(Permission is granted to print and redistribute this material
as long as this header and the footer at the end are included.)


prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

Previous daf

Bava Basra 113

BAVA BASRA 113 (2 Av) - Dr. and Mrs. Andy and Dianne Koenigsberg, of New York, have dedicated this Daf l'Iluy Nishmas Dianne's father, Reb Aharon Dovid ben Elimelech Shmuel Kornfeld (Muncasz-Mukachevo/Israel/New York), who passed away on 2 Av 5761. May his love for Mitzvos and for Eretz Yisrael be preserved in all of his descendants.



(a) The second Tana presumes that the first Pasuk ("ve'Lo Sisov Nachalah mi'Mateh ... ") is speaking about Hasavas ha'Ben, and not Hasavas ha'Ba'al - because a son, who is a blood relative, is a closer relative than a husband (as we explained above).

(b) Siman Amar Rabah bar Rav Shiloh and Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak respectively, suggest that the first Tana establishes the second Pasuk by Hasavas ha'Ba'al because the Torah uses the word "Ish" or "Yidbeku (alone)" - since both expressions pertain more appropriately to a husband than to a son (the latter because from a logical point of view, the former like we find in Megilas Rus "Ish Naomi").

(c) We reject these proposals however - on the grounds that both expressions appear in both Pesukim (even though those who proposed this answer assumed that, for some reason, it was preferable to apply these Leshonos specifically to the husband in the second Pasuk, and to use them for some D'rashah or other in the first).

(d) Rava learns that the second Pasuk speaks about Hasavas ha'Ba'al from the Lashon "Yidbeku Matos", which implies a husband more than it does a son. Rav Ashi learns it from the Lashon "mi'Mateh le'Mateh Acher" - because the woman's son, her own flesh and blood (as we explained earlier), is not considered "Acher".

(a) Rebbi Avahu Amar Rebbi Yochanan, citing Rebbi (or Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah) extrapolates from the Pasuk "u'Seguv Holid es Ya'ir, Vayehi Lo Esrim ve'Shalosh Arim be'Eretz Gil'ad" - that a husband does not inherit property that his wife does not actually have in her possession at the time of her death, even though it is Ra'uy (due to her at a later date).

(b) Had Seguv's wife died after her father - Seguv would have inherited his father-in-law's property.

(c) If not for the Pasuk, we would have thought that, even when she died before her father, her husband should not only inherit her, but should even take precedence over her son - just like he did regarding property that she owned when she died.

(a) Rebbi Avahu cites a second proof for this from the Pasuk in Yehoshua "ve'Elazar ben Aharon Meis ... " - because it is possible that in the previous case, it was Ya'ir's own wife who died, and whom he inherited.

(b) Rabeinu Chananel derives this latter D'rashah from "be'Giv'as Pinchas B'no" (which appears superfluous, seeing as we already know that Pinchas was Elazar's son). We might also learn it however, from the phrase "Asher Nitan Lo be'Har Ephrayim" - which implies that Elazar and Pinchas made a Din Torah over Elazar's wife's property, which Beis-Din placed with Pinchas (because it was Ra'uy).

(c) Rebbi Avahu knows that Pinchas' valley was not a Sadeh Charamim (as Rav Papa suggested earlier) - because he learns from the word "Lo" that it was really due to Elazar, only Pinchas inherited it (see Maharsha).




(a) We Darshen 'B'nei Achyos', ve'Lo B'nos Achyos. This D'rashah cannot be taken literally - since there is no reson why a daughter should not inherit her uncle, there where is no son.

(b) So Rav Sheishes explains it to mean - that she does not inherit her uncle if she has brothers (as we shall now see).

(a) Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak Darshened from "ve'Yarash Osah" (from the extra 'Vav' in 've'Im Ein Achim le'Aviv") - that a son takes precedence over a daughter to inherit his uncle's property (because the Torah is comparing it to the first case of a son inheriting his father.

(b) The current D'rashah is not confined to the Yerushah of uncles, to which this Pasuk refers - but extends to all the heirs mentioned in the Parshah.

(c) We say that - because the Torah writes an extra 'Vav' in each case, from which we can make the same comparison "*ve*'Im Ein Lo Bas", "*ve*'Im Ein Lo Achim" ... .

(a) If a man dies, leaving a nephew and a niece (the respective children of two uncles), but no father, children, brothers or sisters - both the nephew and the niece inherit their respective fathers' portions.

(b) If in the same case, he also left ...

1. ... grandsons - then they will inherit his property.
2. ... granddaughters - then they will inherit it.
(c) We have already learned that if a man dies, the order of inheritance is 1. sons; 2. daughters; 3. father; 4. brothers; 5; sisters; 6. paternal uncles; 7. paternal aunts. In a case where he has only a maternal aunt, but his deceased uncle left ...
1. ... a son - then he will inherit the property of the deceased.
2. ... a daughter - then she will inherit it.
(a) When, based on the Pasuk "ve'Hayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav", Rabah bar Chanina cited a Beraisa in front of Rav Nachman that read 'be'Yom Atah Mapil Nachalos ve'I Atah Mapil Nachalos ba'Laylah', Abaye objected - due to the implication that if someone died in the night, his heirs would not inherit him.

(b) So he suggested that the Beraisa ought to read (not 'Nachalos', but) - Din Nachalos.

(a) We learn from the Pasuk "Beis David Diynu la'Boker Mishpat" - that money-matters must be judged in the day-time.

(b) Another Beraisa learns from the Pasuk "ve'Haysah li'Venei Yisrael le'Chukas *Mishpat*" - that the Dinim of inheritance fall under the category of money-matters in this regard.

(c) We might have thought otherwise - because distributing the inheritance seems to be no different than dividing property between two partners, which may be performed at night-time for reasons that will now become clear.

(d) We reconcile the above Pasuk with the Pasuk "ve'Shaftu es ha'Am be'Chol Eis", from which we extrapolate that Beis-Din are permitted to judge even at night-time - by establishing the latter by the final pronouncement of the Halachah, which may be performed at night-time.

(a) Rav Yehudah stated that if three people went to visit a Shechiv-Mera (a person on his death-bed) , who then wants to distribute his property to whoever it may be - have the choice of either recording the details in the capacity of witnesses, or of serving as Dayanim to instruct the heirs as to the deceased's decisions.

(b) The fact that, should they choose to be Dayanim, there will be no witnesses doesn't matter - because there is no reason to consider witnessing something directly any worse than hearing it from witnesses ('she'Lo Tehei Shemi'ah Gedolah me'Re'iyah').

(c) There having witnessed the proceedings will not suffice however - if what they saw took place at night-time, when they were not eligible to act as Dayanim. In such a case, they would need to hear the testimony from other witnesses, should they wish to serve as Dayanim.

(a) If they came following the Shechiv-Mera's invitation to testify to his actions, it will have the same Din as if they had come in the night - about which Rav Chisda says that they can only serve as witnesses and not as Dayanim. This is due to the principle 'A witness cannot become a judge' (and at night-time, when they cannot be Dayanim, they can only be witnesses but not judges).

(b) This follows the opinion of Rebbi (in the Mishnah in Makos). Rebbi Yossi says there that if a relative or someone who is disqualified from testifying, witnesses a crime for example, then he disqualifies all other witnesses from testifying. According to Rebbi however - a witness is only considered as such if he actually intends to testify, but not by merely seeing what happens.

(c) The source for the principle 'Ein Eid Na'aseh Dayan' lies in the Pasuk "Ve'Amdu Sh'nei ha'Anashim Lifnei Hashem" (obligating the witnesses to stand before the Dayanim, who must be seated).

(a) If it is not three people, but two, who entered the presence of the Shechiv-Mera - they have no option but to act as witnesses.

(b) When Abaye put to Rabah bar Chanina the above (that perhaps one ought to change the wording of the Beraisa to 'Din Nachalos') - he conceded that this was indeed the case.

(c) Witnesses are not eligible to testify in money-matters unless they have been invited to do so by the parties concerned ('Atem Eidai').

(d) We extrapolate that 'Atem Eidei' is not necessary by a Shechiv-Mera, from Rav Huna (through Rav Chisda's statement) - which cannot be speaking when the Shechiv-Mera specifically stated 'Atem Eidai', because then how could he rule 'Ratzu Osin Din' (by day, as Rav Chisda explains) become applicable.

Next daf


For further information on
subscriptions, archives and sponsorships,
contact Kollel Iyun Hadaf,