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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Bava Basra 132


(a) Rava asks whether Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel's Din ('ha'Kosev Kol Nechasav ls'Ishto ... ') will extend to a Bari too.
What are the two sides of the She'eilah? Why might it ...
  1. ... not apply to a Bari?
  2. ... nevertheless apply to a Bari too?
(b) What does the Beraisa say with regard to a woman claiming her Kesuvah, in a case where her husband gives her a gift consisting of ...
  1. ... the Peiros of his estate?
  2. ... part of the land itself?
(c) The Beraisa then discusses a case where, after the husband wrote all his property to his wife, a creditor produces a Sh'tar-Chov on him.
When was the Sh'tar dated?

(d) Rebbi Eliezer says 'Tikara Matanasah, ve'Ta'amod al Kesuvasah'.
Why is that?

(a) The Chachamim of Rebbi Eliezer say 'Tikara Kesuvasah, ve'Ta'amod al Matanasah'.
What does 'Tikara Kesuvasah' mean?

(b) Why can it not be understood literally?

(c) From where do we know that a woman has a right to property that her husband purchases after their marriage

(d) What are the ramifications of this ruling?

(a) What is the Chachamim's reason?

(b) Why is this not Mechilah be'Ta'us?

(c) What did Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nachtom testify about his daughter-in-law?

(d) We extrapolate from the Beraisa 'Ha Lo Yatza Alav Sh'tar-Chov Kanya'?
How do we try to use this to resolve Rava's She'eilah 'be'Bari He'ach'?

(a) We refute this proof however, by establishing the Beraisa in the case of a Shechiv-Mera. How do we then circumvent the Kashya on Shmuel?

(b) What do we mean to include when we add that according to Rav Avira, we might also establish it by 'Kulhu'?

(a) The Tana Kama in another Beraisa rules that, in a case where Reuven heard that his son, who had gone overseas, had died, and after he had written his property to someone else, his son returned alive and well, his gift is nevertheless valid.
What does Rebbi Shimon ben Menasyah say?

(b) Rav Nachman there rules like Rebbi Shimon ben Menasyah.
What is the logic behind this ruling?

(c) How do we then reconcile this ruling with Rav Yosef bar Minyumi Amar Rav Nachman, who rules like the Chachamim 'Tikara Kesuvasah, ve'Ta'amod al Matanasah'? Why do we not go after 'Umdena' there as well (like Rebbi Elazar, as we explained above)?

(a) What does the Mishnah in Pe'ah say about someone who writes his property to his sons and gives a little to his wife, too?

(b) What problem do we have with this Mishnah?

(c) Rav answers by establishing the Mishnah 'bi'Mezakeh Lahen al-Yadah'. What does he mean by that (see Rabeinu Gershom)? How does that answer the Kashya?

(d) According to Shmuel, even if she had not assisted in the distribution of the property, she would lose her Shibud on the Karka, by virtue of her having been present when it was distributed and remaining silent.
In that case, why will the same not apply even when her husband does not give her something, too?

(a) Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina has a third answer.
What does he say?

(b) What do we mean when we say 'u'mi'Kulei Kesuvah Shanu Ka'an? To which of the above answers does this pertain?

(c) Why are the Rabbanan lenient (with the husband, regarding the way he pays his wife's Kesuvah)?

(d) What would be the Din in an equivalent case of Mamon not connected with Kesuvah?

Answers to questions



(a) The Mishnah in Pe'ah continues 'Rebbi Yossi Omer, Im Kiblah Alehah, Af-al-Pi she'Lo Kasav Lah, Avdah Kesuvasah'.
What do we extrapolate from this regarding the opinion of the Tana Kama?

(b) How do we know that ...

  1. ... the Rabbanan require both Kesivah and Kabalah, and not only Kesivah?
  2. ... the author of the entire Mishnah is not Rebbi Yossi (and that there is no Tana Kama)?
(c) What would our Mishnah have held had Rebbi Yossi been the sole author?

(d) We just established that if according to the Tana Kama, Kiblah Alehah ve'Lo Haysah Sham, Lo Avdah Kesuvasah'.
Why not?

(a) What problem does this create?

(b) What do we answer?

(c) What did Rav Nachman reply, when Rava asked him, in light of the three respective interpretations of Rav, Shmuel and Rebbi Chanina b'Rebbi Yossi, what he held?

(d) According to Rashi, 'Keyvan she'As'ah Shutaf Bein ha'Banim' reflects the opinion of Shmuel, Rav Nachman's Rebbe.
But did we not just prove Shmuel wrong?

(a) Here too, Rava asks 'be'Bari He'ach', like he asked on the previous Sugyos, and this time, we remain with 'Teiku'.
What is the basis of his She'eilah? Why might a Bari be different than a Shechiv-Mera in this regard?

(b) Some commentaries explain that Rava was asking whether she had not even lost the right to claim the property that her husband will purchase later.
Why is this explanation unacceptable?

(a) Rav Nachman asked Rav Chisda in Sura about a case where a man left half of his property to each of two daughters.
What did he leave his wife?

(b) In reply, Rav Chisda quoted Shmuel.
What did Shmuel say? Would it make any difference if as yet, no fruit has grown on the tree (according to the Rabbanan of Rebbi Meir, who hold 'Ein Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam')?

(c) Rav Nachman pointed out that his case was not similar to Rav Chisda's ruling.
What had Rav Chisda misunderstood?

(d) Assuming that the woman is allowed to claim her Kesuvah from the daughters, what exactly, is she entitled to claim?

(a) In a case where a man left a third of his property to each of his two daughters, and the remaining third to his wife, one of his daughters died.
What did Rav Papi think that his wife ought to receive?

(b) Why is that?

(c) On what grounds did Rav Kahana correct him?

Answers to questions

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