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Bava Basra 70

BAVA BASRA 70 - Sponsored by Rabbi Kenny Cohen of Yerushalayim, in honor of his Rebbi, Rabbi Gedalya Rabinowitz.


(a) Rav Acha bar Huna asked Rav Sheishes whether, when the seller declared 'Chutz mi'Cheruv P'loni' or 'Chutz mi'Sadan P'loni', the purchaser acquires all other carob or sycamore trees, or whether it is only the one he specified that he does not acquire.
Which kind of 'Ch'ruv and Sadan' is Rav Acha referring to?

(b) What did Rav Sheishes reply?

(c) Considering that the seller specified only one field, what is the logic behind Rav Sheishes ruling?

(d) In that case, why did he choose to specify that particular field, according to ...

  1. ... Rebbi Akiva?
  2. ... the Rabbanan?
(a) Rav Acha queried Rav Sheishes however, from the Beraisa which says, in the same case, 'Lo Kanah'.
How did he interpret the Beraisa in a way that poses a Kashya on Rav Sheishes?

(b) What did Rav Sheishes reply?

(c) How did he prove his answer from a case of someone who sold his field, stipulating 'Chutz mi'Sadeh P'lonis'?

(d) What is the underlying S'vara behind both cases

(a) Some texts read (in Rav Sheishes' answer) 'Ela li'Demei, Hachi Nami li'Demei'.
What does this mean?

(b) In the second Lashon, even Rav Acha bar Huna took for granted that in the case of 'Chutz mi'Cheruv P'loni; Chutz mi'Sadan P'loni', the seller has not sold all his other fields.
What then, was his She'eilah?

(c) What did Rav Sheishes reply?

(d) What does the Beraisa then mean when it says (with regard to the same case) 'Sha'ar Charuvin Lo Kanah'?

(a) Rav Amram asked Rav Chisda whether, in a case where Reuven deposited something by Shimon with a Sh'tar, he is believed if he claims that he had returned it.
On what grounds might he ...
  1. ... be believed? What 'Migu' does he have?
  2. ... not be believed in spite of the 'Migu'?
(b) If Shimon is believed in spite of the Sh'tar, what purpose does the Sh'tar serve?

(c) Before we believe Shimon, why do we not call the witnesses and ask them whether his claim is true?

(a) How does Shimon counter Reuven's claim 'Sh'tarcha be'Yadi Mai Ba'i?

(b) When all's said and done, why is the fact that Shimon did not ask for the Sh'tar back when he purportedly returned the article, not a proof that he did not return it?

(c) By the same token, why is a debtor not believed when he claims that he paid?

(d) The problem with the 'Migu' is, that had Shimon claimed 'Ne'ensu, he would have had to swear (as the Torah writes in Mishpatim "Shevu'as Hashem Tih'yeh Bein Sh'neihem").
How do we resolve the problem?

Answers to questions



(a) The Daynei Golah and the Daynei Eretz Yisrael argue in a Beraisa (see Rashash) about a Sh'tar Kis that Reuven produces against Shimon's Yesomim. We already learned that the Daynei Golah are Shmuel and Karna.
Who are the Daynei Eretz Yisrael?

(b) The Din of a Sh'tar Kis is determined by the ruling of the Neherda'i (in Bava Metzi'a).
What is a Sh'tar Kis?

(c) The Neherda'i rule that 'Iska' is half a loan and half a Pikadon.
What is the significance of this ruling?

(d) What is the significance of Reuven's oath (bearing in mind that it normally the defendant who swears)?

(a) What do the Yesomim claim in the current case?

(b) How do we know that the Yesomim's father did not specifically inform his sons that the Pikadon had not been returned?

(c) If Reuven had produced a Sh'tar-Chov against them, both would have agreed that Reuven would swear and claim his debt. And that is what the Daynei Golah hold in this case.
What do the Daynei Eretz Yisrael say?

(d) How do we attempt to connect Rav Chisda's previous ruling (believing the trustee in spite of the Sh'tar held by the owner)?

(a) We conclude however, that even the Daynei Golah would concede to Rav Chisda that, in a case that did not involve Yesomim, the trustee is believed.
What makes a case which does involve Yesomim different?

(b) How do the Daynei Eretz Yisrael counter this argument?

(a) Rav Huna bar Avin issued two rulings a. 'ha'Mafkid Eitzel Chavero bi'Sh'tar, ve'Amar Lo Hechzartiv Lach Ne'eman', and b. 'Sh'tar Kis ha'Yotzei al ha'Yesomim Nishba ve'Govah ha'Kol'.
What does 'Tarti'? mean?

(b) How do we resolve the problem?

(a) How does Rava rule in the above Machlokes?

(b) How does Mar Zutra, who rules like the Daynei Golah, reconcile his ruling with that of Rava?

(c) And how will we reconcile Rava's ruling like Rav Chisda with the Sugya in Shevu'os, where Rava is silent when, in order to clarify a certain issue there, Rami bar Chama establishes the Halachah that even those who hold 'ha'Malveh es Chavero be'Eidim, Ein Tzarich le'Par'o be'Eidim' concede that 'ha'Malveh es Chavero bi'Sh'tar, Tzarich le'Par'o bi'Sh'tar'?

(d) Why did Ravina and Rav Ashi insert the previous Sugya (beginning with Rav Amram's She'eilah of 'ha'Mafkid es Chavero bi'Sh'tar') in this Perek?

Answers to questions

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