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Bava Basra 52

BAVA BASRA 52 & 53 - these Dafim have been dedicated anonymously l'Iluy Nishmas Tzirel Nechamah bas Tuvya Yehudah.



(a) The Beraisa (regarding the Din of receiving a Pikadon from a woman, an Eved or a Katan) concludes that if any of them leave instructions at the time of death, to return the Pikadon to whoever it might be, one follows the instructions. The Tana refers specifically to the time of death - (not to preclude a case where they did so in their lifetime, but) because otherwise, in most cases, seeing as they could return the Pikadon themselves, the instructions would not be necessary.

(b) When the Tana adds 've'Im La'av, Ya'aseh Pirush le'Pirushan', he means - that if one does not trust them, one returns the Pikadon to the respective master, in spite of their instructions.

(c) It cannot however, mean that if they did instructions, the Pikadon is automatically returned to husband, the master or the father ... - because that would merely be repeating what the Tana already said in the Reisha.

(a) Some versions add 've'Ika de'Amri, Ya'aseh Pirush le'Pirushan', implying that one does follow their instructions at all, but always returns the Pikadon to the husband, master or father ... .

(b) This too, we reject however, on the grounds - that in the case that follows, Rav will then be ruling neither like the Reisha of the Beraisa nor like the Seifa.

(c) When the wife of Rabah bar bar Chanah died, she left instructions to hand a set of very expensive ear-rings to Marsa and his grandsons. Marsa was one of Rebbi Chiya's brothers.

(d) According to the first Lashon, Rav instructed Rabah bar bar Chanah to follow the previous ruling (depending on whether his wife was trustworthy or not). According to the second Lashon, he ordered him - to assess the financial status of the person that his wife claimed owned them (to ascertain whether she might have owned such expensive ear-rings or not) (according to others, to ascertain whether his wife had attained the required social status to have such wealthy friends).

(a) We learned in the Beraisa with regard to someone who accepted a Pikadon from a Katan 'Ya'aseh Lo Segulah'. Rav Chisda interprets this to mean that he should sell it and invest in a Seifer-Torah - Reading in the Sefer is considered Peiros.

(b) What does Rabah bar Rav Huna says - that they should buy the Katan a date-palm, from which he eats the Peiros.

(c) They do not suggest investing in a business - because of the risk that it might fail.

(a) We learned in our Mishnah that a father and son cannot establish a Chazakah on each other. Rav Yosef says 'Afilu Chalku', by which he means - that this ruling applies even if the son left his father's house and became independent.

(b) Rava says - that once the son leaves, they can establish a Chazakah on each other (like we explained in our Mishnah).

(c) The general consensus of opinion in this matter (Rav Papi and Rav Nachman bar Ya'akov) is like Rava.

(d) The Beraisa states that once a son leaves his father's domain and a woman receives a divorce from her husband - they are like two strangers (with regard to establishing a Chazakah on each other).

(a) According to Rav, if, following the death of the father, the eldest brother is managing the affairs of the house, and there are Onos (Sh'tarei Mechirah) and Sh'taros signed in his name, the onus lies on him to prove that the Sh'taros are in fact, his, and not the joint property of the siblings. He claimed to have received the property that he purportedly sold - from his maternal grandfather (assuming that his brothers were half-brothers from his father's side).

(b) Rav's reason is - because (despite the fact that the Sh'taros are written in his name), on the one hand, we do know that he is the sole agent for the joint property of him and his siblings (the whose documents are all written on his name), and on the other hand, we are not aware of his owning any property personally.

(c) According to Shmuel, the burden of proof lies with his siblings (since the Sh'taros in question are written in his name).

(d) Shmuel referred to Rav as 'Aba', because that was his real name ('Aba Aricha'). We call him 'Rav' - because he was the Rebbe of Bavel (like 'Rebbi' was thus called because he was the Rebbe of Eretz Yisrael).

(a) Shmuel maintains that once the eldest brother died, Rav would concede to Shmuel that (assuming that he left behind heirs) it would be up to the brothers to prove that they were joint owners - because the heirs of the deceased brother would not be able to prove that the property belonged to his father.

(b) Rav Papa objects to Shmuel's ruling - on the grounds that the Din of 'To'anin le'Yoresh' is confined to claiming on behalf of the heir what the father might have claimed (and had the father asked for the onus of proof to be switched to his brothers [according to Rav], his claim would have been dismissed).

(c) This case is worse that a case where, after living on the property for three years, the heirs claim that they received it from their father, who had previously lived on the property for one day, where they are believed, even though their father would not have been - because there, we claim on the Yesomim's behalf that their father purchased the field, an argument which he could have presented himself, and on which he would have been believed.

(d) Rav Papa substantiated his Kashya by citing a ruling of Rava, who ruled that the pair of wool-comer's scissors which Yesomim inherited from their father was to be returned forthwith - because the original owner had witnesses that their father had borrowed them from him (whereas according to Shmuel, Rava ought to have asked the owner to substantiate his claim).

(a) Rava's ruling in turn, was based on a statement of Rav Huna bar Avin, who ruled - that objects that people tend to lend or to rent out must be returned, and the borrower is not believed to say that he bought it without solid proof that he did.

(b) The final comment regarding Rav Papa's query on Shmuel's ruling is -'Kashya'.

(c) Rabeinu Chananel draws a distinction between 'Tiyuvta' - which is final, and 'Kashya' - which is not (meaning that we know that the Kashya is answerable, though we don't know what the answer is).

(d) We reject this distinction - because we maintain that there is no difference, in fact, between the two, except that, when the Kashya is from a Mishnah or Beraisa, Chazal use the Lashon 'Tiyuvta', and when it is based on a statement of an Amora, 'Kashya'.

(a) The Rashbam rules completely like Rav (in spite of the principle that the Halachah is like Shmuel in money-matters) - because Rav Chisda and Rabah and Rav Sheishes hold like Rav, and what's more, Rav has the support of a Beraisa (as we shall see shortly).

(b) Rabeinu Chananel quoting Reb Yisrael Gaon rules -like Rav (not the way Shmuel quoted him) in the case where the eldest brother died.




(a) Rav Chisda qualifies Rav's ruling (that the onus of proof of ownership lies with the elder brother) - by confining it to where everything is shared, but if for example, they each make their own dough, he will no longer need to prove that the Sh'taros are indeed his (because we will then say that he saved up the extra bits of dough to obtain funds to purchase his own property).

(b) According to Rabah, the proof Rav requires is witnesses. According to Rav Sheishes - it will suffice to verify his Sh'tar in Beis-Din.

(c) They must be arguing according to Rav, and not Shmuel - because according to Shmuel, Rav Chisda should have said that the siblings must invalidate their brother's Sh'tar (not verify it).

(d) Based on the fact that there is no indication or reason to rule like one more than the other, Rabeinu Chananel rules - like Rabah, because Rav Chisda agrees with his ruling (whereas Rabah does not agree with that of Rav Chisda).

(a) Rava asked Rav Nachman whether he held like Rav or Shmuel, Rabah or Rav Sheishes, to which he replied - that he only knows of a Beraisa which supports Rav (though it gives no indication whether it follows the opinion of Rabah or Rav Sheishes).

(b) The Beraisa incorporates in this ruling - the case of an Almanah whom Beis-Din appointed as an Apotropus over the Yesomim's property, and who, like the eldest brother, must bring proof that any Sh'taros that are written in her name, she inherited independently.

(c) The Tana introduces the latter with 've'Chein' (implying 'even an Almanah'), because we might otherwise have thought that the woman is believed more than the eldest brother, on account of the great honor that she deems it to be trusted by Beis-Din in this way (and for which reason she would not dream of claiming anything belonging to the Yesomim).

(d) Nevertheless, perhaps she is not believed - because we suspect her of taking liberties, in return for looking after the Yesomim's property free of charge (see Tosfos DH 'de'Tarcha').

(e) The Tana mentions that the Almanah inherited the Sh'taros from her paternal grandfather (not to preclude if she inherited them from her father, which would make no difference to the ruling, but) - to balance the Reisha, which speaks about the eldest brother inheriting the property from his maternal grandmother, as we explained above.

11) The Tana states 'Bameh Devarim Amurim be'Machzik', and concludes 'Aval Nosen Matanah ve'ha'Achin she'Chalku ve'ha'Machzik be'Nechsei ha'Ger, Na'al, Gadar u'Paratz, Harei Zu Chazakah' (even though the two statements seem to clash) - because his opening words refer to a three-year Chazakah with a claim, whereas his final phrase refer to a Kinyan Chazakah, which takes effect immediately.


(a) Rav Hoshaya (or Sheravya) cites a Beraisa be'Kidushin de'Bei Levi: 'Na'al, Gadar u'Paratz Kol she'Hu be'Fanav, Harei Zu Chazakah' - with reference to a regular Kinyan Chazakah pertaining to a sale.

(b) We might infer from here that if the purchaser made the Kinyan not in the seller's presence, then he does not acquire the property, but Rava interprets it to mean - that if the Kinyan takes place in the seller's presence, then he does need to instruct the purchaser to go and acquire it, whereas if it takes place outside of his presence, he does ...

(c) ... even if the latter has already paid, in a place that is, where a transaction concerning Karka requires a Sh'tar.

(d) Even in such a place however, the purchaser will acquire the field with money alone - if the seller stipulated that he should.

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