ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Basra 79
BAVA BASRA 78 & 79 - dedicated by an admirer of the work of the Dafyomi
Advancement Forum, l'Iluy Nishmas Mrs. Gisela (Golda bas Reb Chaim Yitzchak
Ozer) and Reb Yisroel Shimon (ben Reb Shlomo) Turkel, A"H.
(a) When the Mishnah in Me'ilah speaks about Hekdesh that is fit for ...
1. ... the Mizbe'ach but not for Bedek ha'Bayis, it is referring to -
unblemished oxen, sheep and goats, pigeons and doves, flour, wine and oil,
which are all fit to go on the Mizbe'ach.
(b) The things listed in the first group are not fit for Bedek ha'Bayis -
because there is an Asei prohibiting the declaration Hekdesh for Bedek
ha'Bayis, something that is fit for the Mizbe'ach.
2. ... Bedek ha'Bayis but not the Mizbe'ach - it is referring to things like
gold, silver and precious stones, wood, stones and other building materials.
3. ... neither - it is referring to foodstuffs, such as milk, cheese,
fish-juice, trash-heaps, grass and the likes, for which Hekdesh has no
specific use. These are known as 'Kedushas Damim', which are holy for their
sale value, but not intrinsically.
(c) The Tana says about all of these - that they, as well as whatever is
inside them, are subject to Me'ilah.
(d) The sequence of the above three groupings (as far as Chidush goes) - is
progressive, as their Kedushah regresses.
(a) The Tana states that if one derives benefit from a pit full of water, a
trash-heap full of manure, a dove-cot full of doves, a field with herbs
growing in it and a laden fruit-tree, if one declared the container
Hekdesh - one is Mo'el, irrespective of whether one benefited from the
container or its contents.
(b) One is Mo'el - as soon as one derives a Perth's-worth of benefit from
the Hekdesh article.
(c) Rebbi Yehudah says that in a case where they were all filled only after
the owner had declared them Hekdesh - then only the receptacles are subject
to Me'ilah, but not the contents.
(d) Rebbi Yossi holds - that what grew afterwards in a field or on a tree of
Hekdesh, is Hekdesh too.
(a) Rebbi maintains, with regard to the above Machlokes - that the Halachah
is like Rebbi Yehudah in the case of water in a pit and doves in a dove-cot,
but like Rebbi Yossi in the case of herbs in a field and fruit on a tree.
(b) The basis for such a distinction is - the fact that in the case of the
field and the tree, the herbs and the fruit actually grow from Hekdesh
(which is not the case by water in a pit and doves in a dove-cot).
(c) The problem with Rebbi declaring that Rebbi Yossi appears right in the
case of a field and a tree is - that this implies that he argues by a pit
and a dove-cot, too (whereas in fact he only mentioned a field and a tree in
(d) We could have asked the same Kashya on the other half of his declaration
'Nir'in Divrei Rebbi Yehudah be'Bor ve'Shuvach' - which also implies that
Rebbi Yossi argues with him there.
(a) When we suggest that Rebbi Yossi only mentioned a field and a tree in
order to challenge Rebbi Yehudah, we mean - that really he argues with Rebbi
Yehudah even by a pit and dove-cot too, and he only mentioned a field and a
tree, to suggest that at least there, Rebbi Yehudah ought to agree with him
(for the reason that we mentioned above).
(b) We refute this suggestion however, from another Beraisa, where Rebbi
Yossi specifically states - that he only argues with Rebbi Yehudah by a
field and a tree (proving that what he said in the previous Beraisa was his
personal view, and not just to challenge Rebbi Yehudah).
(c) Consequently, what Rebbi really said was - that Rebbi Yehudah's words
appeal to Rebbi Yossi only in the case of a pit and a dove-cot, but not in
that of a field or a tree, where he disagrees with him.
(a) In another Beraisa, which discusses 'Hikdishan ve'Achar-kach Nismal'u',
the Tana Kama holds 'Mo'alin Bahen ve'Ein Mo'alin ba'Meh she'be'Tochan', and
Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon disagrees. Initially, Rabah established their
Machlokes - by a field and a tree ...
(b) ... but by a pit and a dove-cot, both would agree that the water and the
doves that came only later, are not Hekdesh (just like we established the
Machlokes between Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yossi in the previous Beraisa).
(a) In the Seifa 'Hikdishan Melei'in', the Tana Kama says 'Mo'alin Bahen
u'va'Meh she'be'Tochan'. When we say 'Rebbi Elazar be'Rebbi Shimon Machlif',
we mean - that in this case he holds 'Moa'lin Bahen, ve'Ein Mo'alin ba'Meh
(b) The problem Abaye presents on Rabah from the Seifa of the Beraisa is -
that if, as Rabah explained, the Beraisa speaks about Sadeh ve'Ilan, then,
seeing as Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon holds 'Mo'alin Bahen u'va'Meh
she'be'Tochan' when the herbs and the fruit grew only afterwards, then 'Kal
va'Chomer', asks Abaye, when they were there initially?
(c) It is obvious that if the fruit was there there initially, it ought to
be Hekdesh - because a. it is 'Gidulei Hekdesh' and b. since he declared the
entire pit Hekdesh, it is not worse than a sale, where everything inside the
pit is sold (see Tosfos DH 've'I').
(a) We therefore amend Rabah's interpretation ofthe Machlokes - establishing
it by a pit and a dove-cot (in which case, Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon
argues with Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yossi in the previous Beraisa).
(b) In the case of a field and a tree however, both Tana'im will agree -
that whatever subsequently grows there is Hekdesh (like Rebbi Yossi there).
(c) We now have two Machlokos, one in the Reisha and one in the Seifa. The
basis of their Machlokes in the Reisha (where the water and the doves came
after the Hekdesh, and) where the Tana Kama holds ' ... Ein Mo'alin ba'Meh
she'be'Tocho' and Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon holds 'Mo'alin' - is whether
'Adam Makneh Davar he'Lo Ba le'Olam' (whether it is possible to effect a
Kinyan on something that is not yet in the world), like Rebbi Meir (Rebbi
Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon), or not (the Rabbanan).
(a) Rebbi Meir does not always hold 'Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam' - only
if it is like the fruit of a date-palm, which is bound to grow.
(b) It is not Rebbi Meir himself who makes this distinction - but Rav Huna,
who holds like him (and who confines his ruling to a date-palm and the
(c) Nevertheless, Rava establishes Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon like Rebbi
Meir, by establishing the case of ...
1. ... the water in the pit - when there is a slope leading to his pit, in
which case, when it rains, the water is bound to flow into it.
(d) This will only apply however, when the dove-cot that is close to the one
in question is - his own, because if it belongs to somebody else, what's to
stop the owner from taking the doves for himself?
2. ... the doves in the dove-cot - when he owns another dove-cot nearby, and
the doves are bound to fly from one to the other.
(a) Rava establishes the declaration of Hekdesh in the Seifa (where the
water and the doves were there before the Hekdesh) - when he was Makdish the
pit and the dove-cot S'tam (without including its contents).
Rava reconciles this with our Mishnah 'Machar Bor, Machar Meimehah' - by
establishing the latter like Rebbi Nasan, who argues with the Rabbanan in a
Beraisa (with whom Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon concurs).
(b) And to explain Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon ('Ein Mo'alin ba'Meh
she'be'Tocho'), he establishes him like his father in 'ha'Mocher es
ha'Bayis', where Rebbi Shimon rules that if someone sells a pit which is
full of water - he has not sold the water (because he holds 'Mocher be'Ayin
Ra'ah Mocher' [though that is not the actual case of Rebbi Shimon there]).
(c) His son Rebbi Elazar now holds - that just as a seller sells
reluctantly, so too, is someone who is Makdish, Makdish reluctantly.
(d) Nevertheless, he holds in the Reisha (where the Hekdesh preceded the
water and the doves) 'Mo'alin Bo u'va'Meh she'be'Tocho' - because the S'vara
'Makdish, be'Ayin Ra'ah Makdish' is only applicable when the owner already
owns it (and wants to retain what he owns).
(a) We just established our Mishnah like Rebbi Nasan (whom we referred to as
an individual opinion). This does not mean that the Halachah is not like him
(but like the Rabbanan) - because we have a principle 'S'tam be'Masnisin
u'Machlokes bi'Beraisa, Halachah ki'S'tam be'Masnisin'.
(b) We nevertheless refer to it as an individual opinion - in order to
justify Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon disagreement (though a Tana is not
really bound by other opinions).
(c) The same principle - would not apply if an Amora, in refuting a Kashya
directed at him from a S'tam Mishnah, answered 'Yechida'ah Hi'. In that
case, we would rule like the Amora, and not like the S'tam Mishnah.
(d) The Rabbanan of Rebbi Nasan ('Hikdishan Melei'in, Mo'alin BAahen
u'va'Meh she'be'Tochan') either hold - 'be'Ayin Yafah Makdish' (even though
they hold 'be'Ayin Ra'ah Mocher'), or like Rebbi Nasan, that both a seller
and a Makdish sell and us Makdish generously.