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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Bava Basra 132



(a) Rava asks whether Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel's Din ('ha'Kosev Kol Nechasav ls'Ishto ... ') will extend to a Bari too. On the one hand, it might ...
1. ... not apply to a Bari - because her husband is still alive, and their children will anyway show her respect, in deference to their father. On the other hand, it might ...
2. ... nevertheless apply to a Bari, too - because the knowledge that they will later need to come on to their mother, will suffice to create an intrinsic respect beginning already from now.
(b) The Beraisa rules with regard to a woman claiming her Kesuvah, in a case where her husband gives her a gift consisting of ...
1. ... the Peiros of his estate - that she may still claim her Kesuvah from the actual land itself.
2. ... part of the land itself - that she may claim from the remainder of the land.
(c) The Beraisa then discusses a case where, after the husband wrote all his property to his wife, a creditor produces a Sh'tar-Chov on him. The Sh'tar is dated - after the date on the Kesuvah but before the date on the gift.

(d) Rebbi Eliezer says 'Tikara Matanasah, ve'Ta'amod al Kesuvasah' - because of the Umdena (assessment) that a woman would be most unlikely to give up her rights to a field that is Meshubad towards her Kesuvah, for the sake of a Matanah that is taken away from her.

(a) The Chachamim of Rebbi Eliezer say 'Tikara Kesuvasah, ve'Ta'amod al Matanasah'. 'Tikara Kesuvasah' - means that she puts her Kesuvah away and does not claim with it.

(b) It cannot be understood literally - since she still needs it to claim from property that her husband will subsequently purchase.

(c) We know that a woman has a right to property that her husband purchases after their marriage, because he specifically writes in her Kesuvah that the property that he owns then and that he will later acquire, is all Meshubad to her Kesuvah.

(d) The ramifications of this ruling are - that she loses at either end, inasmuch as the creditor claims his debt from that particular field, and in addition, she loses her rights in that field vis-a-vis her Kesuvah.

(a) The Chachamim's reason is - because the woman was Mochel her Shibud regarding the Kesuvah for the pleasure of receiving a gift (without realizing that the gift was made erroneously).

(b) This is not a case of Mechilah be'Ta'us - because at the time, the gift was perfectly valid (on the grounds that her husband had the option of paying off his creditor with cash, even though he later chose not to).

(c) Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nachtom testified - that, when a similar incident occurred with his daughter-in-law, the Chachamim ruled 'Tikara Kesuvasah, ve'Ta'amod al Matanasah', like the Chachamim of Rebbi Eliezer.

(d) We now extrapolate from the Beraisa 'Ha Lo Yatza Alav Sh'tar-Chov, Kanya'. Based on Shmuel's ruling 'Lo As'ah Ela Apotropus', we assume that the Tana must be referring (not to a Shechiv-Mera, but) to a Bari - a proof that Shmuel's ruling does not extend not to a Bari.

(a) We refute this proof however, by establishing the Beraisa in the case of a Shechiv-Mera, circumventing the Kashya on Shmuel - by also establishing it by a woman whom the husband only betrothed (but did not yet marry) or by a divorced wife (both of whom acquire the property according to Ravina (as we explained earlier).

(b) When we add that according to Rav Avira, we might also establish it by 'Kulhu' - we are only repeating our previous statement according to Ravina (only this is the Lashon used by Rav Avira), because the only case that he added to those that acquire is that of a daughter when there are sons (and that is not applicable here, since the Tana mentions specifically a wife).

(a) The Tana Kama in another Beraisa rules that, in a case where Reuven heard that his son, who had gone overseas, had died, and after he had written his property to someone else, his son returned alive and well, his gift is nevertheless valid. Rebbi Shimon ben Menasyah rules that it is not.

(b) Rav Nachman there rules like Rebbi Shimon ben Menasyah - because we go after 'Umdena' (assessing, even though the father did not make any stipulation, that is really what he meant when he gave his property to a third person.

(c) We reconcile this ruling with Rav Yosef bar Minyumi Amar Rav Nachman, who rules like the Chachamim 'Tikara Kesuvasah, ve'Ta'amod al Matanasah' by pointing out that (even though Rebbi Eliezer's ruling is based on Umdena, as we explained earlier) - there is a counter Umdana, inasmuch as she is pleased to receive such a major gift from her husband, which demonstrates to all and sundry the extent of his trust in her.

(a) The Mishnah in Pe'ah states that if someone writes his property to his sons and gives a little to his wife too - she loses her rights to her Kesuvah (at least, from her husband's current property).

(b) The problem we have with this Mishnah is - that it does not seem logical for a woman to lose her rights to her Kesuvah simply because she received a gift.

(c) Rav answers by establishing the Mishnah 'bi'Mezakeh Lahen al-Yadah', by which he means - that she was involved in the distribution to each of her children, a clear sign that she is Mochel her Shibud on those fields.

(d) According to Shmuel, even if she had not assisted in the distribution of the property, she would lose her Shibud on the Karka, by virtue of her having been present when it was distributed and remaining silent. This would not however have been the case if her husband had not given her something too - because then we would have construed her silence as an effort to keeping on good terms with her husband (but not of genuine Mechilah).

(a) Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina has a third answer. He establishes the Mishnah - when her husband actually told her that he was giving her the piece of land as part payment of her Kesuvah, again an indication that she is Mochel the rest of her Shibud (on this property).

(b) When we say 'u'mi'Kulei Kesuvah Shanu Ka'an - we are referring to all three answers, which are confined to the Din of Kesuvah.

(c) The Rabbanan are lenient (with the husband, regarding the way he pays his wife's Kesuvah) - because (as opposed to other creditors, who are likely to stop lending money if they encounter any difficulty in claiming their debts), a woman will not refuse to marry on that score, because of the principle that 'a woman wants to marry more than a man' (by which token she is also willing to marry any man, as Resh Lakish explains in Kidushin).

(d) In an equivalent case of Mamon not connected with Kesuvah - we would not assume that the debtor was Mochel, until such time as he was Mochel verbally




(a) The Mishnah in Pe'ah continues 'Rebbi Yossi Omer, Im Kiblah Alehah, Af-al-Pi she'Lo Kasav Lah, Avdah Kesuvasah', from which we extrapolate - that the Tana Kama requires both Kesivah (that the husband writes his wife a gift) and Kabalah (that she verbally accepts the distribution of the fields between the children).

(b) We know that ...

1. ... the Rabbanan require both Kesivah and Kabalah because if they required Kesivah only - Rebbi Yossi would have said 'Af-al-Pi she'Kasav Lah, Lo Avdah Kesuvasah, Ela-im-Kein Kiblah Alehah'.
2. ... the author of the entire Mishnah is not Rebbi Yossi (and that there is no Tana Kama) - because of a Beraisa, where Rebbi Yehudah using a Lashon 'Eimasai' (a sign that he is coming to explain the Tana Kama [it cannot be Rebbi Yossi, with whose opinion, his statement does not conform]), explains that the woman must both be there and accept the facts before she loses her Kesuvah.
(c) Had Rebbi Yossi been the sole author of the Mishnah, the Mishnah would require either Kabalah or Kesivah.

(d) We just established that if according to the Tana Kama, 'Kiblah Alehah ve'Lo Haysah Sham, Lo Avdah Kesuvasah' - because she can they claim that she only remained silent in order to keep in her husband's good books, but not because she was genuinely Mochel.

(a) This creates the problem - that none of the above Amora'im interpret the Chachamim correctly (since the latter require explicit Kabalah, and not just an implied Mechilah, as they all explain).

(b) We have no answer to this Kashya - and remain with a 'Tiyuvta'.

(c) When Rava asked Rav Nachman, in light of the three respective interpretations of Rav, Shmuel and Rebbi Chanina b'Rebbi Yossi, what he held - he replied that in his opinion 'Keyvan she'As'ah Shutaf Bein ha'Banim' (by giving her a portion too), Avdah Kesuvasah' (like Rebbi Yossi).

(d) According to Rashi, 'Keyvan she'As'ah Shutaf Bein ha'Banim' reflects the opinion of Shmuel, Rav Nachman's Rebbe ('bi'Mechalek Lefanehah ve'Hi Shosekes). We did indeed just prove Shmuel wrong - but that was because Shmuel was interpreting the opinion of the Tana Kama (who, we just proved, requires Kabalah as well as Kesivah); whereas he was saying this according to Rebbi Yossi, (who requires either Kesivah or Kabalah, and) according to whom the original Kashya 'Mishum de'Kasav Lah Karka Kol-she'Hu Avdah Kesuvasah' is equally pertinent?

(a) Here too, Rava asks 'be'Bari He'ach', like he asked on the previous Sugyos, and this time, we remain with 'Teiku'. The basis of his She'eilah is - whether it is only by Shechiv-Mera, where the woman knows that her husband has no more property, nor will he obtain more, that we interpret her silence as Mechilah, because; whereas by a Bari, where we can ascribe her silence to the fact that she expects her husband to obtain fresh property some time in the future, her silence cannot be taken seriously.

(b) Some commentaries explain that Rava was asking whether she had not even lost the right to claim the property that her husband will purchase later. This explanation is unacceptable however - because immediately after this, we cite the opinion of Rav Kahana, who explicitly holds that in such a case, the woman may claim, and if Rava was uncertain about this, we should have said 'Milsa de'Miba'i Leih le'Rava, Peshita Leih le'Rav Kahana', as we do in other places.

(a) Rav Nachman asked Rav Chisda in Sura about a case where a man left a half of his property to each of two daughters, and his wife - a third of the fruit.

(b) In reply, Rav Chisda quoted Shmuel, who stated - that even if he left his wife as little as a date-palm, she loses her Kesuvah (even if as yet, no fruit has grown on the tree, even according to the Rabbanan of Rebbi Meir, who hold 'Ein Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam', because he gave her a portion in the tree [for the fruit], and that was already in the world.

(c) Rav Nachman pointed out that his case was not similar to the case of Rav Chisda - who thought that the fruit was attached to the tree (when really, it was detached).

(d) Assuming that the woman is allowed to claim her Kesuvah from the daughters, she may only claim - the balance between what she already received (which we consider payment of her Kesuvah, as we shall see later in the Perek), and the remainder of her Kesuvah.

(a) In a case where a man left a third of his property to each of his two daughters, and the remaining third to his wife, one of his daughters died. Rav Papi thought that his wife ought to receive - her third, but nothing from the property of the deceased daughter ...

(b) ... seeing as she had already been Mochel it.

(c) Rav Kahana corrected him however, on the grounds - that it was no worse that fresh property that the acquires, which is Meshubad to his wife even though it was not in his domain at the time of their marriage (as we have already explained).

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