ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Basra 46
BAVA BASRA 46 & 47 - dedicated by Reb Gedalia Weinberger of New York, an
Ohev Torah and Marbitz Torah whose tireless efforts on behalf of Klal
Yisroel have produced enormous benefits for the Lomdei Hadaf over the years.
(a) The Beraisa states that if Reuven received a different cloak than the
one that he gave ...
1. ... to repair, from the tailor - he is permitted to wear it until the
owner comes to pick it up.
(b) It ought to be forbidden to use the coat in the Reisha no less than in
the Seifa - because of the principle 'Sho'el she'Lo mi'Da'as Gazlan Hu'.
2. ... to the doorman to hang up at a Beis-Avel or at a wedding - he is
forbidden to wear it.
(c) Rav asked Rebbi Chiya this Kashya. He replied - that we assume that the
owner of the coat that Reuven received asked the tailor to sell the cloak
for him, and by mistake, he sold Reuven's cloak, and paid the owner (see
(d) This only applies however, if the Uman himself returned the wrong coat,
but not if it was his wife of children who returned it. Rav Chiya B'rei
de'Rav Nachman qualifies the concession even if the Uman himself was the one
who returned it - confining it to where he returned the cloak S'tam; but if
he said 'Here's *your* cloak', then it is evident that he erred and Reuven
is prohibited to wear it.
(a) Abaye volunteered to show Rava the swindlers of Pumbedisa. When Reuven
claimed that he had witnesses that the coat that he saw by him was the one
that he had given him to repair, the Uman would counter - that it was not
the same coat.
(b) Reuven could not take the coat on the basis of that evidence - because
the witnesses only caught a glimpse of a coat that resembled Reuven's, but
did not get a chance to look at it properly to ascertain that it really was.
(c) When Reuven asked the Uman to produce the coat for the witnesses to
identify - he refused.
(d) Rava justified the Uman's behavior - based on the Beraisa (that we
discussed on the previous Daf) which rules against the Uman provided the
owner saw (and recognized) the article. Otherwise, he has no claim against
(a) Rav Ashi advised Reuven (if he was smart) - to pull the Uman aside and
admit that he owes him a large sum of money, which is presumably why he is
holding on to the coat, and that if they assessed its value together, it may
turn out to be worth more than the debt, in which case, he was willing to
pay his debt, and redeem his coat.
(b) According to Rav Acha B'rei de'Rav Ivya, if the Uman was smart - he
would decline his offer, on the grounds that the assessors had already
assessed it and that, in fact, it was not worth more than the debt.
(a) When we ask on our Mishnah that denies an Aris the right to establish a
Chazakah 'Amai, Ad ha'Idna Palga ve'Hashta Kula', we mean to ask - why it is
not a Chazakah, seeing as an Aris takes only half the produce, whilst the
Aris in our Mishnah, took the entire harvest (which the owner would
certainly not have allowed him to do, unless he had actually purchased it).
(b) Rebbi Yochanan answers 'Masnisin be'Arisi Batei Avos'. What
distinguishes Arisei Batei Avos from other Arisin - is the fact that they
are hired for life (and after their death, the contract extends to their
(c) Rebbi Yochanan means - that unlike regular Arisin, who would generally
divide the crops with the owner on an annual rote basis, the Arisei Batei
Avos and the owner would take two or three years each alternately, thereby
making a Chazakah impossible.
(a) If an Aris Batei Avos brought other Arisin down to the field to work
there, he establishes a Chazakah - because the owner would not allow him to
send other Arisin down to the field in his place without his express
(b) Even this will not constitute a Chazakah however - if he distributed the
work among the Arisin with his own participation, because we assume that if
the work proves too much for the Aris, the owner authorizes him to get other
Arisin to assist him.
(a) Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda asked Rav Nachman bar Ya'akov (see Tosfos)
whether an Aris may testify - whether if someone claimed the field from his
employer, he was permitted to testify on his behalf, or whether, since he
received fruit from the field, he was prejudiced.
(b) Rav Yosef, who was sitting in front of Rav Nachman, quoted Shmuel, who
ruled in the affirmative. The problem with this ruling is - that the Tana of
a Beraisa rules 'Eino Me'id'.
(c) Rav Yosef reconciles Shmuel with the Beraisa by establishing the latter
when there is fruit in the field, by which he means - that the Aris has not
yet taken his portion of the fruit. Consequently, it lies in his interest to
ensure that his employer retains ownership of the field. Otherwise, the
claimant will take the field, together with the fruit (as is the Din
regarding a Nigzal).
(d) Whereas Shmuel speaks when there is no more fruit in the field, because
he has already received his portion (Rabeinu Gershom), in which case it
makes no difference whether his employer retains the field or loses it. Nor
is he prejudiced inasmuch as the owner will probably hire him again next
year if the field remains in his possession - because firstly, it is easy to
find employment as an Aris, and secondly, there is no guarantee that he will
not hire him someone else the following year.
(a) A creditor or the guarantor may testify on behalf of the debtor -
provided he has another field from which to claim.
(b) We do not consider the guarantor prejudiced even then, because if the
debtor has another field, it will save problems should he have other
creditors, who will otherwise take the one field, leaving the guarantor with
the obligation of giving the second creditor the other one - because it is
too far-fetched (to worry that a. the debtor will not pay his debt on time,
and b. that he has other debtors who will claim his field).
(c) The first purchaser may also testify for the second purchaser only if he
has another field. This means that if Reuven sold one field to Levi and
another, to Yehudah, Levi may testify on behalf of Yehudah (against Shimon's
claims) if either Yehudah has another field that he bought from Reuven or if
Reuven himself still possesses a field that he did not yet sell (or even if
he sold it to Yisachar after selling to Yehudah).
(d) Otherwise Levi is forbidden to testify on his behalf - because he is
prejudiced inasmuch as, once Yehudah loses the field that he bought from
Reuven, Reuven's creditor will turn to him.
(a) On the other hand, the second purchaser (Yehudah), is permitted to
testify on behalf of the first one (Levi), whether he (the first purchaser
or the seller) has other fields or not - because either way, the creditor
always goes to the second purchaser first.
(b) This too, will be prohibited however - if Reuven sold Levi the field
with Achrayus and does have other fields from which he can claim, because
then, should Levi lose his field to Reuven's creditor, he will turn to him.
(c) An Areiv Kablan is an Areiv who takes the money from the creditor and
hands it to the debtor. As opposed to an ordinary Areiv, from whom the
creditor cannot claim as long as the debtor is able to pay, an Areiv Kablan
must be prepared to pay should the creditor decide to go to him first (even
if the debtor has the money [see Rashash]).
(d) Some say that an Areiv Kablan may testify for the debtor, provided he
has another field (just like an ordinary Areiv can). Others forbid it -
because the more fields the debtor has, the more chance that the creditor
will claim one of them, and leave him alone.
(a) An Areiv who possesses Beinonis (medium-quality fields) might find it
worthwhile to testify on behalf of a debtor - who otherwise owns Ziburis, if
the field in question is Beinonis (because in doing so, he encourages the
creditor to claim from the debtor and not from him).
(b) If a regular Areiv owns Beinonis and the debtor Ziburis (poor-quality
fields) - then the creditor has no right to claim from the Areiv, only from