ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Basra 45
BAVA BASRA 44-55 - sponsored by Harav Ari Bergmann of Lawrence, N.Y., out of
love for the Torah and for those who study it.
(a) We discussed earlier the ruling of Ravin bar Shmuel 'ha'Mocher Sadeh
la'Chavero she'Lo be'Achryus Ein Me'id Lo Aleheh Mipnei she'Ma'amidah
bi'Fenei Ba'al-Chovo'. He cannot be speaking when Shimon (the seller) owns
other fields - because then there would be no reason for him to be
prejudiced that the field remains in Levi's.
(b) On the other hand, even though Shmuel is speaking when the disputed
field was his only property, Shimon nevertheless wants the disputed field to
remain in the purchaser's possession - so that, should his creditor claim
his debt, he will be able to claim the field from Levi, and not accuse him
of being "a Loveh Rasha ve'Lo Yeshalem".
(c) Should the claimant win the case, on the other hand, Levi will not then
be able to accuse Shimon of being "a Loveh Rasha ve'Lo Yeshalem" - because
that is precisely why he sold him the field without Achrayus. Consequently,
it is to his advantage that field remain with Levi, and not fall into the
Reshus of the claimant.
(a) Rava (or Rav Papa) made an important announcement, which he wanted
everyone to know. When he said 'de'Salkin le'Eila, u'de'Nachsin le'Tata', he
meant - both those who go from Bavel to Eretz Yisrael and those who go from
Eretz Yisrael to Bavel.
(b) He announced that if Reuven sold Shimon a donkey and a Nochri took it
from him by force - Reuven is obligated to approach the Nochri with
witnesses, and try and induce him to return it.
(c) This will only apply however, if the Nochri took the donkey but not the
saddle - because this proves that his claim on the donkey was genuine
(otherwise he would have taken the saddle too).
(d) The second condition that is required before Reuven is obligated to make
the effort on behalf of Shimon is - that Shimon does not actually recognize
the donkey as having belonged to him (Reuven), because if he did, then
Reuven is absolved.
(a) Reuven will not be obligated to talk the Nochri into returning the
donkey to Shimon if either the two conditions are not met - because then we
assume the Nochri to have forced the donkey out of Shimon's Reshus
unlawfully, in which case Reuven has no obligations to take any action on
(b) If it had been a Yisrael who coerced Shimon into handing him the donkey,
the Din would have differed - inasmuch as a Yisrael has no right to force
anyone to give him his donkey, without taking him to Beis-Din. Consequently,
Shimon should not have given it to him in the first place, and Reuven is
absolved from taking any action.
(c) Ameimar disagrees with Rava. According to him - based on the Pasuk in
Tehilim "Asher Pihem Diber Shav, vi'Yeminam Yemin Shaker", the Nochri's
claim is discredited whatever the circumstances, and Reuven is under no
obligation to reclaim the donkey on his behalf.
(a) We learned in our Mishnah that an Uman has no Chazakah. Rabah restricts
this to where the owner handed the article with witnesses - where he is not
believed to say that he purchased it, even if the article was not seen in
his possession, because Rabah holds 'ha'Mafkid Eitzel Chavero be'Eidim
Tzarich le'Par'o be'Eidim' (someone who is given a Pikadon with witnesses,
must return it with witnesses [depriving him of a 'Migu' that he could have
said that he returned the article]).
(b) If he claimed that he gave the article back in front of witnesses, who
then left for overseas - he would be believed.
(c) He is not however believed, to say that he returned the article without
witnesses since he could have claimed that he returned it in front of two
witnesses who then went overseas - because (bearing in mind the definition
of 'Migu' - that we believe the current claim, because if the defendant
wanted to lie, he could have told a better lie), this cannot be considered
'a better lie', since when the witnesses later return and refute his claim,
he will proved to be a liar ('Milsa de'Avidi Liglu'yi').
(a) If the article was handed over to him without witnesses, the Uman will
be believed - because he has a 'Migu' to claim that he bought the article,
since he could have denied it altogether.
(b) This concession will apply - even if witnesses saw the article in his
possession, because he still has a 'Migu' that he could have denied having
received it from him (but from someone else to whom the original owner had
sold it in hi presence).
(c) Abaye asked Rabah why the 'Migu' was not applicable even if the owner
handed the Uman the article with witnesses, to which Rabah replied with the
principle - 'ha'Mafkid Eitzel Chavero be'Eidim Tzarich le'Par'o be'Eidim',
whereas Abaye holds 'Ein Tzarich le'Par'o be'Eidim' (in which case the 'Migu
will apply even if the Uman received the article with witnesses).
(a) In a case where Reuven queries the Uman about his Eved, whom witnesses
find training with him, or his cloak which they spot with the laundryman,
assuming that the latter replies ...
1. ... 'You gave him to me as a gift, the Beraisa rules - that *he is not
(b) Even though, in the case of the cloak, the Tana is speaking about an
immediate Chazakah, the case of the Eved must be speaking about one of three
years - because otherwise, in view of the principle 'ha'Godros Ein Lahen
Chazakah', why does the Tana present the case of an Uman (implying that
someone other than an Uman would have a Chazakah)?
2. ... 'You asked Levi to give him/it to me as a gift, the Beraisa rules
that he *is*.
(c) Rava establishes the Seifa when they found the Eved or the cloak in the
Reshus of Levi, from whom Reuven now claims it. The case is when the
defendant claims that in his presence, Reuven instructed the Uman or the
laundryman to hand him the Eved or the cloak as a gift.
(d) And he is believed - like any purchaser who is not an Uman (because of
(a) The Reisha however, presents the case of 'Ra'ah'. Assuming that there
were witnesses who saw that the article was handed over for repairs, Rava
now asks on Rabah from the Reisha, 'Ra'ah Avdo be'Yad Uman ... Lo Amar
K'lum' - why the Tana needs to say 'Ra'ah', considering that Rabah holds
'ha'Mafkid Eitzel Chavero be'Eidim, Tzarich le'Par'o be'Eidim' (even if he
did not see the article by the Uman)?
(b) Rava tries to extrapolate from this - that the Tana must be speaking
when there are no witnesses, and that nevertheless the Uman is not believed
with a 'Migu' once the owner has seen the article by him, like Metaltelin
that one tends to lend or hire out (on which one cannot establish a
(c) ... a Kashya on Rabah, who maintains that even Ra'ah is believed unless
there are witnesses too.
(d) Rabah answers - that the Beraisa is speaking when there are both
witnesses and he saw the article by the Uman/laundryman (in which case he
can neither claim to have bought it nor that he returned it). And although
earlier, Rabah had maintained that witnesses alone were sufficient reason to
break his 'Migu', he now retracted from that view.
(a) Rabah and Abaye now argue exclusively - whether 'Ra'ah' has the same Din
as articles that one tends to end or rent out, on which one cannot establish
a Chazakah (Abaye), or not (Rabah).
(b) In a case where the Uman claims that Reuven fixed a price of two Zuz to
repair his cloak, whereas Reuven counters that he promised him only one, the
Tana rules that as long as the Uman still has the cloak in his possession -
he is believed ...
(c) ... with a 'Migu', because he could have claimed that he bought the
(d) If the dispute arises after the Uman has already returned it - then
'Toch Zemano' the Uman is believed with a Shevu'ah, but le'Achar Zemano, he
will have to prove his claim ('ha'Motzi me'Chavero Alav ha'Re'ayah').
(a) In spite of the principle 'Ein Nishba'in ve'Notlin', the Tana rules in
the case of 'Toch Zemano' - that the Uman swears and takes, because the
owner is too busy paying all his employees to remember exactly which one he
has paid and which ones he hasn't (so Chazal switched the Shevu'ah from the
defendant to the claimant).
(b) The reason that the Uman is believed is because he has a 'Migu' (because
he could have claimed that he bought the cloak). Rava attempts to prove
Rabah's viewpoint from there - based on the current assumption that they saw
the article by the Uman, yet the Uman is believed with a 'Migu' (like
(c) We refute the proof however - by establishing the Beraisa when there
were neither witnesses who saw the article handed over for repairs, nor are
there witnesses who subsequently saw it in the Uman's Reshus.
(a) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak extrapolates from our Mishnah 'Uman Ein Li
Chazakah' - that anyone other than an Uman does have a Chazakah.
(b) The Beraisa cannot be speaking when Reuven handed the article to the
Uman with witnesses - because, then, seeing as there are witnesses that the
owner handed it to him for repairs, and in addition, we assume (as we shall
see shortly), that it was subsequently seen by the Uman, it is obvious that
the Uman would not be believed, any more than an Aris or an Apotropus.
(c) Rava finally proves Rabah wrong from there - because we see that on the
basis of 'Ra'ah' alone, the Uman is not believed.
(d) Neither can we refute this proof by establishing the Mishnah when the
article was not seen in the Reshus of the Uman - because then even an Uman
would be unanimously believed, as we learned earlier.