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Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Bava Basra 44

BAVA BASRA 44-55 - sponsored by Harav Ari Bergmann of Lawrence, N.Y., out of love for the Torah and for those who study it.


(a) Rav Sheishes just established the Beraisa currently under discussion, when Yehudah claimed that property which Reuven stole from Shimon and sold to Levi, belonged to him, and where Shimon is then not believed to testify on behalf of Levi.
In what way could the Tana have presented the case in a shorter form?

(b) What ought he then to have written instead of 'Mipnei she'Achrayuso Alav'?

(c) In that case, why did he find it necessary to insert Levi at all?

(d) At which stage was Shimon heard to be Meya'esh?

(a) We query the above answer however.
What do we mean when we ask ' ... mi'D'meih Mi Meya'esh'?

(b) We therefore establish the Beraisa when the Gazlan died. How does this answer the Kashya? What does the Mishnah in Bava Kama say about 'ha'Gozel u'Ma'achil es Banav ve'Hini'ach Lifneihem'?

(a) What problem does this (the fact that the Tana must in any event be talking about where the Gazlan died) pose on the Beraisa?

(b) Why can we not answer that the Tana holds 'Reshus Yoresh La'av ki'Reshus Loke'ach Dami' (i.e. entering the domain of an heir is not considered a Shinuy Reshus as is entering that of a purchaser)?

(c) Abaye has an additional problem with the Lashon of the Beraisa 'Mipnei she'Achrayuso Alav' and ... 'Ein Achrayuso Alav'? What ought the Tana to have rather said?

(d) What is Abaye's problem? What is wrong with the original Lashon?

(a) We therefore retract from the current interpretation of our Mishnah. Does this mean that it is not Halachah?

(b) Instead, we establish the Beraisa like Ravin bar Shmuel quoting his father (whom we quoted and explained on the previous Daf) 'ha'Mocher Sadeh la'Chavero she'Lo be'Achrayus Ein Me'id Lo Alehah Mipnei she'Ma'amido bi'Fenei Ba'al-Chovo' (which we established when Shimon sold the property without Achrayus).
Why does this pertain specifically to a house or a field, but not to a cow or a cloak?

(c) What does the debtor then mean when he writes in the Sh'tar Chov that the creditor may claim 'even the shirt on his back'?

(a) What is the basis for this distinction between Karka and Metaltelin?

(b) Why does the Tana not include Metaltelin in the Reisha, in a case where the debtor declared them an Apotiki (designated for the creditor to claim)?

Answers to questions



(a) What does Rava say about Reuven's creditor claiming an Apotiki which Reuven subsequently sold, if that Apotiki is ...
  1. ... an Eved?
  2. ... an ox or a donkey?
(b) Why the difference?
(a) Based on a statement by Rabah, we ask that, even by a cow and a cloak, Shimon should not be permitted to testify on behalf of Levi.
What does Rabah say with regard to a debtor being Makneh Metaltelin together with Karka to the creditor, even in the form of a Shibud?

(b) What would the debtor have to stipulate in such a case? How would the transaction work?

(c) Why would such a transaction not be effective with Metaltelin alone, even if he acquired them with a Kinyan Sudar?

(d) According to Rav Chisda, the debtor needs to add 'de'Lo ke'Asmachta (which this resembles [even though we are talking about Karka], seeing as it is only a Shibud), ve'Lo ke'Tufsa di'Sh'tara'.
What is 'ke'Tufsa di'Sh'tara'?

(a) What is now the Kashya on the Beraisa? Why should Shimon not be permitted to testify on behalf of Levi even by a cow and a cloak, according to Rabah?

(b) How do we answer the above Kashya? How can we be sure that Shimon did not declare the cow and the cloak an Apotiki before he sold it?

(c) We query this however, and ask 've'Lichush Dilma de'Ikni Amar Leih'. What does this mean?

(d) What do we try to prove from here?

(a) How do we refute the previous proof? How do we establish the Beraisa?

(b) How can the witnesses be absolutely certain that what they are saying is true?

(a) We query the current explanation of the Beriasa (Ravin bar Shmuel Amar Shmuel) from a statement of Rav Papa.
What distinction does Rav Papa make in a case where someone who sells something without Achrayus, whether his creditor then claims from the purchaser, or whether the article is found not to have belonged to him in the first place?

(b) How would this pose a Kashya on the Beraisa, which permits Shimon to testify on behalf of Levi, on the basis of his having sold it to him without Achrayus?

(c) How do we therefore establish the Beraisa according to Rav Papa?

(d) Rav Z'vid disagrees with Rav Papa.
What does he say?

Answers to questions

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