statement that reveals what Rebbi Yehudah holds, and only the *second* half
that reveals what Rebbi Yosi holds. That is why Rashi puts them in that
order -- he is explaining the proofs of the Gemara in the order that the
Gemara presents them.
In addition, in the Girsa of that appears in an early manuscript of Rashi
(quoted in Dikdukei Sofrim #200), it is even more clear that there are two
parts to the proof, because in that text there is an additional comment (DH
Ta Shema) that does not appear in our text of Rashi, in which Rashi says
explicitly that since Rebbi Yosi says "any area...," "and also in the end of
his words he adds 'even if it is [far away]...,' from here we learn that he
holds of two leniencies." Rashi is explaining that the Gemara is saying a
two-part proof -- that Rebbi Yosi holds of two leniencies, *and* that Rebbi
Yehudah holds that the Karpaf needs to be nearby. (M. Kornfeld)
2) A STOREHOUSE OF FRUIT THAT BECAME BREACHED ON YOM TOV
QUESTION: The Mishnah states that if a storehouse of fruit became breached
on Yom Tov, one may take fruit by reaching in through the opening, but one
may not break open any part of the storehouse l'Chatchilah. Rebbi Meir says
that it is permitted to break open the storehouse l'Chatchilah in order to
get to the fruit.
If the fruit was locked up within the storehouse in such a way that it was
not possible to get to the fruit during Bein ha'Shemashos, then the fruit
should be Muktzah! Why, then, is it permitted to take the fruit on Yom Tov
when the storehouse is breached?
(a) RASHI (DH Notel) explains that when an object may not be used at the
start of Shabbos only because it is Asur mid'Rabanan to use it, then the
object is not Muktzah Machmas Isur. In order to get to the fruits, one would
have to do only an Isur d'Rabanan of Stirah, as the Gemara says, since the
storehouse is built with uncemented rows of bricks. Therefore, the fruit is
not Muktzah Machmas Isur.
HALACHAH: The SHULCHAN ARUCH (OC 518:9) permits fruit behind a fallen wall
without qualifying what kind of wall (like the Rif and Rambam).
It would seem that the fruit is allowed whether an Isur d'Oraisa is involved
in dismantling the wall or an Isur d'Rabanan, whether part or the wall or
the entire wall collapsed, whether it collapsed on Erev Yom Tov or on Yom
Tov, whether the wall was weak or strong. The Poskim point out that the only
way of explaining this ruling is as the Ramban suggested (f), that the
fruits did not become Muktzah since the Isur is not inherent to them.
TOSFOS asks that we find a number of cases where an Isur d'Rabanan does
create an Isur of Muktzah, such as a bed on which money was left during Bein
ha'Shemashos (Shabbos 44b), and a basket on which there were chicks (Shabbos
43a) during Bein ha'Shemashos, in which case the bed or basket become a
"Basis l'Davar he'Asur" and may not be moved the entire Shabbos.
Rashi might answer that cases of a Basis l'Davar he'Asur are different
because the object of Heter that is underneath the Muktzah itself becomes an
object of Isur. In contrast, when the object of Heter is merely inaccessible
due to an Isur which stands before it (it is locked inside of a room, such
as in our case), then the object (the fruit) has no Isur of Muktzah.
The RAMBAN asks a different question. We find that a candle that was aflame
during Bein ha'Shemashos is Muktzah, even though extinguishing it is only an
Isur d'Rabanan (because it is a Melachah sh'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah).
According to Rashi, it should not be Muktzah! The answer to this question
may be that Rashi holds that a Melachah sh'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah, although
Asur only mid'Rabanan, is also a "Melachah," and therefore it is treated
(b) TOSFOS (DH v'Nifchas) cites RABEINU MOSHE who offers a different answer.
He says that it does not matter whether the Isur involved with using the
object is an Isur d'Oraisa or an Isur d'Rabanan. Rather, it depends on
whether the Isur has been entirely removed from the world, or whether it is
still in existence but no longer acts to prohibit the second object. In the
case of a storehouse built with uncemented rows of bricks, once there is an
opening in some of them, there is absolutely no Isur of Stirah involved in
entering through that opening and taking the fruit. Similarly, he says,
fruits of Tevel are not Muktzah on Shabbos and may be eaten when their
Ma'aser is separated (even though it is not permitted to separate Ma'aser on
Shabbos), since the Isur Tevel of those fruits is no longer extant. In the
case of a Basis, though, the object of Muktzah which had made the permitted
utensil a Basis in the first place is still in existence (it has just been
removed from the item that was supporting it), and therefore the utensil
remains a Basis and is Asur.
Tosfos questions this answer. According to this logic it should be *Asur* to
take the fruits from the storehouse because the rest of the bricks are still
present and the Isur Stirah is therefore still present. Only if *all* of the
bricks were removed would it be permitted to take the fruits.
(c) TOSFOS explains that this Mishnah is in accordance with the opinion of
Rebbi Shimon who does not hold of Muktzah.
What does Tosfos mean by that? Rebbi Shimon agrees that in order for the
item which was inaccessible because of an Isur during Bein ha'Shemashos to
be Mutar, one must be "Yoshev u'Metzapeh" (anticipate that it will become
Mutar), and in this case there would seem to be no reason for the owner of
the storehouse to anticipate being able to eat the fruit on Yom Tov!
The RASHBA asks this question, and answers that the Mishnah is referring to
a case of a storehouse that is already beginning to break down and is likely
to collapse on Yom Tov, and thus one had intention to use the fruit inside
(d) The RASHBA himself says that if it is talking about a storehouse that
had a shaky wall ("Kosel Re'u'ah"), then the Mishnah could be in accordance
with both Rebbi Shimon *and* Rebbi Yehudah. It is referring to a case where
one made a Tenai before the start of Yom Tov that he wants to be able to use
the fruit when the wall breaks down. Such a Tenai works even according to
Rebbi Yehudah, states the Rashba. (See Insights to 30:1:(c).)
(e) The RAMBAN (in Milchamos at the end of the Perek) explains that the
Mishnah is discussing a case when the storehouse had become breached
*before* Shabbos. That is why the fruits are not Muktzah Machmas Isur.
However, if the storehouse was breached before Shabbos, then obviously it is
permitted to take the fruit on Shabbos, and thus what is the Chidush of the
The Ramban explains that we might have thought that it is prohibited to take
fruits from the place of the breach, because one might extend the opening to
make it larger. Alternatively, we might have thought that it is prohibited
because it is like an Otzar, a storehouse; since one originally sealed it
off, the fruit is like an item that was placed in a storehouse, which Rebbi
Yehudah maintains is Muktzah. Therefore, the Mishnah teaches that it is not
considered Muktzah, nor is it prohibited to take the fruit out of fear that
one might make the opening larger.
The Ramban asserts that this is the opinion of the RIF (and, by inference,
of the RAMBAM).
(f) The Ramban suggests a second possible way of understanding the Rif (and
Rambam). Perhaps these fruits are not considered Muktzah Machmas Isur
because there is nothing inherently wrong with them. The only thing
preventing us from eating them is something external to them; the wall that
stands between us and them. They themselves, though, are perfectly edible on
Shabbos. For this reason, the fruit cannot be compared to an oil lamp that
is burning at the start of Shabbos, in which case the oil was unable to be
used because of the inherent Isur of extinguishing the fire (Mechabeh) by
removing the oil from the lamp. (The Ramban adds that Basis l'Davar he'Asur
is an exception to this rule. Although an external object makes the Basis
inaccessible, the Basis nevertheless becomes Muktzah Machmas Isur since it
becomes itself an object of Isur, see above (a).)
(The Ramban himself, in Milchamos to Pesachim 56a, seems to reject this
argument when he writes that detached dates high up in a palm tree become
Muktzah Machmas Isur, since one cannot climb the tree to get them at the
start of Shabbos -- M. Kornfeld.)
The BI'UR HALACHAH, though, writes that since most of the Rishonim do not
accept this ruling (and the Ramban himself offered another possible way of
interpreting the Gemara), one should not permit such fruits to be eaten or
moved except under extenuating circumstances ("She'as ha'Dechak").