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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Bava Basra 138


(a) According to Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel, if Shimon rejects the property that Reuven writes out to him, he nevertheless acquires it.
What does Rebbi Yochanan say?

(b) Rebbi Aba bar Mamal explains that they do not in fact, argue.
What does he mean by that?

(c) Why might a gift be considered detrimental to a person (and not an asset)?

(d) What will be the status of a gift which the beneficiary rejects?

(e) If the beneficiary was initially silent, what should he now do if he decides that he does not want the gift?

(a) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak connects the case of Reuven who handed Levi a gift on behalf of Shimon, in front of Shimon, to a Machlokes between Raban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbanan.
What does the Tana Kama say in this case, where the property includes Avadim, and where the beneficiary is a Kohen?

(b) What does Raban Shimon ben Gamliel say?

(c) Seeing as one is not obligated to sustain one's Eved Cana'ani, why might a person not want to accept (specifically) an Eved as a gift?

(d) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel actually says that the property reverts to the owner or to his heirs.
But did we not cite Resh Lakish a little earlier, who holds that in such a case, the property is Hefker?

(a) What problem do we have with the Tana Kama's ruling?

(b) How does Rava (or Rebbi Yochanan) establish the Machlokes to answer this Kashya?

(c) According to the Rabbanan, the beneficiary's initial silence construes acceptance, and his subsequent objection, a change of heart, which cannot undo the acceptance.
What does Raban Shimon ben Gamliel say? Why does he accept the beneficiary delayed objection?

(d) Why, in spite of the principle 'Halachah ke'Raban Shimon ben Gamliel be'Mishnaseinu', do we rule like the Chachamim in our Sugya?

(a) What does the Beraisa say in a case where a Shechiv-Mera says 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni, ve'Shalosh Me'os li'Peloni, ve'Arba Me'os li'Peloni', with regard to the Shechiv-Mera's creditor who claimed from them before they received the money?

(b) What would be the Din ...

  1. ... if the creditor claimed from them after they had received the money?
  2. ... in the equivalent case, but by a Matnas Bari?
(c) Is there any way that this ruling could apply even if the creditor were to claim *after* the beneficiaries had already received their portions?

(d) Does it make any difference if the Shechiv-Mera bequeathed all his property in this way, or if he retained some?

(a) In the case of the Beraisa, how much would each beneficiary be obligated to pay if the creditor claimed a debt of nine Dinrim?

(b) How will the Halachah differ if the owner said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni, ve'Acharav Shalosh Me'os li'Peloni ve'Acharav Arba Me'os li'Peloni'?

(a) What does the Beraisa say about a Shechiv-Mera who said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni B'ni Bechor ...
  1. ... ka'Ra'uy Lo'?
  2. ... bi'Vechoraso'?
(b) And what does the Tana say in a case where he said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Pelonis Ishti ...
  1. ... ka'Ra'uy Lah'?
  2. ... 'bi'Kesuvasah'?
(c) What is the common reason for both of the above latter rulings? Why do both beneficiaries have the upper hand?
Answers to questions



(a) In similar vein, the Beraisa continues 'u'Shechiv-Mera she'Amar T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni Ba'al Chovi *ka'Ra'uy Lo*, Notlan ve'Notel es Chovo'. What does the Tana rule in a case where he said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni Ba'al Chovi *be'Chovo*'?

(b) What problem do we have with the Reisha?

(c) To answer this Kashya, Rav Huna told Rav Nachman that the author of the Beraisa must be Rebbi Akiva? How does that answer the Kashya? What principle does Rebbi Akiva hold?

(a) We learned in the Mishnah in 'ha'Mocher es ha'Bayis' that someone who sells a house, has not sold the pit or the enclosure.
Does this apply even if he stipulated 'Umka ve'Ruma'?

(b) Rebbi Akiva holds that the seller nevertheless needs to purchase a path to his pit, because a person who sells, sells generously.
What does he say in a case where the seller specifically stipulates that he is not selling the pit or the enclosure?

(c) What do the Rabbanan say in this regard?

(d) Seeing as the Rabbanan agree with Rebbi Akiva in this point, why did Rav Huna cite specifically Rebbi Akiva?

(a) According to Rebbi Meir, if a Shechiv-Mera says that so-and-so owes him a Manah, witnesses are permitted to document his statement, even without recognizing the debtor, or without knowing about the debt.
What are the ramifications of this ruling?

(b) What do the Chachamim say?

(c) Bearing in mind that with a Shechiv-Mera, there may not always be time to verify all the facts, why do the Chachamim disagree with Rebbi Meir?

(d) How did Rav Nachman quoting Rav Huna, cite the Machlokes Tana'im?

(a) What ruling Rav Dimi from Neherda'a issue? Like whom did he rule?

(b) What did Rava say about Beis-Din performing Chalitzah without knowing for sure that the so-called Yavam is genuine?

(c) Which other similar ruling did he issue?

(d) What are the ramifications of Rava's ruling?

(a) How do we reconcile the rulings of Rava and Rav Dimi from Neherda'a?

(b) What is the problem with the text that quotes, not Rava himself, but 'Rava Amar Rav Sechorah Amar Huna', who says 'Ein Choltzin Ela-im-Kein Makirin ... ')?

(a) What does the Tana of our Mishnah mean when he writes 'ha'Av Tolesh u'Ma'achil le'Chol Mi she'Yirtzeh'? What is he referring to?

(b) Who receives the fruit that is detached when the father dies?

(c) What can we infer from this statement?

(d) Will it make any difference whether the fruit has still to ripen or whether it is already ripe and ready to pick?

(a) What does the Tana of the Beraisa hold in the above case, if the son to whom the father gave the field then sold it to a third person and the father died? Who then owns the field?

(b) What does the Tana then mean when he continues 'Shamin es ha'Mechubarin le'Loke'ach'?

(c) How does Ula resolve the discrepancy between the inference from our Mishnah (which considers the attached fruit as part of the land which goes to the son together with the field]) and the ruling of the Beraisa, (which does not)?

(d) What will be the Din in the equivalent case, but where the recipient of the field was not the benefactor's son, but somebody else (who did not subsequently sell the field).

Answers to questions

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