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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Bava Basra 51

BAVA BASRA 51 - dedicated anonymously towards a Refu'ah Sheleimah for Esther Basha bas Malka Faiga.


(a) We learned in our Mishnah that a woman cannot establish a Chazakah on her husband's property.
Is it not obvious, since everyone knows that she is simply eating the Mezonos to which she is entitled?

(b) Then why can she not establish a Chazakah?

(c) We infer, like we did in the previous Sugya, that although there is no Chazakah on her husband's field, if the woman proves that she purchased it, we accept her proof.
What problem do we have with this? Why ought we not to believe her?

(d) How do we establish the inference even according to those who hold that someone who sells a field to his wife is believed to say that he only did so in order to get her to reveal money that she hid from him?

(a) Rav Nachman commented to Rav Huna about the wonderful thing they had learned the previous day in the T'chum.
What did he mean by 'the T'chum'?

(b) What did Rav Huna retort, when Rav Nachman told him that they had learned 'ha'Mocher Sadeh le'Ishto, Kansah ... ' (based on the assumption that the husband also wrote his wife a Sh'tar), and we do not say that he only intended to induce her to reveal her money?

(c) Why does Rav Huna not contend with the possibility that the husband deliberately wrote the Sh'tar for fear that, if he would not, his wife would not hand over the money?

(d) Rav Huna bases his ruling (that a Sh'tar Mechirah alone acquires) on the Mishnah in Kidushin, which validates a Kinyan of Karka by means of Kesef, Sh'tar or Chazakah. We refute this proof however, from a statement by Shmuel.
How does Shmuel establish the case of Sh'tar there?

(a) Rav Hamnuna attempts to corroborate Rav Huna's opinion from the Beraisa 'bi'Sh'tar Keitzad?', which specifically rules that a Sh'tar alone acquires. How does Rav Hamnuna himself establish this Beraisa, to conform with Rav Nachman and Shmuel?

(b) How indeed, does this now conform with Rav Nachman?

(c) Rav Ashi disagrees with Rav Hamnuna, establishing the latter Beraisa by a Sh'tar Matanah. In that case, why does the Tana state 'Sadi Mechurah Lach, Sadi Nesunah Lach' (if he is talking about a Matanah only)?

(d) How does the Nosen strengthen the Mekabel's hand by writing in the Sh'tar ...

  1. ... 'Sadi Mechurah Lach'?
  2. ... 'Sadi Nesunah Lach'?
(a) The Beraisa rules that if someone borrowed from his Eved, whom he subsequently set free, or from his wife, whom he subsequently divorced, he owes them nothing.
Why is that?

(b) On what S'vara is this reason based?

(c) Then why do we not apply it in our case (of Rav Nachman and Rav Huna) where the man sold his wife his field?

(d) Will it make any difference if he sold it to her with Achrayus?

Answers to questions



(a) Rav Huna bar Avin sent to the Beis-Hamedrash that if someone sells his field to his wife, she acquires it (like Rav Nachman), whilst he eats the Peiros. But, he hastened to add, Rebbi Aba, Rebbi Avahu and all the Gedolei ha'Dor disagreed with him.
What did they say?

(b) How do we reconcile Rav Huna bar Avin with the Beraisa that we just cited 'Lavah min ha'Eved ve'Shichrero ... Ein Lahen Alav K'lum'?

(c) What distinction does Rav make between whether one sells his wife a field or gives it to her as a gift?

(d) What does Rebbi Elazar say?

(a) When Rav Chisda ruled like Rebbi Elazar, Rabana Ukva and Rabana Nechemya objected. Rabana Ukva and Rabana Nechemya were brothers.
Whose grandchildren were they?

(b) What was the gist of their objection?

(c) Why did Rav Chisda not reply that he had indeed followed the opinion of great men (i.e. Rebbi Aba, Rebbi Avahu and their colleagues)?

(d) What *did* he then? Whose opinion did he in fact, follow?

(a) Rava finally rules 'ha'Mocher Sadeh le'Ishto, Lo Kansah, ve'ha'Ba'al Ochel Peiros'.
What do we mean when we ask 'Tarti'?

(b) How do we explain the discrepancy in Rava's ruling?

(c) Rava in fact, holds like Rav Yehudah, who makes the same distinction.
How does this ruling overturn the entire Sugya?

(a) Why does the Beraisa forbid the acceptance of a Pikadon from a woman, an Eved or a Katan?

(b) What should one do if one did accept a Pikadon from a woman or an Eved ...

  1. ... assuming that they are still alive?
  2. ... assuming that they have died?
(c) Why is the Pikadon returned to the husband, and not to the woman's heirs?
(a) To whom must one return the Pikadon ...
  1. ... if the woman was already divorced at the time of her death?
  2. ... if the Eved had been set free before he died?
(b) Why the difference?

(c) What must someone who accepted a Pikadon from a Katan do?

(d) And what if the Katan had already died?

Answers to questions

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