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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Bava Basra 88

BAVA BASRA 87 & 88 - dedicated by an admirer of the work of the Dafyomi Advancement Forum, l'Iluy Nishmas Mrs. Gisela (Golda bas Reb Chaim Yitzchak Ozer) and Reb Yisroel Shimon (ben Reb Shlomo) Turkel, A"H.


(a) In our search for the reason why the store-keeper is obligated to pay for the bottle, we cite Abaye and Rebbi Chanina, sons of Avin, who establish the case when the store-keeper took the bottle from the child in order to measure with it. According to the Chachamim, he is liable because of Rabah's Din.
What does Rabah say about a venerable man who strikes a lost animal with a stick?

(b) Why is he not obligated to return it anyway?

(c) How does Rabah's ruling connect with the case of the store-keeper?

(d) On what grounds do we reject this explanation, too?

(a) Rabah, together with 'the lion of the group', finally explains the reason behind the store-keeper's liability for the bottle.
Who is the 'lion of the group'?

(b) They establish the Mishnah when the store-keeper took the bottle in order to measure oil for another customer.
What is then the basis of the Machlokes between Rebbi Yehudah and the Chachamim?

(c) Considering that a Sho'el is liable for Onsin, on what grounds is the store-keeper Patur according to Rebbi Yehudah?

(d) How will we now interpret the Seifa? What does the Mishnah mean when it says 'u'Modim Chachamim ... bi'Zeman she'ha'Tzeluchis be'Yad ha'Tinok ... '?

(a) We cited Shmuel earlier, who rules that someone who takes a vessel from a craftsman in order to inspect it - is liable for damages until he has returned it.
On what grounds is the potential purchaser liable, seeing as he has not yet acquired it, and the seller benefits as much as the seller does?

(b) What happened to the piece of thigh which a customer took from the butcher to examine?

(c) Rav Yeimar obligate the customer to pay, based on Shmuel's ruling.
On what condition did he issue this ruling?

(d) What did that man do when people began taking the pumpkins that he had brought to Pum Nahara to sell?

(a) Why did he do that, seeing as they took them with a view to purchase them (and not to steal them)?

(b) On what grounds did Rav Kahana invalidate his declaration?

(c) Under which condition would he have validated it?

(d) Why would the owner's Hekdesh be any more effective than in a case where he declares Hekdesh his object that someone stole, which is invalid because the object is not under his jurisdiction, even though it is his?

(a) What does the Beraisa say (regarding Ma'asros) about a 'Chaver' (who is particular about Ma'asros, and who) in the process of purchasing vegetables from an Am-ha'Aretz (who is not particular) picks those that he wants and places them to one side (even if he spends all day doing this)?

(b) What will change if he decides that he actually wants those vegetables that he put aside?

(c) What problem do we now have? Why can he not ...

  1. ... return the vegetables?
  2. ... Ma'aser the vegetables and then return them?
(d) Then what must he do, should he decide to retract?
(a) Why does this ruling appear rather strange?

(b) We therefore establish the Beraisa by someone like Rav Safra.
What happened to Rav Safra once whilst he was reciting the Sh'ma?

(c) On which Pasuk in Tehilim was his behavior based?

(d) How will we now interpret the Beraisa?

(a) We learn in our Mishnah that a Sitton must clean his measures once every thirty days.
Why is that? What is a 'Sitton'?

(b) How often must a private person clean them? Why is that?

(c) What does Raban Shimon ben Gamliel say?

(d) A store-keeper, our Mishnah rules, must clean his measures twice a week, like the Tana Kama (since he uses them more often even, than a wholesaler). How might we establish this latter ruling even like Raban Shimon ben Gamliel? What makes this explanation preferable to the first one?

(a) How often is one obligated to clean one's ...
  1. ... weights each week?
  2. ... scales? Why the difference?
(b) Until now, the Tana has discussed weights that are used for liquids . What does Raban Shimon ben Gamliel say about weights that are used for solids?

(c) The Tana obligates a seller to tip the scales one Tefach.
How much must the scales tip if he is weighing two Litra?

(d) What is the exception to this rule? When will one not need to tip the scale a Tefach?

Answers to questions



(a) If a seller failed to tip the scales, what must he do?

(b) Where it is customary to use ...

  1. ... a small measure (a Kav), why may one not use a large one (a Sa'ah)?
  2. ... a large measure, why may one not use a small one?
(c) How else might we explain the reason for this?

(d) What else does the Tana forbid to switch with regard to selling in measures?

(a) How does Resh Lakish initially learn the Reisha of the Mishnah (the Din of Hachra'ah) from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei "Even Sheleimah va'Tzedek Yih'yeh Lach"?

(b) What problem do we have with this from the Seifa of the Mishnah (the Din of Girumin)?

(c) So how do we establish ...

  1. ... the Reisha of the Mishnah?
  2. ... the D'rashah of Resh Lakish?
(d) How does Rebbi Aba bar Mamal Amar Rav interpret our Mishnah 'Echad la'Asarah be'Lach'?
(a) Our Mishnah continues 'Echad le'Esrim be'Yavesh'.
Based on the fact that 'Echad le'Esrim be'Lach' means a tenth of a tenth, what Safek do we now have over how to explain this?

(b) How do we resolve the Safek?

(c) Either way, why is the Din so much more stringent by liquid measures than by solid ones?

(a) What does Rebbi Levi extrapolate from the fact that the Torah writes "es ha'To'avos *ha'Eil*" in the Parshah of Arayos in Acharei-Mos but "Kol Oseh Eileh"* in that of Midos (weights and measures) in Ki Seitzei?

(b) What do we prove from the Pasuk in Yechezkel "ve'es Eilei ha'Aretz Lakach"?

(c) How do we reconcile Rebbi Levi with the Pasuk in Kedoshim "Ki Kol Asher Ya'aseh mi'Kol ha'To'avos *ha'Eileh*" (where "Eileh" appears in connection with Arayos too)?

(d) Why might we have thought otherwise?

(e) Why can it not be by means of ...

  1. ... a 'Gezeirah-Shavah' ("Eil" "Eileh")?
  2. ... a 'Kal va'Chomer'?
(a) From where do we know that Teshuvah is effective by Arayos?

(b) In what way is Midos worse than Arayos? Why is Teshuvah not effective in this area?

(c) But did Chazal not say that someone who steals from the public should atone by giving money for public ventures?

(a) What are the two Pesukim in Vayikra "Nefesh Ki Secheta u'Ma'alah Ma'al ba'Hashem ve'Kichesh ba'Amiso", and "Ki Sim'ol Ma'al ve'Chat'ah bi'Shegagah" (ibid.) referring to?

(b) What does Rebbi Levi learn from the fact that in the former Pasuk, the Torah places 'Chet' before Me'ilah (which is basically a Lashon of sinning) whereas in the latter, it reverses the order?

(c) And what does he comment on the fact that the B'rachos in Bechukosai begin with "Im Bechukosai ... " and end with "Komemiyus") whilst the curses begin with "ve'Im Bechukosai Tim'asu" and end with "ve'es Chukosai Ga'alah Nafsham"; whereas in the equivalent Parshah in Ki Savo, the B'rachos begin with "ve'Hayah Im Shamo'a Tishma" and end with "ve'Ein Koneh"?

(d) And what is the significance of these facts?

Answers to questions

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