ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Basra 70
BAVA BASRA 70 - Sponsored by Rabbi Kenny Cohen of Yerushalayim, in honor of
his Rebbi, Rabbi Gedalya Rabinowitz.
(a) Rav Acha bar Huna asked Rav Sheishes whether, when the seller declared
'Chutz mi'Cheruv P'loni' or 'Chutz mi'Sadan P'loni', the purchaser acquires
all other carob or sycamore trees, or whether it is only the one he
specified that he does not acquire. Rav Acha is referring to - 'Ch'ruv
ha'Murkav ve'Sadan ha'Shikmah.'
(b) Rav Sheishes replied - 'Lo Kanah' (that he does not acquire any of
(c) Considering that the seller specified only one field, the logic behind
Rav Sheishes ruling is - the fact that a Ch'ruv ha'Murkav and a Sadan
ha'Shikmah are not sold anyway, so why should that change just because of
(d) Nevertheless, he chose to specify that particular tree ...
1. ... according to Rebbi Akiva (who holds Mocher be'Ayin Yafah Hu Mocher) -
in order to retain a path to get to it.
2. ... according to the Rabbanan (who hold Mocher be'Ayin Ra'ah Hu Mocher) -
in order to reinforce his rights on it (in the way that we explained on the
(a) Rav Acha queried Rav Sheishes however, from the Beraisa which says, in
the same case, 'Lo Kanah', which he interpreted to mean that he did not
acquire that Charuv, but that he did acquire all the other carob-trees in
the field (a Kashya on Rav Sheishes).
(b) To which Rav Sheishes replied - that 'Lo Kanah' extended to the other
carob-trees in the field, too.
(c) He proved his answer from a case of someone who sold his field,
stipulating 'Chutz mi'Sadeh P'lonis' - where it is obvious that he did sell
him all his other fields. In our case too, a Ch'ruv ha'Murkav and a Sadan
ha'Shikmah are considered as separate fields (like we explained earlier).
(d) The underlying S'vara behind both cases is - that if Reuven sells Shimon
one field and then acts stupidly by (unnecessarily) precluding another of
his fields from the sale, he is not going to sell him all his other fields,
on the basis of the one that he stupidly precluded (though this seems to
clash with the respective S'varos that we gave earlier according to Rebbi
Akiva and the Rabbanan).
(a) Some texts read (in Rav Sheishes' answer) 'Ela li'Demei, Hachi Nami
li'Demei' which means - that when Reuven said 'Chutz mi'Sadeh P'lonis' or
'Chutz mi'Cheruv' or 'mi'Sadan P'loni', he meant to deduct from the field
that he was selling him an area to the value of that specified field or
(b) In the second Lashon, even Rav Acha bar Huna took for granted that in
the case of 'Chutz mi'Cheruv P'loni, Chutz mi'Sadan P'loni', the seller has
not sold all his other fields, and the She'eilah he asked was whether, if he
said 'Chutz mi'Chatzi Ch'ruv P'loni ... ', he meant to include the other
half of the Ch'ruv or the Sadan in the sale, or whether it too, was
precluded, like the other trees were.
(c) To which Rav Sheishes replied 'Lo Kanah' (like he did in the first
(d) When the Beraisa says (with regard to the same case) 'Sha'ar Charuvin Lo
Kanah' - the Tana means to incorporate the other half of the tree that he
precluded from the sale.
(a) Rav Amram asked Rav Chisda whether, in a case where Reuven deposited
something by Shimon with a Sh'tar, he is believed if he claims that he had
returned it. He might ...
1. ... be believed, because of a 'Migu' - that he could have claimed that
the article was lost, broke or died be'O'nes (in which case, he would have
been believed with a Shevu'ah).
(b) Even though Shimon is believed in spite of the Sh'tar, the Sh'tar
serves - to counter Shimon, should he claim 'Lo ha'Dam' ('Lo Hayu ha'Devarim
me'Olam'), denying that he ever received the Pikadon.
2. ... not be believed (in spite of the 'Migu') - because the owner can
claim 'Sh'tarcha be'Yadi Mai Ba'i' (What is your Sh'tar doing with me? You
should have taken it back when you paid?) And this is similar to a 'Migu
(c) There is no point in calling the witnesses and asking them whether his
claim is true - because we ruled in the previous Perek 'ha'Mafkid es
Chavero be'Eidim, Eino Tzarich le'Par'o be'Eidim'.
(a) Shimon counters Reuven's claim 'Sh'tarcha be'Yadi Mai Ba'i' - with the
argument that had he claimed 'Ne'ensu', he would have been believed, despite
the fact that Reuven was holding the Sh'tar.
(b) The fact that Shimon did not ask for the Sh'tar back when he purportedly
returned the article is not a proof that he did not return it - due to the
combination that a. it sometimes happens that the owner claims that he has
lost the Sh'tar (in which case the trustee cannot get it), and b. the
trustee is not worried about this in the knowledge that he will always be
able to say that an O'nes occurred, and be believed, Sh'tar or no Sh'tar.
(c) A debtor, by the same token, is not believed when he claims that he
paid - because seeing as he cannot exempt himself by claiming 'Ne'ensu',
when paying his debt, he has no business to leave the Sh'tar with the
creditor, (and is therefore not believed when he claims that he paid).
(d) The apparent problem with the 'Migu' that had Shimon claimed 'Ne'ensu,
he would have had to swear (as the Torah writes in Mishpatim "Shevu'as
Hashem Tih'yeh Bein Sh'neihem"), is no problem at all - because in our case
too, Shimon is only believed with a Shevu'ah.
(a) The Daynei Golah and the Daynei Eretz Yisrael argue in a Beraisa (see
Rashash) about a Sh'tar Kis that Reuven produces against Shimon's Yesomim.
We already learned that the Daynei Golah are Shmuel and Karna; the Daynei
Eretz Yisrael are - Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Asi.
(b) The Din of a Sh'tar Kis is determined by the ruling of the Neherda'i (in
Bava Metzi'a) - that an Iska (where Reuven makes a deal with Shimon, whereby
he provides the cash which Shimon goes on to invest in goods, and they share
the profits. A Sh'tar Kis is the Sh'tar that Shimon gives Reuven upon
receipt of the money.
(c) The significance of the Neherdai's ruling that Iska is half a loan and
half a Pikadon is - that Reuven bears responsibility for the half that is a
Pikadon (should any sort of O'nes occur), whilst Shimon accepts
responsibility for the half that is a loan.
(d) The significance of Reuven's oath (bearing in mind that it normally the
defendant who swears) is - based on the principle that one cannot claim from
Yesomim without a Shevu'ah.
(a) In the current case, the Yesomim claim - that their father may have (or
that he did) return the Pikadon.
(b) We know that the Yosemite's father did not specifically inform his sons
that the Pikadon had not been returned - only because the Yesomim are
obligated to swear to that effect?
(c) If Reuven had produced a Sh'tar-Chov against them, both would have
agreed that Reuven would swear and claim his debt. And that is what the
Daynei Golah hold in this case. The Daynei Eretz Yisrael however rule - that
he swears and claims half (the half that is a loan).
(d) We suggest that Rav Chisda who just believed the trustee in spite of the
Sh'tar held by the owner - follows the opinion of the Daynei Eretz Yisrael.
(a) We conclude however, that even the Daynei Golah would concede to Rav
Chisda that, in a case that did not involve Yesomim, the trustee is
believed. What makes a case which does involve Yesomim different - is the
fact that, had their father paid, he would have informed them of the fact
before his death.
(b) The Daynei Eretz Yisrael counter this argument however, by pointing
out - that death may have overcome him before he had a chance to do so.
(a) Rav Huna bar Avin issued two rulings a. 'ha'Mafkid Eitzel Chavero
bi'Sh'tar, ve'Amar Lo Hechzartiv Lach Ne'eman', and b. 'Sh'tar Kis ha'Yotzei
al ha'Yesomim Nishba ve'Govah ha'Kol'. 'Tarti'? means - that the two
statements are an apparent contradiction.
(b) We resolve the problem - in exactly the same way as we did to reconcile
Rav Chisda with the Daynei Golah (by differentiating between a regular case
of trustee, and one which involves Yesomim).
(a) Rava rules (in the above Machlokes) - 'Nishba ve'Govah Mechtzah' (like
the Daynei Eretz Yisrael).
(b) Mar Zutra, who rules like the Daynei Golah, reconciles his ruling with
that of Rava - by pointing out that he learned the opinions of the Daynei
Golah and the Daynei Eretz Yisrael in the reverse.
(c) And in the Sugya in Shevu'os, where, in order to clarify a certain issue
there, Rami bar Chama establishes the Halachah that even those who hold
'ha'Malveh es Chavero be'Eidim, Ein Tzarich le'Par'o be'Eidim' concede that
'ha'Malveh es Chavero bi'Sh'tar, Tzarich le'Par'o bi'Sh'tar', Rava's silence
is not an indication of admission, as is evident from our Sugya, where he
rules like Rav Chisda (and the opinion of Rami bar Chama remains his own).
Alternatively, we do not remain with the outcome there, which equates Rava
with Rami bar Chama.
(d) Ravina and Rav Ashi inserts the previous Sugya (beginning with Rav
Amram's She'eilah of 'ha'Mafkid es Chavero bi'Sh'tar') in this Perek -
because of the opinion of the Daynei Golah, which occurred in the previous
Sugya (and who are otherwise rarely quoted).